From: "Masami Ichikawa" <masami.ichikawa@miraclelinux.com>
To: cip-dev <cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org>
Subject: [cip-dev] New CVE entry this week
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 09:59:10 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAODzB9rKixC0p_tFV=qR7sTgPqS1ZxuXJJnkPufW+z-m8NFHxA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20211007005910.nrvJxPx0Z1xWdBgnMBjvDYRymR14UBKNZUAUaOsTuzg@z> (raw)
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Hi !
It's this week's CVE report.
This week reported new CVEs.
* New CVEs
CVE-2021-41864: bpf: Fix integer overflow in prealloc_elems_and_freelist()
CVSS v3 score is not provided.
Patch 30e29a9a2bc6 (bpf: Fix integer overflow in prealloc_elems_and_freelist()
) fixes commit 557c0c6e7df8 ("bpf: convert stackmap to
pre-allocation") which has been introduced in 4.6-rc1. Therefore 4.4
kernel isn't affected this issue.
For 4.19 and 5.4, patch can be applied by "git am". For 4.9, patch can
be applied by "git am -3".
Fixed status
Fix patch has been merged into bpf tree, but not in the mainline yet.
CVE-2021-42008: net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
The 6pack module has slab out-of-bounds vulnerability in decode_data()
which allow local attacker can gain their privileges.
This bug has been fixed since 5.14-rc7. All stable kernels have
already been fixed.
Fixed status
cip/4.19: [4e370cc081a78ee23528311ca58fd98a06768ec7]
cip/4.19-rt: [4e370cc081a78ee23528311ca58fd98a06768ec7]
cip/4.4: [d66736076bd84742c18397785476e9a84d5b54ef]
cip/4.4-rt: [d66736076bd84742c18397785476e9a84d5b54ef]
mainline: [19d1532a187669ce86d5a2696eb7275310070793]
stable/4.14: [5e0e782874ad03ae6d47d3e55aff378da0b51104]
stable/4.19: [4e370cc081a78ee23528311ca58fd98a06768ec7]
stable/4.4: [d66736076bd84742c18397785476e9a84d5b54ef]
stable/4.9: [de9171c1d9a5c2c4c5ec5e64f420681f178152fa]
stable/5.10: [85e0518f181a0ff060f5543d2655fb841a83d653]
stable/5.4: [a73b9aa142691c2ae313980a8734997a78f74b22]
* Updated CVEs
CVE-2019-19449: mounting a crafted f2fs filesystem image can lead to
slab-out-of-bounds read access in f2fs_build_segment_manager in
fs/f2fs/segment.c
This patch has been merged since 5.10-rc1.
For 5.4, patch can be applied via git-am. For 4.4 and 4.19, patch can
be applied via git-am with -3 option.
Fixed status
mainline: [3a22e9ac71585bcb7667e44641f1bbb25295f0ce]
stable/5.10: [3a22e9ac71585bcb7667e44641f1bbb25295f0ce]
CVE-2021-37159: net: hso: do not call unregister if not registered
4.14, 4.19, and 5.4 have been fixed. 4.4 and 4.9 haven't been fixed
yet. However, patch can be applied to 4.4 and 4.9 without any
modification. According to cip-kernel-config, no CIP member use HSO
module.
Fixed status
mainline: [a6ecfb39ba9d7316057cea823b196b734f6b18ca]
stable/4.14: [4c0db9c4b3701c29f47bac0721e2f7d2b15d8edb]
stable/4.19: [f6cf22a1ef49f8e131f99c3f5fd80ab6b23a2d21]
stable/5.10: [115e4f5b64ae8d9dd933167cafe2070aaac45849]
stable/5.13: [eeaa4b8d1e2e6f10362673d283a97dccc7275afa]
stable/5.4: [fe57d53dd91d7823f1ceef5ea8e9458a4aeb47fa]
CVE-2021-38300: bpf, mips: Validate conditional branch offsets
This vulnerability is only affected to MIPS architecture. No cip
member use MIPS architecture.
5.10 has been fixed. Applying this fix to 4.4, 4.9, 4.19, and 5.4, it
needs to modify the patch.
Fixed status
mainline: [37cb28ec7d3a36a5bace7063a3dba633ab110f8b]
stable/5.10: [c61736a994fe68b0e5498e4e84e1c9108dc41075]
Currently tracking CVEs
CVE-2021-31615: Unencrypted Bluetooth Low Energy baseband links in
Bluetooth Core Specifications 4.0 through 5.2
There is no fix information.
CVE-2021-3640: UAF in sco_send_frame function
Fixed in bluetooth-next tree.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git/commit/net/bluetooth/sco.c?id=99c23da0eed4fd20cae8243f2b51e10e66aa0951
CVE-2020-26555: BR/EDR pin code pairing broken
No fix information
CVE-2020-26556: kernel: malleable commitment Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
No fix information.
CVE-2020-26557: kernel: predictable Authvalue in Bluetooth Mesh
Provisioning Leads to MITM
No fix information.
CVE-2020-26559: kernel: Authvalue leak in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
No fix information.
CVE-2020-26560: kernel: impersonation attack in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
No fix information.
Regards,
--
Masami Ichikawa
Cybertrust Japan Co., Ltd.
Email :masami.ichikawa@cybertrust.co.jp
:masami.ichikawa@miraclelinux.com
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next reply other threads:[~2021-10-07 0:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-07 0:59 Masami Ichikawa [this message]
2021-10-07 0:59 ` [cip-dev] New CVE entry this week Masami Ichikawa
2021-10-07 7:30 ` Pavel Machek
2021-10-07 7:30 ` Pavel Machek
2021-10-07 11:38 ` Masami Ichikawa
2021-10-07 11:38 ` Masami Ichikawa
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-10-21 1:21 Masami Ichikawa
2021-10-13 23:54 Masami Ichikawa
2021-09-30 0:12 Masami Ichikawa
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