From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, kernel-team <kernel-team@fb.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 09:28:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWFeAXjZEiTZJjansqCLLO3OK=Vf+qeRh48akMjf34Ctw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <536636ad-0baf-31e9-85fe-2591b65068df@iogearbox.net>
> On Aug 29, 2019, at 8:47 AM, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>
>> On 8/29/19 7:12 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> [...]
>> +/*
>> + * CAP_BPF allows the following BPF operations:
>> + * - Loading all types of BPF programs
>> + * - Creating all types of BPF maps except:
>> + * - stackmap that needs CAP_TRACING
>> + * - devmap that needs CAP_NET_ADMIN
>> + * - cpumap that needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> + * - Advanced verifier features
>> + * - Indirect variable access
>> + * - Bounded loops
>> + * - BPF to BPF function calls
>> + * - Scalar precision tracking
>> + * - Larger complexity limits
>> + * - Dead code elimination
>> + * - And potentially other features
>> + * - Use of pointer-to-integer conversions in BPF programs
>> + * - Bypassing of speculation attack hardening measures
>> + * - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data
>> + * - Iterate system wide loaded programs, maps, BTF objects
>> + * - Retrieve xlated and JITed code of BPF programs
>> + * - Access maps and programs via id
>> + * - Use bpf_spin_lock() helper
>
> This is still very wide. Consider following example: app has CAP_BPF +
> CAP_NET_ADMIN. Why can't we in this case *only* allow loading networking
> related [plus generic] maps and programs? If it doesn't have CAP_TRACING,
> what would be a reason to allow loading it? Same vice versa. There are
> some misc program types like the infraread stuff, but they could continue
> to live under [CAP_BPF +] CAP_SYS_ADMIN as fallback. I think categorizing
> a specific list of prog and map types might be more clear than disallowing
> some helpers like below (e.g. why choice of bpf_probe_read() but not
> bpf_probe_write_user() etc).
Wow, I didn’t notice that bpf_probe_write_user() existed. That should
need something like CAP_PTRACE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
I'm starting to think that something like this:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/968f3551247a43e1104b198f2e58fb0595d425e7.1565040372.git.luto@kernel.org/
should maybe be finished before CAP_BPF happens at all. It really
looks like the bpf operations that need privilege need to get fully
catalogued and dealt with rather than just coming up with a new
capability that covers a huge swath.
(bpf_probe_write_user() is also terminally broken on architectures
like s390x, but that's not really relevant right now. I'm a bit
surprised it works on x86 with SMAP, though.)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-29 16:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-29 5:12 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 5:12 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 6:04 ` Song Liu
2019-08-29 17:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 15:32 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-08-29 17:30 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-30 15:19 ` Nicolas Dichtel
2019-09-04 1:39 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-04 15:16 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-09-04 15:21 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-05 8:37 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-09-05 22:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 5:12 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 3/3] perf: implement CAP_TRACING Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 6:06 ` Song Liu
2019-08-29 6:00 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING Song Liu
2019-08-29 7:44 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2019-08-29 17:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 18:05 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2019-08-29 20:25 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2019-08-29 21:10 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 13:36 ` Nicolas Dichtel
2019-08-29 17:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-29 15:47 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-08-29 16:28 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-08-30 4:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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