* [PATCH stable 4.9] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction
@ 2020-06-12 4:42 Florian Fainelli
2020-06-23 18:46 ` Florian Fainelli
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2020-06-12 4:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arm-kernel
Cc: Florian Fainelli, open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE KVM,
Radim Krčmář,
Marc Zyngier, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, open list, stable,
Paolo Bonzini, will,
open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 KVM/arm64,
Christoffer Dall
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
commit 679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 upstream
Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform
speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return.
Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level
at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a
side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is
held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[florian: Adjust hyp-entry.S to account for the label]
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
---
Will,
Can you confirm that for 4.9 these are the only places that require
patching? Thank you!
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index ca978d7d98eb..3408c782702c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
.else
eret
.endif
+ sb
.endm
.macro get_thread_info, rd
@@ -945,6 +946,7 @@ __ni_sys_trace:
mrs x30, far_el1
.endif
eret
+ sb
.endm
.align 11
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
index a360ac6e89e9..bc5c6cdb8538 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter)
// Do not touch any register after this!
eret
+ sb
ENDPROC(__guest_enter)
ENTRY(__guest_exit)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
index bf4988f9dae8..3675e7f0ab72 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2
do_el2_call
2: eret
+ sb
el1_hvc_guest:
/*
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ wa_epilogue:
mov x0, xzr
add sp, sp, #16
eret
+ sb
el1_trap:
get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ el2_error:
b.ne __hyp_panic
mov x0, #(1 << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT)
eret
+ sb
ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic)
mov lr, #(PSR_F_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_D_BIT |\
@@ -206,6 +209,7 @@ ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic)
ldr lr, =panic
msr elr_el2, lr
eret
+ sb
ENDPROC(__hyp_do_panic)
ENTRY(__hyp_panic)
--
2.17.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH stable 4.9] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction
2020-06-12 4:42 [PATCH stable 4.9] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction Florian Fainelli
@ 2020-06-23 18:46 ` Florian Fainelli
2020-06-24 12:58 ` Will Deacon
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2020-06-23 18:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arm-kernel, will, Catalin Marinas
Cc: open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE (KVM),
Radim Krčmář,
Marc Zyngier, Will Deacon, open list, stable, Paolo Bonzini,
open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64),
Christoffer Dall
On 6/11/20 9:42 PM, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>
> commit 679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 upstream
>
> Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform
> speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return.
> Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level
> at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a
> side-channel attack.
>
> This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is
> held up on exception return.
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> [florian: Adjust hyp-entry.S to account for the label]
> Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
> ---
> Will,
>
> Can you confirm that for 4.9 these are the only places that require
> patching? Thank you!
Hi Will, Catalin,
Does this look good to you for a 4.9 backport? I would like to see this
included at some point since this pertains to CVE-2020-13844.
Thanks!
--
Florian
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH stable 4.9] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction
2020-06-23 18:46 ` Florian Fainelli
@ 2020-06-24 12:58 ` Will Deacon
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Will Deacon @ 2020-06-24 12:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Florian Fainelli
Cc: open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE (KVM),
Radim Krčmář,
Marc Zyngier, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, open list, stable,
Christoffer Dall, Paolo Bonzini,
open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64),
linux-arm-kernel
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 11:46:37AM -0700, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> On 6/11/20 9:42 PM, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> > From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> >
> > commit 679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 upstream
> >
> > Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform
> > speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return.
> > Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level
> > at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a
> > side-channel attack.
> >
> > This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is
> > held up on exception return.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> > [florian: Adjust hyp-entry.S to account for the label]
> > Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > Will,
> >
> > Can you confirm that for 4.9 these are the only places that require
> > patching? Thank you!
>
> Hi Will, Catalin,
>
> Does this look good to you for a 4.9 backport? I would like to see this
> included at some point since this pertains to CVE-2020-13844.
I think you're missing one of the ERET instructions in hyp/entry.S
Will
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2020-06-12 4:42 [PATCH stable 4.9] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction Florian Fainelli
2020-06-23 18:46 ` Florian Fainelli
2020-06-24 12:58 ` Will Deacon
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