* [PATCH bpf-next 1/1] selftests/bpf: update tcp_custom_syncookie to use scalar packet offset
2024-02-22 15:02 [PATCH bpf-next 0/1] selftests/bpf: reduce tcp_custom_syncookie verification complexity Eduard Zingerman
@ 2024-02-22 15:03 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-02-22 16:50 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/1] selftests/bpf: reduce tcp_custom_syncookie verification complexity patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2024-02-22 15:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast
Cc: andrii, daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, kuniyu,
Eduard Zingerman
This commit updates tcp_custom_syncookie.c:tcp_parse_option() to use
explicit packet offset (ctx->off) for packet access instead of ever
moving pointer (ctx->ptr), this reduces verification complexity:
- the tcp_parse_option() is passed as a callback to bpf_loop();
- suppose a checkpoint is created each time at function entry;
- the ctx->ptr is tracked by verifier as PTR_TO_PACKET;
- the ctx->ptr is incremented in tcp_parse_option(),
thus umax_value field tracked for it is incremented as well;
- on each next iteration of tcp_parse_option()
checkpoint from a previous iteration can't be reused
for state pruning, because PTR_TO_PACKET registers are
considered equivalent only if old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value;
- on the other hand, the ctx->off is a SCALAR,
subject to widen_imprecise_scalars();
- it's exact bounds are eventually forgotten and it is tracked as
unknown scalar at entry to tcp_parse_option();
- hence checkpoints created at the start of the function eventually
converge.
The change is similar to one applied in [0] to xdp_synproxy_kern.c.
Comparing before and after with veristat yields following results:
File Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF)
------------------------------- --------- --------- -----------------
test_tcp_custom_syncookie.bpf.o 466657 12423 -454234 (-97.34%)
[0] commit 977bc146d4eb ("selftests/bpf: track tcp payload offset as scalar in xdp_synproxy")
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
.../bpf/progs/test_tcp_custom_syncookie.c | 83 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tcp_custom_syncookie.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tcp_custom_syncookie.c
index a5501b29979a..c8e4553648bf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tcp_custom_syncookie.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tcp_custom_syncookie.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
#include "test_siphash.h"
#include "test_tcp_custom_syncookie.h"
+#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
+
/* Hash is calculated for each client and split into ISN and TS.
*
* MSB LSB
@@ -52,16 +54,15 @@ static siphash_key_t test_key_siphash = {
struct tcp_syncookie {
struct __sk_buff *skb;
+ void *data;
void *data_end;
struct ethhdr *eth;
struct iphdr *ipv4;
struct ipv6hdr *ipv6;
struct tcphdr *tcp;
- union {
- char *ptr;
- __be32 *ptr32;
- };
+ __be32 *ptr32;
struct bpf_tcp_req_attrs attrs;
+ u32 off;
u32 cookie;
u64 first;
};
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ bool handled_syn, handled_ack;
static int tcp_load_headers(struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
{
+ ctx->data = (void *)(long)ctx->skb->data;
ctx->data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->skb->data_end;
ctx->eth = (struct ethhdr *)(long)ctx->skb->data;
@@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ static int tcp_reload_headers(struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
if (bpf_skb_change_tail(ctx->skb, data_len + 60 - ctx->tcp->doff * 4, 0))
goto err;
+ ctx->data = (void *)(long)ctx->skb->data;
ctx->data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->skb->data_end;
ctx->eth = (struct ethhdr *)(long)ctx->skb->data;
if (ctx->ipv4) {
@@ -195,47 +198,68 @@ static int tcp_validate_header(struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
return -1;
}
-static int tcp_parse_option(__u32 index, struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
+static __always_inline void *next(struct tcp_syncookie *ctx, __u32 sz)
{
- char opcode, opsize;
+ __u64 off = ctx->off;
+ __u8 *data;
- if (ctx->ptr + 1 > ctx->data_end)
- goto stop;
+ /* Verifier forbids access to packet when offset exceeds MAX_PACKET_OFF */
