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From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Cc: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>,
	Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>,
	git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warn
Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2022 08:11:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqbkxdudvv.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e81cdc6e-da42-d1d1-5d66-7d5e2a8aebbe@github.com> (Derrick Stolee's message of "Thu, 7 Apr 2022 09:21:35 -0400")

Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> writes:

> It is definitely good to keep in mind that other repositories have
> included bare repositories for convenience. I'm not sure that the behavior
> of some good actors should outweigh the benefits of protecting against
> this attack vector.

Good line of thinking.

>  2. Suppress warnings on trusted repos, scoped to a specific set of known
>     trees _or_ based on some set of known commits (in case the known trees
>     are too large).

Is "It is OK to check out an embedded repository from this commit or
any of its ancestors" the kind of suppression you meant by "known
commits"?

>  3. Prevent writing a bare repo to the worktree, unless the user provided
>     an opt-in to that behavior.
>
> Since your patch is moving in the right direction here, I don't think
> steps (2) and (3) are required to move forward with your patch. However,
> it is a good opportunity to discuss the full repercussions of this issue.

We can definitely start without (3).  Unleashing (1) before (2) is
ready would mean folks cannot clone projects like libgit2 until
later, which takes us back to the first point you made above.

Those who use embedded bare repositories as test vector can easily
switch to storing an equivalent of "a tarball that is expanded while
building and/or testing", and as long as the user trusts the project
enough to run its build procedure or tests, we are not adding much
to the attack surface, I would guess.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-07 15:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-06 22:43 Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk Glen Choo
2022-04-06 23:22 ` [PATCH] fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warn Glen Choo
2022-04-07 12:42   ` Johannes Schindelin
2022-04-07 13:21     ` Derrick Stolee
2022-04-07 14:14       ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-14 20:02         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 12:46           ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:11       ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2022-04-13 22:24       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-07 13:12   ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:20   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-07 18:38 ` Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk John Cai
2022-04-07 21:24 ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 21:53   ` Justin Steven
2022-04-07 22:10     ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 22:40       ` rsbecker
2022-04-08  5:54       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:03         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:04         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:44       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 20:37 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:36   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 16:41     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-14 17:35       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 18:19         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 21:33         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 22:17           ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  0:52             ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-15 22:43           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 20:13       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 23:45         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 23:59           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:00           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  1:18             ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  1:30               ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  0:34 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  0:41 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:28   ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 18:25     ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:29       ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:47         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-21 18:54           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 19:09       ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 21:01         ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 21:22           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-29 23:57     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-30  1:14       ` Taylor Blau
2022-05-02 19:39         ` Glen Choo
2022-05-02 14:05       ` Philip Oakley
2022-05-02 18:50         ` Junio C Hamano

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