From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, serge.ayoun@intel.com, shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/sgx: Driver documentation Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 16:56:51 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <fe28962d-367b-b8bb-8280-fe48c7d08813@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181015205436.GA28500@amd> On 10/15/2018 01:54 PM, Pavel Machek wrote: >> +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to >> +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is >> +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control. >> +In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the >> +application from a malicious host. > Well, recently hardware had some problems keeping its > promises. So... what about rowhammer, meltdown and spectre? There's a ton of documentation out there about what kinds of protections SGX provides. I don't think this is an appropriate place to have an exhaustive discussion about it. But, there's extensive discussion of it on Intel's security site: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/ There's documentation on how L1TF affects SGX here: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/l1-terminal-fault Or Spectre v2 here: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass > Which ones apply, which ones do not, and on what cpu generations? The CVEs list this in pretty exhaustive detail. The L1TF/SGX one, for example: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3615 Lists a bunch of processor models.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>, <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>, <nhorman@redhat.com>, <npmccallum@redhat.com>, <serge.ayoun@intel.com>, <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>, <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/sgx: Driver documentation Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 16:56:51 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <fe28962d-367b-b8bb-8280-fe48c7d08813@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181015205436.GA28500@amd> On 10/15/2018 01:54 PM, Pavel Machek wrote: >> +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to >> +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is >> +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control. >> +In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the >> +application from a malicious host. > Well, recently hardware had some problems keeping its > promises. So... what about rowhammer, meltdown and spectre? There's a ton of documentation out there about what kinds of protections SGX provides. I don't think this is an appropriate place to have an exhaustive discussion about it. But, there's extensive discussion of it on Intel's security site: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/ There's documentation on how L1TF affects SGX here: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/l1-terminal-fault Or Spectre v2 here: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass > Which ones apply, which ones do not, and on what cpu generations? The CVEs list this in pretty exhaustive detail. The L1TF/SGX one, for example: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3615 Lists a bunch of processor models.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-17 23:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 184+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-25 13:06 [PATCH v14 00/19] Intel SGX1 support Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 01/19] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 02/19] x86/sgx: Architectural structures Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 03/19] x86/cpufeature: Add SGX and SGX_LC CPU features Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 04/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX feature bits Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-25 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-25 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-26 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-26 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-26 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-26 11:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-26 11:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-27 13:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-27 13:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-27 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 05/19] x86/msr: Add SGX definitions to msr-index.h Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 06/19] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Add new 'PF_SGX' page fault error code bit Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 07/19] x86/fault: x86/mm/pkeys: relocate stale comment regarding OSPKE Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 08/19] signal: x86/sgx: Add SIGSEGV siginfo code for SGX EPCM fault Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-26 19:14 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 19:14 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 19:14 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-27 18:41 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-27 18:41 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-27 18:41 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 09/19] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SEGV_SGXERR for #PFs w/ PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-25 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 18:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 18:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 20:16 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 20:16 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 20:44 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 20:44 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-09-26 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 21:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 21:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 21:45 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 21:45 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-26 22:37 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-26 22:37 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-27 14:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 14:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 14:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-27 14:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-27 13:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-01 21:42 ` Jethro Beekman 2018-10-01 22:03 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-31 21:30 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-31 21:30 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-31 21:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-31 21:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-31 21:53 ` Jethro Beekman 2018-10-31 21:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-31 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-31 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-01 17:51 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-01 17:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-01 17:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-01 17:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-11-01 17:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-11-01 17:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-11-01 17:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-11-01 17:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-11-01 17:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-02 0:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-02 0:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-01 14:29 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-01 14:29 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-01 14:41 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-01 14:41 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-02 0:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-02 0:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 14:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-27 14:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-27 15:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 15:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 15:53 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-27 15:53 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-27 13:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 19:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-27 19:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-27 19:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-09-28 12:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-28 12:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 10/19] x86/sgx: Detect Intel SGX Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 20:02 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:02 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:02 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-27 13:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 11/19] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 20:01 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:01 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:01 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-27 13:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 12/19] x86/sgx: Add data structures for tracking the EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 20:00 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:00 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-25 20:00 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-27 13:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-27 13:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 13/19] x86/sgx: Enclave Page Cache (EPC) memory manager Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 14/19] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for initializing enclaves Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 15/19] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-04 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-04 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-04 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2018-10-05 11:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-05 11:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-05 11:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 16/19] platform/x86: Add swapping functionality to the " Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 17/19] x86/sgx: Add a simple swapper for the EPC memory manager Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 18/19] platform/x86: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/sgx: Driver documentation Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-09-25 13:27 ` Jonathan Corbet 2018-09-25 13:27 ` Jonathan Corbet 2018-09-25 13:27 ` Jonathan Corbet 2018-10-15 20:54 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-15 20:54 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-17 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-17 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-18 9:57 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:57 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-19 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-19 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2018-10-17 23:56 ` Dave Hansen [this message] 2018-10-17 23:56 ` Dave Hansen
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