+ if (off > MAX_PACKET_OFF - sz)
+ return NULL;
+
+ data = ctx->data + off;
+ barrier_var(data);
+ if (data + sz >= ctx->data_end)
+ return NULL;
- opcode = *ctx->ptr++;
+ ctx->off += sz;
+ return data;
+}
- if (opcode == TCPOPT_EOL)
+static int tcp_parse_option(__u32 index, struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
+{
+ __u8 *opcode, *opsize, *wscale;
+ __u32 *tsval, *tsecr;
+ __u16 *mss;
+ __u32 off;
+
+ off = ctx->off;
+ opcode = next(ctx, 1);
+ if (!opcode)
goto stop;
- if (opcode == TCPOPT_NOP)
+ if (*opcode == TCPOPT_EOL)
+ goto stop;
+
+ if (*opcode == TCPOPT_NOP)
goto next;
- if (ctx->ptr + 1 > ctx->data_end)
+ opsize = next(ctx, 1);
+ if (!opsize)
goto stop;
- opsize = *ctx->ptr++;
-
- if (opsize < 2)
+ if (*opsize < 2)
goto stop;
- switch (opcode) {
+ switch (*opcode) {
case TCPOPT_MSS:
- if (opsize == TCPOLEN_MSS && ctx->tcp->syn &&
- ctx->ptr + (TCPOLEN_MSS - 2) < ctx->data_end)
- ctx->attrs.mss = get_unaligned_be16(ctx->ptr);
+ mss = next(ctx, 2);
+ if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_MSS && ctx->tcp->syn && mss)
+ ctx->attrs.mss = get_unaligned_be16(mss);
break;
case TCPOPT_WINDOW:
- if (opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW && ctx->tcp->syn &&
- ctx->ptr + (TCPOLEN_WINDOW - 2) < ctx->data_end) {
+ wscale = next(ctx, 1);
+ if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW && ctx->tcp->syn && wscale) {
ctx->attrs.wscale_ok = 1;
- ctx->attrs.snd_wscale = *ctx->ptr;
+ ctx->attrs.snd_wscale = *wscale;
}
break;
case TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP:
- if (opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP &&
- ctx->ptr + (TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP - 2) < ctx->data_end) {
- ctx->attrs.rcv_tsval = get_unaligned_be32(ctx->ptr);
- ctx->attrs.rcv_tsecr = get_unaligned_be32(ctx->ptr + 4);
+ tsval = next(ctx, 4);
+ tsecr = next(ctx, 4);
+ if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP && tsval && tsecr) {
+ ctx->attrs.rcv_tsval = get_unaligned_be32(tsval);
+ ctx->attrs.rcv_tsecr = get_unaligned_be32(tsecr);
if (ctx->tcp->syn && ctx->attrs.rcv_tsecr)
ctx->attrs.tstamp_ok = 0;
@@ -244,13 +268,12 @@ static int tcp_parse_option(__u32 index, struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
}
break;
case TCPOPT_SACK_PERM:
- if (opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM && ctx->tcp->syn &&
- ctx->ptr + (TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM - 2) < ctx->data_end)
+ if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM && ctx->tcp->syn)
ctx->attrs.sack_ok = 1;
break;
}
- ctx->ptr += opsize - 2;
+ ctx->off = off + *opsize;
next:
return 0;
stop:
@@ -259,7 +282,7 @@ static int tcp_parse_option(__u32 index, struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
static void tcp_parse_options(struct tcp_syncookie *ctx)
{
- ctx->ptr = (char *)(ctx->tcp + 1);
+ ctx->off = (__u8 *)(ctx->tcp + 1) - (__u8 *)ctx->data,
bpf_loop(40, tcp_parse_option, ctx, 0);
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 0/1] selftests/bpf: reduce tcp_custom_syncookie verification complexity
2024-02-22 15:02 [PATCH bpf-next 0/1] selftests/bpf: reduce tcp_custom_syncookie verification complexity Eduard Zingerman
2024-02-22 15:03 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/1] selftests/bpf: update tcp_custom_syncookie to use scalar packet offset Eduard Zingerman
@ 2024-02-22 16:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2024-02-22 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eduard Zingerman
Cc: bpf, ast, andrii, daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, kuniyu
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>:
On Thu, 22 Feb 2024 17:02:59 +0200 you wrote:
> Thread [0] discusses a fix for bpf_loop() handling bug.
> That change makes tcp_custom_syncookie test too complex to verify.
> The fix discussed in [0] would be sent via 'bpf' tree,
> tcp_custom_syncookie test is not in 'bpf' tree yet.
> As agreed in [0] I'm sending syncookie test update separately.
>
> [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240216150334.31937-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,1/1] selftests/bpf: update tcp_custom_syncookie to use scalar packet offset
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/b546b5752695
You are awesome, thank you!
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