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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, npmccallum@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 18:15:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YMeOnO4PBnvxEQEv@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8a598020-7d89-b399-efb9-735b2a6da8a9@amd.com>

* Tom Lendacky (thomas.lendacky@amd.com) wrote:
> On 6/9/21 2:24 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
> >> Version 2 of GHCB specification provides NAEs that can be used by the SNP
> >> guest to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor
> >> who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent.
> >>
> >> The hypervisor uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST command interface provided by
> >> the SEV-SNP firmware to forward the guest messages to the PSP.
> >>
> >> In order to communicate with the PSP, the guest need to locate the secrets
> >> page inserted by the hypervisor during the SEV-SNP guest launch. The
> >> secrets page contains the communication keys used to send and receive the
> >> encrypted messages between the guest and the PSP.
> >>
> >> The secrets page is located either through the setup_data cc_blob_address
> >> or EFI configuration table.
> >>
> >> Create a platform device that the SNP guest driver can bind to get the
> >> platform resources. The SNP guest driver can provide userspace interface
> >> to get the attestation report, key derivation etc.
> >>
> >> The helper snp_issue_guest_request() will be used by the drivers to
> >> send the guest message request to the hypervisor. The guest message header
> >> contains a message count. The message count is used in the IV. The
> >> firmware increments the message count by 1, and expects that next message
> >> will be using the incremented count.
> >>
> >> The helper snp_msg_seqno() will be used by driver to get and message
> >> sequence counter, and it will be automatically incremented by the
> >> snp_issue_guest_request(). The incremented value is be saved in the
> >> secrets page so that the kexec'ed kernel knows from where to begin.
> >>
> >> See SEV-SNP and GHCB spec for more details.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h      |  12 +++
> >>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h |   2 +
> >>  arch/x86/kernel/sev.c           | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c     |   2 +
> >>  include/linux/efi.h             |   1 +
> >>  include/linux/sev-guest.h       |  76 ++++++++++++++
> >>  6 files changed, 269 insertions(+)
> >>  create mode 100644 include/linux/sev-guest.h
> >>
> 
> >> +u64 snp_msg_seqno(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
> >> +	u64 count;
> >> +
> >> +	layout = snp_map_secrets_page();
> >> +	if (layout == NULL)
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +
> >> +	/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
> >> +	count = readl(&layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0);
> > 
> > Why is this seqno_0 - is that because it's the count of talking to the
> > PSP?
> 
> Yes, the sequence number is an ever increasing value that is used in
> communicating with the PSP. The PSP maintains the next expected sequence
> number and will reject messages which have a sequence number that is not
> in sync with the PSP. The 0 refers to the VMPL level. Each VMPL level has
> its own sequence number.

Can you just clarify; is that the VMPL of the caller or the destination?
What I'm partially asking here is whether it matters which VMPL the
kernel is running at (which I'm assuming could well be non-0)

> > 
> >> +	iounmap(layout);
> >> +
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a 64-bit value
> >> +	 * but the version 2 of GHCB specification defines the 32-bit storage for the
> >> +	 * it.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	if ((count + 1) >= INT_MAX)
> >> +		return 0;
> > 
> > Is that UINT_MAX?
> > 
> >> +
> >> +	return count + 1;
> >> +}
> >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_seqno);
> >> +
> >> +static void snp_gen_msg_seqno(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
> >> +	u64 count;
> >> +
> >> +	layout = snp_map_secrets_page();
> >> +	if (layout == NULL)
> >> +		return;
> >> +
> >> +	/* Increment the sequence counter by 2 and save in secrets page. */
> >> +	count = readl(&layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0);
> >> +	count += 2;
> > 
> > Why 2 not 1 ?
> 
> The return message by the PSP also increments the sequence number, hence
> the increment by 2 instead of 1 for the next message to be submitted.

OK

Dave

> I'll let Brijesh address the other questions.
> 
> Thanks,
> Tom
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK


  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-14 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02 14:03 [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 01/22] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-08 16:51     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 19:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 17:35   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 04/22] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-06-05 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 14:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 16:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-17 18:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  5:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 07/22] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 15:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 11:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 15:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-09 17:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10  5:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 15:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:45     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 19:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 21:01         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 11:00             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 12:03               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 12:49                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:02                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 13:10                     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:36                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:37                         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:06                   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 12/22] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 16:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 13/22] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-06-11  9:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 13:05     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 19:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 15/22] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 19:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 19:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 17/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 18/22] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 16:13     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  6:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-23  4:30         ` Michael Roth
2021-06-23 10:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24  3:19             ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24  7:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 12:26                 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:34                 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:54                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 14:11                     ` Michael Roth
2021-06-25 14:48                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 15:24                         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-25 17:01                           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 18:14                             ` Michael Roth
2021-06-28 13:43                               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 13:09               ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 11:28   ` Sergio Lopez
2021-06-09 19:24   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-11 13:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 17:15       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2021-06-14 18:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 13:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 17:23       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-14 20:50         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  9:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 13:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-30 16:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-01 18:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-01 21:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-03 16:19           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-05 10:39             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Venu Busireddy
2021-06-07 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov

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