From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>, Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Linux PCI <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>, USB list <linux-usb@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 06:36:18 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAPcyv4hP6mtzKS-CVb-aKf-kYuiLM771PMxN2zeBEfoj6NbctA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210930065953-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 4:03 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 06:05:09PM -0700, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote: > > Confidential guest platforms like TDX have a requirement to allow > > only trusted devices. By default the confidential-guest core will > > arrange for all devices to default to unauthorized (via > > dev_default_authorization) in device_initialize(). Since virtio > > driver is already hardened against the attack from the un-trusted host, > > override the confidential computing default unauthorized state > > > > Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> > > Architecturally this all looks backwards. IIUC nothing about virtio > makes it authorized or trusted. The driver is hardened, > true, but this should be set at the driver not the device level. That's was my initial reaction to this proposal as well, and I ended up leading Sathya astray from what Greg wanted. Greg rightly points out that the "authorized" attribute from USB and Thunderbolt already exists [1] [2]. So the choice is find an awkward way to mix driver trust with existing bus-local "authorized" mechanisms, or promote the authorized capability to the driver-core. This patch set implements the latter to keep the momentum on the already shipping design scheme to not add to the driver-core maintenance burden. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQuaJ78y8j1UmBoz@kroah.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQzF%2FutgrJfbZuHh@kroah.com/ > And in particular, not all virtio drivers are hardened - > I think at this point blk and scsi drivers have been hardened - so > treating them all the same looks wrong. My understanding was that they have been audited, Sathya? _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>, Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>, Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>, "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>, Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Linux PCI <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, USB list <linux-usb@vger.kernel.org>, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 06:36:18 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAPcyv4hP6mtzKS-CVb-aKf-kYuiLM771PMxN2zeBEfoj6NbctA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210930065953-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 4:03 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 06:05:09PM -0700, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote: > > Confidential guest platforms like TDX have a requirement to allow > > only trusted devices. By default the confidential-guest core will > > arrange for all devices to default to unauthorized (via > > dev_default_authorization) in device_initialize(). Since virtio > > driver is already hardened against the attack from the un-trusted host, > > override the confidential computing default unauthorized state > > > > Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> > > Architecturally this all looks backwards. IIUC nothing about virtio > makes it authorized or trusted. The driver is hardened, > true, but this should be set at the driver not the device level. That's was my initial reaction to this proposal as well, and I ended up leading Sathya astray from what Greg wanted. Greg rightly points out that the "authorized" attribute from USB and Thunderbolt already exists [1] [2]. So the choice is find an awkward way to mix driver trust with existing bus-local "authorized" mechanisms, or promote the authorized capability to the driver-core. This patch set implements the latter to keep the momentum on the already shipping design scheme to not add to the driver-core maintenance burden. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQuaJ78y8j1UmBoz@kroah.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQzF%2FutgrJfbZuHh@kroah.com/ > And in particular, not all virtio drivers are hardened - > I think at this point blk and scsi drivers have been hardened - so > treating them all the same looks wrong. My understanding was that they have been audited, Sathya?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-30 13:36 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 132+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-09-30 1:05 [PATCH v2 0/6] Add device filter support Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] driver core: Move the "authorized" attribute from USB/Thunderbolt to core Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 1:42 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 1:42 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 1:55 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 1:55 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 2:38 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 4:59 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 4:59 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 9:05 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2021-09-30 9:05 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2021-09-30 14:59 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 14:59 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 15:25 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 15:25 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 11:19 ` Yehezkel Bernat 2021-09-30 15:28 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 15:28 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 18:25 ` Yehezkel Bernat 2021-09-30 19:04 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 19:04 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 19:50 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 20:23 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 20:23 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] driver core: Add common support to skip probe for un-authorized devices Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 10:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 10:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 13:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 13:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 14:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 14:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 14:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 14:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 15:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 15:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 17:17 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 17:17 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 17:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 17:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 19:15 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 19:15 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-01 6:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-01 6:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-01 15:51 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 15:51 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 15:56 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-01 15:56 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 14:43 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 14:43 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 14:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 14:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:32 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 15:32 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 15:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 14:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 14:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:35 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 15:35 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 15:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 19:23 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 19:23 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 20:44 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 20:44 ` Alan Stern 2021-09-30 20:52 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 20:52 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 1:41 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 1:41 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 2:20 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 2:20 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 21:12 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 21:12 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] driver core: Allow arch to initialize the authorized attribute Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 11:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 11:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 13:36 ` Dan Williams [this message] 2021-09-30 13:36 ` Dan Williams 2021-09-30 13:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 13:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 15:18 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 15:20 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:20 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-09-30 15:23 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 15:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 15:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 19:04 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 19:16 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 19:30 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 19:30 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 19:40 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-10-01 7:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-01 7:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-01 15:49 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-01 15:49 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-02 11:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-10-02 11:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-10-02 11:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-02 11:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-02 14:20 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-02 14:20 ` Andi Kleen 2021-10-02 14:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-02 14:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-02 18:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-10-02 18:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-10-03 6:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-03 6:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-04 21:04 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-04 21:04 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 16:13 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 16:13 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 16:45 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 16:45 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 18:09 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 18:09 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 19:00 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 19:00 ` Alan Stern 2021-10-01 19:45 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan 2021-10-01 19:57 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-01 19:57 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-04 5:16 ` Mika Westerberg 2021-10-05 22:33 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-05 22:33 ` Dan Williams 2021-10-06 5:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-10-06 5:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2021-09-30 19:25 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 19:25 ` Andi Kleen 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/tdx: Add device filter support for x86 TDX guest platform Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-09-30 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] PCI: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
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