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From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
	boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com,
	sstabellini@kernel.org, joro@8bytes.org, will@kernel.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	martin.petersen@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, hch@lst.de,
	m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, rientjes@google.com,
	martin.b.radev@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	rppt@kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com, krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com,
	saravanand@fb.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	pgonda@google.com, david@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	hannes@cmpxchg.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
	michael.h.kelley@microsoft.com
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	vkuznets@redhat.com, anparri@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/13] x86/HV: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 20:49:31 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ccbe6f4c-5ffe-4d63-67ab-6384fcb8691d@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c00e269c-da4c-c703-0182-0221c73a76cc@intel.com>

Hi Dave:
      Thanks for your review.

On 7/28/2021 11:29 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/28/21 7:52 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>> @@ -1986,7 +1988,9 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>>   	/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
>> -	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>> +	if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
>> +		return hv_set_mem_enc(addr, numpages, enc);
>> +	else if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>>   		return 0;
> 
> __set_memory_enc_dec() is turning into a real mess.  SEV, TDX and now
> Hyper-V are messing around in here.
> 
> It doesn't help that these additions are totally uncommented.  Even
> worse is that hv_set_mem_enc() was intentionally named "enc" when it
> presumably has nothing to do with encryption.
> 
> This needs to be refactored.  The current __set_memory_enc_dec() can
> become __set_memory_enc_pgtable().  It gets used for the hypervisors
> that get informed about "encryption" status via page tables: SEV and TDX.
> 
> Then, rename hv_set_mem_enc() to hv_set_visible_hcall().  You'll end up
> with:
> 
> int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> {
> 	if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
> 		return hv_set_visible_hcall(...);
> 
> 	if (mem_encrypt_active() || ...)
> 		return __set_memory_enc_pgtable();
> 
> 	/* Nothing to do */
> 	return 0;
> }
> 
> That tells the story pretty effectively, in code.

Yes, this is good idea. Thanks for your suggestion.

> 
>> +int hv_set_mem_enc(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>> +{
>> +	return hv_set_mem_host_visibility((void *)addr,
>> +			numpages * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE,
>> +			enc ? VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE
>> +			: VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE);
>> +}
> 
> I know this is off in Hyper-V code, but this just makes my eyes bleed.
> I'd much rather see something which is less compact but readable.

OK. Will update.

> 
>> +/* Hyper-V GPA map flags */
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE		0
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_ONLY	1
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE	3
> 
> That looks suspiciously like an enum.
>

OK. Will update.


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
	boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com,
	sstabellini@kernel.org, joro@8bytes.org, will@kernel.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	martin.petersen@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, hch@lst.de,
	m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, rientjes@google.com,
	martin.b.radev@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	rppt@kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com, krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com,
	saravanand@fb.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	pgonda@google.com, david@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	hannes@cmpxchg.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
	michael.h.kelley@microsoft.com
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	anparri@microsoft.com, vkuznets@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/13] x86/HV: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 20:49:31 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ccbe6f4c-5ffe-4d63-67ab-6384fcb8691d@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c00e269c-da4c-c703-0182-0221c73a76cc@intel.com>

Hi Dave:
      Thanks for your review.

On 7/28/2021 11:29 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/28/21 7:52 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>> @@ -1986,7 +1988,9 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>>   	/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
>> -	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>> +	if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
>> +		return hv_set_mem_enc(addr, numpages, enc);
>> +	else if (!mem_encrypt_active())
>>   		return 0;
> 
> __set_memory_enc_dec() is turning into a real mess.  SEV, TDX and now
> Hyper-V are messing around in here.
> 
> It doesn't help that these additions are totally uncommented.  Even
> worse is that hv_set_mem_enc() was intentionally named "enc" when it
> presumably has nothing to do with encryption.
> 
> This needs to be refactored.  The current __set_memory_enc_dec() can
> become __set_memory_enc_pgtable().  It gets used for the hypervisors
> that get informed about "encryption" status via page tables: SEV and TDX.
> 
> Then, rename hv_set_mem_enc() to hv_set_visible_hcall().  You'll end up
> with:
> 
> int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> {
> 	if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
> 		return hv_set_visible_hcall(...);
> 
> 	if (mem_encrypt_active() || ...)
> 		return __set_memory_enc_pgtable();
> 
> 	/* Nothing to do */
> 	return 0;
> }
> 
> That tells the story pretty effectively, in code.

Yes, this is good idea. Thanks for your suggestion.

> 
>> +int hv_set_mem_enc(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>> +{
>> +	return hv_set_mem_host_visibility((void *)addr,
>> +			numpages * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE,
>> +			enc ? VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE
>> +			: VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE);
>> +}
> 
> I know this is off in Hyper-V code, but this just makes my eyes bleed.
> I'd much rather see something which is less compact but readable.

OK. Will update.

> 
>> +/* Hyper-V GPA map flags */
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE		0
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_ONLY	1
>> +#define	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE	3
> 
> That looks suspiciously like an enum.
>

OK. Will update.

_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-29 12:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-28 14:52 [PATCH 00/13] x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/HV: Initialize GHCB page in Isolation VM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 11:53   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 11:53     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:35     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:35       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/HV: Initialize shared memory boundary in the " Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/HV: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 15:29   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-28 15:29     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-29 12:49     ` Tianyu Lan [this message]
2021-07-29 12:49       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:01     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:01       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:59       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:59         ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 13:11       ` Juergen Gross
2021-08-02 13:11         ` Juergen Gross via iommu
2021-08-02 13:30         ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 13:30           ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-28 17:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-28 17:06     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-29 13:01     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 13:01       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 14:09       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-29 14:09         ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-29 15:02         ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 15:02           ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 16:05           ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-29 16:05             ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-30  2:52             ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-30  2:52               ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 04/13] HV: Mark vmbus ring buffer visible to host in Isolation VM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:07   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:07     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:56     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:56       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:59       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:59         ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 13:08         ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 13:08           ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 05/13] HV: Add Write/Read MSR registers via ghcb page Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:28   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:28     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 13:18     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 13:18       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 06/13] HV: Add ghcb hvcall support for SNP VM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:39   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:39     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 13:32     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 13:32       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 07/13] HV/Vmbus: Add SNP support for VMbus channel initiate message Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 12:58   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 12:58     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 08/13] HV/Vmbus: Initialize VMbus ring buffer for Isolation VM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 09/13] DMA: Add dma_map_decrypted/dma_unmap_encrypted() function Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 15:13   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 15:13     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/Swiotlb: Add Swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-29 16:29   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-07-29 16:29     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-07-30  4:10     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-30  4:10       ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 11/13] HV/IOMMU: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/13] HV/Netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/13] HV/Storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver Tianyu Lan
2021-07-28 14:52   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 13:20   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 13:20     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 14:08     ` Tianyu Lan
2021-08-02 14:08       ` Tianyu Lan

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