From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
"Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 13:07:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201026200715.170261-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACT4Y+beaHrWisaSsV90xQn+t2Xn-bxvVgmx8ih_h=yJYPjs4A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field
stayed at the original 64 bytes.
This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be
defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
(either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an
easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
This addresses the syzbot report
"UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e).
Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/af_alg.c | 10 +++++++---
include/uapi/linux/if_alg.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index d11db80d24cd1..9acb9d2c4bcf9 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr;
+ struct sockaddr_alg_new *sa = (void *)uaddr;
const struct af_alg_type *type;
void *private;
int err;
@@ -155,7 +155,11 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EINVAL;
- if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg_new, salg_name) !=
+ offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name) != sizeof(*sa));
+
+ if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1)
return -EINVAL;
/* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */
@@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0;
- sa->salg_name[sizeof(sa->salg_name) + addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
+ sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
type = alg_get_type(sa->salg_type);
if (PTR_ERR(type) == -ENOENT) {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_alg.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_alg.h
index 60b7c2efd921c..dc52a11ba6d15 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_alg.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_alg.h
@@ -24,6 +24,22 @@ struct sockaddr_alg {
__u8 salg_name[64];
};
+/*
+ * Linux v4.12 and later removed the 64-byte limit on salg_name[]; it's now an
+ * arbitrary-length field. We had to keep the original struct above for source
+ * compatibility with existing userspace programs, though. Use the new struct
+ * below if support for very long algorithm names is needed. To do this,
+ * allocate 'sizeof(struct sockaddr_alg_new) + strlen(algname) + 1' bytes, and
+ * copy algname (including the null terminator) into salg_name.
+ */
+struct sockaddr_alg_new {
+ __u16 salg_family;
+ __u8 salg_type[14];
+ __u32 salg_feat;
+ __u32 salg_mask;
+ __u8 salg_name[];
+};
+
struct af_alg_iv {
__u32 ivlen;
__u8 iv[0];
base-commit: 3650b228f83adda7e5ee532e2b90429c03f7b9ec
--
2.29.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-26 20:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <00000000000014370305b1c55370@google.com>
[not found] ` <202010162042.7C51549A16@keescook>
2020-10-17 6:20 ` UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind Jann Horn
[not found] ` <CACT4Y+bG=89ii+kzgGvNiZnB9ZEcAsy-3YofJeW5K_rynp_S7g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-10-17 11:02 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-17 14:41 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-26 20:07 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-10-26 21:21 ` [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:10 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:40 ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 21:23 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-26 21:56 ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 22:40 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-06 7:01 ` Herbert Xu
2020-11-02 2:17 ` UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind syzbot
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