Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y

[Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>]

On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 10:18 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> wrote:
> The patchsets help to produce KASAN report when size is negative numbers
> in memory operation function. It is helpful for programmer to solve the
> undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
> suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.
>
> [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/
>
> Walter Wu (2):
> kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
> kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove
>
>  lib/test_kasan.c          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  mm/kasan/common.c         | 13 ++++++++-----
>  mm/kasan/generic.c        |  5 +++++
>  mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>  mm/kasan/tags.c           |  5 +++++
>  mm/kasan/tags_report.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
>  6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
>
>
>
> commit 5b3b68660b3d420fd2bd792f2d9fd3ccb8877ef7
> Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
> Date:   Fri Oct 4 18:38:31 2019 +0800
>
>     kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
>
>     It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative numbers to
> memset()/memcpy()/memmove()
>     , so need to be detected by KASAN.
>
>     If size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons to be defined
> as out-of-bounds bug type.
>     1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a
> large
>     size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this
> can
>     qualify as out-of-bounds.
>     2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports
> by
>     some systems, e.g. syzbot.
>
>     KASAN report:
>
>      BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
>      Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task
> cat/72
>
>      CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted
> 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
>      Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
>      Call trace:
>       dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
>       show_stack+0x14/0x20
>       dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
>       print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
>       __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
>       kasan_report+0xc/0x18
>       check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
>       memmove+0x34/0x88
>       kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
>
>     [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
>
>     Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
>     Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
>     Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
>  #undef memset
>  void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
>  {
> -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> +               return NULL;
>
>         return __memset(addr, c, len);
>  }
> @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
>  #undef memmove
>  void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>  {
> -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> +       !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> +               return NULL;
>
>         return __memmove(dest, src, len);
>  }
> @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t
> len)
>  #undef memcpy
>  void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>  {
> -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> +       !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> +               return NULL;
>
>         return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
>  }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool
> check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
>         if (unlikely(size == 0))
>                 return true;
>
> +       if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> +               kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> +               return false;
> +       }
> +
>         if (unlikely((void *)addr <
>                 kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
>                 kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> index 36c645939bc9..ed0eb94cb811 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> @@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct
> kasan_access_info *info)
>
>  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>  {
> +       /*
> +        * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> +        * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> +        * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> +        * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> +        * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> +        * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> reports
> +        * by some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> +        */
> +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> +               return "out-of-bounds";

"out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. It won't
prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the frequent one.

>         if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr))
>                 return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
>         return get_wild_bug_type(info);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t
> size, bool write,
>         if (unlikely(size == 0))
>                 return true;
>
> +       if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> +               kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> +               return false;
> +       }
> +
>         tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
>
>         /*
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> index 969ae08f59d7..012fbe3a793f 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,18 @@
>
>  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>  {
> +       /*
> +        * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> +        * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> +        * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> +        * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> +        * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> +        * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> reports
> +        * by some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> +        */
> +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> +               return "out-of-bounds";
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
>         struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
>         struct kmem_cache *cache;
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> commit fb5cf7bd16e939d1feef229af0211a8616c9ea03
> Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
> Date:   Fri Oct 4 18:32:03 2019 +0800
>
>     kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove
>
>     Test size is negative vaule in memmove in order to verify
>     if it correctly get KASAN report.
>
>     Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init
> kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void)
>         kfree(ptr);
>  }
>
> +static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void)
> +{
> +       char *ptr;
> +       size_t size = 64;
> +
> +       pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n");
> +       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!ptr) {
> +               pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
> +               return;
> +       }
> +
> +       memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
> +       memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2);
> +       kfree(ptr);
> +}
> +
>  static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void)
>  {
>         char *ptr;
> @@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
>         kmalloc_oob_memset_4();
>         kmalloc_oob_memset_8();
>         kmalloc_oob_memset_16();
> +       kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size();
>         kmalloc_uaf();
>         kmalloc_uaf_memset();
>         kmalloc_uaf2();
>
>
>
>
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