Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 02:01:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2fP7yupg6Th+Hg0tL3o06p2PR1HtQcvy4Ro+Q5T2Nfkw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202009101634.52ED6751AD@keescook>

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 1:49 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 01:21:06PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > From: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
> >
> > To detect a fork brute force attack it is necessary to compute the
> > crashing rate of the application. This calculation is performed in each
> > fatal fail of a task, or in other words, when a core dump is triggered.
> > If this rate shows that the application is crashing quickly, there is a
> > clear signal that an attack is happening.
> >
> > Since the crashing rate is computed in milliseconds per fault, if this
> > rate goes under a certain threshold a warning is triggered.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/coredump.c          |  2 ++
> >  include/fbfam/fbfam.h  |  2 ++
> >  security/fbfam/fbfam.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  3 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> > index 76e7c10edfc0..d4ba4e1828d5 100644
> > --- a/fs/coredump.c
> > +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> > @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
> >  #include "internal.h"
> >
> >  #include <trace/events/sched.h>
> > +#include <fbfam/fbfam.h>
> >
> >  int core_uses_pid;
> >  unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
> > @@ -825,6 +826,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
> >  fail_creds:
> >       put_cred(cred);
> >  fail:
> > +     fbfam_handle_attack(siginfo->si_signo);
>
> I don't think this is the right place for detecting a crash -- isn't
> this only for the "dumping core" condition? In other words, don't you
> want to do this in get_signal()'s "fatal" block? (i.e. very close to the
> do_coredump, but without the "should I dump?" check?)
>
> Hmm, but maybe I'm wrong? It looks like you're looking at noticing the
> process taking a signal from SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK ?
>
> (Better yet: what are fatal conditions that do NOT match
> SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK, and should those be covered?)
>
> Regardless, *this* looks like the only place without an LSM hook. And it
> doesn't seem unreasonable to add one here. I assume it would probably
> just take the siginfo pointer, which is also what you're checking.

Good point, making this an LSM might be a good idea.

> e.g. for include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:
>
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_coredump, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo);

I guess it should probably be an LSM_RET_VOID hook? And since, as you
said, it's not really semantically about core dumping, maybe it should
be named task_fatal_signal or something like that.