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From: u3557@miso.sublimeip.com
To: "Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Frederic Weisbecker" <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	"Amnon Shiloh" <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 21:33:42 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ffbad99ce24a54ce51dbcd9557f3a993.squirrel@mail.sublimeip.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1353349500.6276.9.camel@gandalf.local.home>

Dear Steve,

> But here, there's no prejudice between tasks. All tasks will now hit the
> breakpoint regardless of if it is being traced or not.

Just to clarify, there is no intention to allow conventional breakpoints
in the vsyscall page - that would indeed be a disaster affecting all other
processes.

The aim of this patch is to allow ptracers to set the x86 debug-registers
of their traced process, so that it stops when it reaches the entry points
of those (few) system-calls that are in the vsyscall page.  Note that those
debug registers are anyway swapped at context-switch, so no other processes
are affected.

> Is this really what we want? I mean, isn't syscall tracing in the kernel
> done by a flag set to the task's structure. If the task has a flag set,
> then it does the slow (ptrace) path which handles the breakpoint for the
> user.

Most system-calls can be trapped by the PTRACE_SYSCALL option (and the
later PTRACE_SYSEMU), but those few system-calls on the vsyscall page
defy the intention to trap ALL system-calls.  They also cannot be
checkpointed by inserting a trap-instruction (as that, if allowed, would
break all other processes), hence the only alternative left is to have
this patch that fixes the oversight in the design of
PTRACE_SYSCALL/PTRACE_SYSEMU in the presence of a vsyscall page.

Best Regards,
Amnon.

> On Mon, 2012-11-19 at 18:47 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> On 11/09, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> >
>> > On 11/09, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> > >
>> > > Note: TASK_SIZE doesn't look right at least on x86, I think it
>> should
>> > > be replaced by TASK_SIZE_MAX.
>> > > ...
>> > > --- x/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
>> > > +++ x/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
>> > > @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct
>> > >  	va = info->address;
>> > >  	len = get_hbp_len(info->len);
>> > >
>> > > -	return (va >= TASK_SIZE) && ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE);
>> > > +	return (va >= TASK_SIZE) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE);
>> >
>> > But actully I'd like to ask another question.
>> >
>> > Can't we add the additional !in_gate_area_no_mm() check to allow
>> > the hw breakpoints in vsyscall?
>> >
>> > Quoting Amnon:
>> >
>> > 	My service needs to catch the system-calls of its traced son.
>> > 	Almost all system-calls are caught with PTRACE_SYSCALL, but not those
>> > 	using the vsyscall page - especially "gettimeofday()" and "time()".
>> >
>> > 	...> Is this really what we want? I mean, isn't syscall tracing in
the kernel
> done by a flag set to the task's structure. If the task has a flag set,
> then it does the slow (ptrace) path which handles the breakpoint for the
> user.
>> >
>> > 	However, the code in "arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c" forbids catching
>> kernel
>> > 	addresses.
>> >
>> > I tend to agree with Amnon...
>> >
>> > What do you think?
>>
>> ping ;)
>>
>> I agree the patch I sent is very minor (although it looks like the
>> trivial
>> bugfix to me).
>>
>> Just I think Amnon has a point, shouldn't we change this change like
>> below?
>> (on top of this fixlet).
>>
>> Oleg.
>>
>> --- x/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
>> +++ x/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
>> @@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ static int get_hbp_len(u8 hbp_len)
>>  	return len_in_bytes;
>>  }
>>
>> +static inline bool bp_in_gate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
>> +{
>> +	return in_gate_area_no_mm(start) && in_gate_area_no_mm(end);
>> +}
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * Check for virtual address in kernel space.
>>   */
>> @@ -200,7 +205,8 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct
>>  	va = info->address;
>>  	len = get_hbp_len(info->len);
>>
>> -	return (va >= TASK_SIZE) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE);
>> +	return ((va >= TASK_SIZE) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE)) &&
>> +		!bp_in_gate(va, va + len - 1);
>
> So we want to allow non privileged to add a breakpoint in a vsyscall
> area even if it happens to lay in kernel space?
>
> Is this really what we want? I mean, isn't syscall tracing in the kernel
> done by a flag set to the task's structure. If the task has a flag set,
> then it does the slow (ptrace) path which handles the breakpoint for the
> user.
>
> But here, there's no prejudice between tasks. All tasks will now hit the
> breakpoint regardless of if it is being traced or not.
>
> -- Steve
>
>
>>  }
>>
>>  int arch_bp_generic_fields(int x86_len, int x86_type,
>
>
>



  reply	other threads:[~2012-11-20 10:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-11-09 18:29 [PATCH] arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-09 18:30 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-19 17:47   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-19 18:25     ` Steven Rostedt
2012-11-20 10:33       ` u3557 [this message]
2012-11-20 15:48       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-20 15:55         ` Steven Rostedt
2012-11-20 18:32         ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-20 23:16           ` u3557
2012-11-21 14:16             ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-21 17:30               ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-22 16:12                 ` vdso && cr (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check) Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-22 20:57                   ` Pavel Emelyanov
2012-11-23  0:20                     ` vdso && cr (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-23 17:45                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-24 12:47                         ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-23 17:42                     ` vdso && cr (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check) Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-23  9:14                   ` arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-23 16:33                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-23 17:05                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-24 14:14                         ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-24 13:45                       ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-25 22:55                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-11-25 23:48                           ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-12-02 19:30                             ` PTRACE_SYSCALL && vsyscall (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check) Oleg Nesterov
2012-12-02 23:54                               ` u3557
2012-12-04 17:59                                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-12-04 22:44                                   ` u3557
2013-01-08 17:08                                   ` Pedro Alves
2013-01-09 17:52                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-10  6:54                                       ` u3557
2013-01-12 18:12                                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-14  2:31                                           ` u3557
2013-01-14 16:01                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-02-18  1:39                                               ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-18  5:44                                                 ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Randy Dunlap
2013-02-18 15:21                                                 ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Steven Rostedt
2013-02-18 16:33                                                   ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-18 19:49                                                     ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Steven Rostedt
2013-02-19  6:25                                                       ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-20  8:39                                                         ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Cyrill Gorcunov
2013-02-20  9:38                                                           ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-20 10:51                                                             ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Cyrill Gorcunov
2013-02-20 11:16                                                               ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-21  7:46                                                               ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-21  8:00                                                                 ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Cyrill Gorcunov
2013-02-21  8:03                                                                   ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-21  8:09                                                                     ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Cyrill Gorcunov
2013-02-21 22:18                                                                   ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Andrew Morton
2013-02-21 22:42                                                                     ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Cyrill Gorcunov
2013-02-22  1:18                                                                     ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Amnon Shiloh
2013-02-22 14:23                                                         ` prctl(PR_SET_MM) Denys Vlasenko
2012-12-05  9:29                               ` PTRACE_SYSCALL && vsyscall (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range check) Jan Kratochvil
2012-12-05 13:14                                 ` u3557
2012-11-26  9:44                   ` vdso && cr " Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-11-26 12:27                     ` Andrey Wagin
2012-11-26 12:55                       ` Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-26 14:18                         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-11-26 14:26                           ` vdso && cr (Was: arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace: fix the range Amnon Shiloh
2012-11-26 14:41                             ` vdso && cr Cyrill Gorcunov

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