From: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, arjan@linux.intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 04/11] x86/boot/KASLR: Introduce PRNG for faster shuffling
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2020 08:52:55 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7d1309623b172bfcd4517898c99138c6f363604b.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202002070100.2521E7563@keescook>
On Fri, 2020-02-07 at 01:05 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 07, 2020 at 08:23:53AM +0100, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
> wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 6, 2020 at 4:10 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Hey Kees,
> > >
> > > On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 02:39:43PM -0800, Kristen Carlson Accardi
> > > wrote:
> > > > +#define rot(x, k) (((x)<<(k))|((x)>>(64-(k))))
> > > > +static u64 prng_u64(struct prng_state *x)
> > > > +{
> > > > + u64 e;
> > > > +
> > > > + e = x->a - rot(x->b, 7);
> > > > + x->a = x->b ^ rot(x->c, 13);
> > > > + x->b = x->c + rot(x->d, 37);
> > > > + x->c = x->d + e;
> > > > + x->d = e + x->a;
> > > > +
> > > > + return x->d;
> > > > +}
> > >
> > > I haven't looked closely at where the original entropy sources
> > > are
> > > coming from and how all this works, but on first glance, this
> > > prng
> > > doesn't look like an especially cryptographically secure one. I
> > > realize
> > > that isn't necessarily your intention (you're focused on speed),
> > > but
> > > actually might this be sort of important? If I understand
> > > correctly, the
> > > objective of this patch set is so that leaking the address of one
> > > function doesn't leak the address of all other functions, as is
> > > the case
> > > with fixed-offset kaslr. But if you leak the addresses of _some_
> > > set of
> > > functions, and your prng is bogus, might it be possible to figure
> > > out
> > > the rest? For some prngs, if you give me the output stream of a
> > > few
> > > numbers, I can predict the rest. For others, it's not this
> > > straight
> > > forward, but there are some varieties of similar attacks. If any
> > > of that
> > > set of concerns turns out to apply to your prng_u64 here, would
> > > that
> > > undermine kaslr in similar ways as the current fixed-offset
> > > variety? Or
> > > does it not matter because it's some kind of blinded fixed-size
> > > shuffle
> > > with complex reasoning that makes this not a problem?
> >
> > Let me share my 2 cents:
> >
> > That permutation might be safe but afaict it hasn't been analyzed
> > wrt
> > modern cryptographic techniques and there might well be
> > differential
> > characteristics, statistical biases, etc.
> >
> > What about just using SipHash's permutation, already in the kernel?
> > It
> > works on 4*u64 words too, and 6 rounds would be enough.
> >
> > Doing a basic ops count, we currently have 5 group operations and 3
> > rotations per round or 150 and 90 for the 30 init rounds. With
> > SipHash it'd
> > be 48 and 36 with the proposed 6 rounds. Probably insignificant
> > speed wise
> > as init is only done once but just to show that we'd get both
> > better
> > security assurance and better performance.
>
> Yeah, this was never meant to be anything but a POC and after timing
> tests, it seemed like an unneeded abstraction but was kept for this
> RFC so it was possible to specify a stable seed at boot for
> debugging,
> etc. I think this patch will not survive to v1. :)
That's right, I'm going to drop it and go with the ChaCha20
implementation as was suggested.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-07 16:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-05 22:39 [RFC PATCH 00/11] Finer grained kernel address space randomization Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 01/11] modpost: Support >64K sections Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 02/11] x86: tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 03/11] x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 11:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 16:58 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 04/11] x86/boot/KASLR: Introduce PRNG for faster shuffling Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 1:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 15:10 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-07 7:23 ` Jean-Philippe Aumasson
2020-02-07 9:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-07 16:52 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi [this message]
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 05/11] x86: Makefile: Add build and config option for CONFIG_FG_KASLR Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 10:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 11:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 17:55 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-26 19:13 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-24 21:24 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-25 15:34 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 06/11] x86: make sure _etext includes function sections Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 13:15 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-06 16:27 ` David Laight
2020-02-06 14:39 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 15:29 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 16:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 14:57 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 15:45 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 19:41 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-07 9:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-10 1:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-10 10:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-10 15:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2020-02-10 16:36 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-21 19:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-02-21 23:05 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 07/11] x86/tools: Adding relative relocs for randomized functions Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 08/11] x86: Add support for finer grained KASLR Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 1:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 11:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 17:36 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 10:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 12:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 14:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 17:25 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 17:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 17:43 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-25 17:49 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-26 19:26 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 09/11] kallsyms: hide layout and expose seed Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 17:51 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 19:27 ` Jann Horn
2020-03-02 19:01 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-02 19:08 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-02 19:19 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-27 2:42 ` Baoquan He
2020-02-27 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 3:36 ` Baoquan He
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 10/11] module: Reorder functions Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-11 12:39 ` Jessica Yu
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 11/11] x86/boot: Move "boot heap" out of .bss Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 0:11 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 0:33 ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 11:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 14:25 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 21:32 ` Kees Cook
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