From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Dongsu Park <dpark@posteo.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 16:51:29 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXzZwz4a9uhQfdHb4L2afApTvVLPwVx640vvV-fzbCR0w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJTdL7To2JsQUXyg6B7Xbb0kow6sXH-L+teVi88=gm7MQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 4:40 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 4:19 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 7:41 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 4:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> +/* Sets task's modules_autoload */
>>>>>>> +static inline int task_set_modules_autoload(struct task_struct *task,
>>>>>>> + unsigned long value)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + if (value > MODULES_AUTOLOAD_DISABLED)
>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>> + else if (task->modules_autoload > value)
>>>>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>>>>>> + else if (task->modules_autoload < value)
>>>>>>> + task->modules_autoload = value;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This needs to be more locked down. Otherwise someone could set this
>>>>>> and then run a setuid program. Admittedly, it would be quite odd if
>>>>>> this particular thing causes a problem, but the issue exists
>>>>>> nonetheless.
>>>>>
>>>>> Eeeh, I don't agree this needs to be changed. APIs provided by modules
>>>>> are different than the existing privilege-manipulation syscalls this
>>>>> concern stems from. Applications are already forced to deal with
>>>>> things being missing like this in the face of it simply not being
>>>>> built into the kernel.
>>>>>
>>>>> Having to hide this behind nnp seems like it'd reduce its utility...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think that adding an inherited boolean to task_struct that can be
>>>> set by unprivileged tasks and passed to privileged tasks is a terrible
>>>> precedent. Ideally someone would try to find all the existing things
>>>> like this and kill them off.
>>>
>>> (Tristate, not boolean, but yeah.)
>>>
>>> I see two others besides seccomp and nnp:
>>>
>>> PR_MCE_KILL
>>
>> Well, that's interesting. That should presumably be reset on setuid
>> exec or something.
>>
>>> PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
>>
>> Um. At least that's just a performance issue.
>>
>>>
>>> I really don't think this needs nnp protection.
>>>
>>>> I agree that I don't see how one would exploit this particular
>>>> feature, but I still think I dislike the approach. This is a slippery
>>>> slope to adding a boolean for perf_event_open(), unshare(), etc, and
>>>> we should solve these for real rather than half-arsing them IMO.
>>>
>>> I disagree (obviously); this would be protecting the entire module
>>> autoload attack surface. That's hardly a specific control, and it's a
>>> demonstrably needed flag.
>>>
>>
>> The list is just going to get longer. We should probably have controls for:
>>
>> - Use of perf. Unclear how fine grained they should be.
>
> This can already be "given up" by a process by using seccomp. The
> system-wide setting is what's missing here, and that's a whole other
> thread already even though basically every distro has implemented the
> = 3 sysctl knob level.
But it can't be done the way Linus wants it, and I don't blame him for
complaining.
>
>> - Creation of new user namespaces. Possibly also use of things like
>> iptables without global privilege.
>
> This is another one that can be controlled by seccomp. The system-wide
> setting already exists in /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces.
Awkwardly, though.
>
>> - Ability to look up tasks owned by different uids (or maybe other
>> tasks *at all*) by pid/tid. Conceptually, this is easy. The API is
>> the only hard part, I think.
>
> The attack surface here is relatively small compared to the other examples.
>
>> - Ability to bind ports, maybe?
>
> seccomp and maybe a sysctl? I'd have to look at that more carefully,
> but again, this isn't a comparable attack-surface/confinement issue.
>
>> My point is that all of these need some way to handle configuration
>> and inheritance, and I don't think that a bunch of per-task prctls is
>> the right way. As just an example, saying that interactive users can
>> autoload modules but other users can't, or that certain systemd
>> services can, etc, might be nice. Linus already complained that he
>> (i.e. user "torvalds" or whatever) should be able to profile the
>> kernel but that other uids should not be able to.
>>
>> I personally like my implicit_rights idea, and it might be interesting
>> to prototype it.
>
> I don't like blocking a needed feature behind a large super-feature
> that doesn't exist yet. We'd be able to refactor this code into using
> such a thing in the future, so I'd prefer to move ahead with this
> since it would stop actual exploits.
I don't think the super-feature is so hard, and I think we should not
add the per-task thing the way it's done in this patch. Let's not add
per-task things where the best argument for their security is "not
sure how it would be exploited".
Anyway, I think the sysctl is really the important bit. The per-task
setting is icing on the cake IMO. One upon a time autoload was more
important, but these days modaliases are supposed to do most of the
work. I bet that modern distros don't need unprivileged autoload at
all.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-21 23:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-19 22:20 [PATCH v3 0/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restrictions Djalal Harouni
2017-04-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction Djalal Harouni
2017-04-19 23:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-20 2:22 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-20 12:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-04-20 15:02 ` Ben Hutchings
[not found] ` <1492700543.31767.23.camel-/+tVBieCtBitmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-20 20:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
[not found] ` <CAEiveUdFL53XyQpacmN6f8F28M0bLQDcetpRXJjrJ10vDmQi8Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-20 21:28 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 22:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction Djalal Harouni
2017-04-19 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-19 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-20 2:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrUueOx1tqj+Ru93KGpy2HHR-A_GQ6DrAppiomkPTtX7Lw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-21 23:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-21 23:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-21 23:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-21 23:51 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-04-22 0:12 ` Djalal Harouni
[not found] ` <CAEiveUcx8fwQgXdLPeMNsTjX2KPhQKH__a-XzcHko_1aCmh4sg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-22 1:19 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-22 6:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrUT73CcPQx2T=1zWbOUhw9r-c_YqXw5-KTwxgWPgXuTwA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-22 19:29 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLV+WZyj+xnxVFkFEgEthNt6eXdcSgHT-=85mJ1ECZ1Rw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 14:25 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-24 18:02 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jL_-cxidy_O4ORaN0iX9o7=hsi3DYTRvQs5w5363Z+MVg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 18:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-21 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-22 0:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-22 0:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-22 6:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-22 12:17 ` Djalal Harouni
[not found] ` <CAEiveUdbQcfn1xC5xWMv91vL_uR1MGTvARqw-E4GDTMUZ6t=bA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 13:07 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-05-04 14:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-05 13:06 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-05-05 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-04-20 1:57 ` kbuild test robot
[not found] ` <1492640420-27345-3-git-send-email-tixxdz-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-19 22:38 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-24 4:29 ` Rusty Russell
2017-04-26 9:06 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-27 2:07 ` Rusty Russell
[not found] ` <87k266hacq.fsf-8n+1lVoiYb80n/F98K4Iww@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-27 13:16 ` Djalal Harouni
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