From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE"
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
"Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
syzbot <syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:56:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201026215658.GA185792@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez2Og6fWUKZbNO5EtYK-jS+J8rf6r+rOyfUp1MUuy4kMyA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 10:23:35PM +0100, 'Jann Horn' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 9:08 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> > Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
> > names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
> > in sockaddr_alg.
>
> That's not true; it's still limited by the size of struct
> sockaddr_storage (128 bytes total for the entire address).
Interesting, so the actual limit is 104 bytes. It seems like the intent of that
commit was to make it unlimited, though...
> If you make it longer, __copy_msghdr_from_user() will silently truncate the
> size.
That's used for sys_sendmsg(), which AFAICT isn't relevant here. sockaddr_alg
is used with sys_bind(), which fails with EINVAL if the address is longer than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage).
However, since sys_sendmsg() is truncating overly-long addresses, it's probably
the case that sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) can never be increased in the
future...
>
> > This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
> > which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
> > is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be
> > defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
> > (either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
> > these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
> >
> > We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
> > break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
> > sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
> > sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
> >
> > One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
> > when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an
> > easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
> >
> > Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
> > array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
> > Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
> [...]
> > @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
> > struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> > struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> > - struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr;
> > + struct sockaddr_alg_new *sa = (void *)uaddr;
> > const struct af_alg_type *type;
> > void *private;
> > int err;
> > @@ -155,7 +155,11 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa))
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg_new, salg_name) !=
> > + offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name));
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name) != sizeof(*sa));
> > +
> > + if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > /* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */
> > @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0;
> > - sa->salg_name[sizeof(sa->salg_name) + addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
> > + sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
>
> This looks like an out-of-bounds write in the case `addr_len ==
> sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)`.
I think you mean addr_len == sizeof(*sa)? That's what the
'if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1) return -EINVAL' above is for.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-26 21:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <00000000000014370305b1c55370@google.com>
[not found] ` <202010162042.7C51549A16@keescook>
2020-10-17 6:20 ` UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind Jann Horn
[not found] ` <CACT4Y+bG=89ii+kzgGvNiZnB9ZEcAsy-3YofJeW5K_rynp_S7g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-10-17 11:02 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-17 14:41 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-26 20:07 ` [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 21:21 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:10 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-10-26 23:40 ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-26 21:23 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-26 21:56 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-10-26 22:40 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-06 7:01 ` Herbert Xu
2020-11-02 2:17 ` UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind syzbot
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