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From: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, wugyuan@cn.ibm.com,
	jlayton@kernel.org, hsiangkao@aol.com, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] vfs: Really check for inode ptr in lookup_fast
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 19:08:54 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191022133855.B1B4752050@d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191015040730.6A84742047@d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com>

I think we have still not taken this patch. Al?


On 10/15/19 9:37 AM, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
> ping!!
> 
> On 9/27/19 10:12 AM, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
>> d_is_negative can race with d_instantiate_new()
>> -> __d_set_inode_and_type().
>> For e.g. in use cases where Thread-1 is creating
>> symlink (doing d_instantiate_new()) & Thread-2 is doing
>> cat of that symlink while doing lookup_fast (via REF-walk-
>> one such case is, when ->permission returns -ECHILD).
>>
>> During this race if __d_set_and_inode_type() does out-of-order
>> execution and set the dentry->d_flags before setting
>> dentry->inode, then it can result into following kernel panic.
>>
>> This change fixes the issue by directly checking for inode.
>>
>> E.g. kernel panic, since inode was NULL.
>> trailing_symlink() -> may_follow_link() -> inode->i_uid.
>> Issue signature:-
>>    [NIP  : trailing_symlink+80]
>>    [LR   : trailing_symlink+1092]
>>    #4 [c00000198069bb70] trailing_symlink at c0000000004bae60  
>> (unreliable)
>>    #5 [c00000198069bc00] path_openat at c0000000004bdd14
>>    #6 [c00000198069bc90] do_filp_open at c0000000004c0274
>>    #7 [c00000198069bdb0] do_sys_open at c00000000049b248
>>    #8 [c00000198069be30] system_call at c00000000000b388
>>
>> Sequence of events:-
>> Thread-2(Comm: ln)            Thread-1(Comm: cat)
>>
>>                     dentry = __d_lookup() //nonRCU
>>
>> __d_set_and_inode_type() (Out-of-order execution)
>>      flags = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_flags);
>>      flags &= ~(DCACHE_ENTRY_TYPE | DCACHE_FALLTHRU);
>>      flags |= type_flags;
>>      WRITE_ONCE(dentry->d_flags, flags);
>>
>>                     if (unlikely(d_is_negative()) // fails
>>                            {}
>>                     // since d_flags is already updated in
>>                     // Thread-2 in parallel but inode
>>                     // not yet set.
>>                     // d_is_negative returns false
>>
>>                     *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
>>                     // means inode is still NULL
>>
>>      dentry->d_inode = inode;
>>
>>                     trailing_symlink()
>>                         may_follow_link()
>>                             inode = nd->link_inode;
>>                             // nd->link_inode = NULL
>>                             //Then it crashes while
>>                             //doing inode->i_uid
>>
>> Reported-by: Guang Yuan Wu <wugyuan@cn.ibm.com>
>> Tested-by: Guang Yuan Wu <wugyuan@cn.ibm.com>
>> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   fs/namei.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>>   1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>> index 671c3c1a3425..7c5337cddebd 100644
>> --- a/fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/namei.c
>> @@ -1617,7 +1617,21 @@ static int lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
>>           dput(dentry);
>>           return status;
>>       }
>> -    if (unlikely(d_is_negative(dentry))) {
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * Caution: d_is_negative() can race with
>> +     * __d_set_inode_and_type().
>> +     * For e.g. in use cases where Thread-1 is creating
>> +     * symlink (doing d_instantiate_new()) & Thread-2 is doing
>> +     * cat of that symlink and falling here (via Ref-walk) while
>> +     * doing lookup_fast (one such case is when ->permission
>> +     * returns -ECHILD).
>> +     * Now if __d_set_inode_and_type() does out-of-order execution
>> +     * i.e. it first sets the dentry->d_flags & then dentry->inode
>> +     * then it can result into inode being NULL, causing panic later.
>> +     * Hence directly check if inode is NULL here.
>> +     */
>> +    if (unlikely(d_really_is_negative(dentry))) {
>>           dput(dentry);
>>           return -ENOENT;
>>       }
>>
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-22 13:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-27  4:42 [PATCH RESEND 1/1] vfs: Really check for inode ptr in lookup_fast Ritesh Harjani
2019-10-15  4:07 ` Ritesh Harjani
2019-10-22 13:38   ` Ritesh Harjani [this message]
2019-10-22 14:37     ` Al Viro
2019-10-22 14:50       ` Al Viro
2019-10-22 20:11       ` Al Viro
2019-10-23 11:05         ` Ritesh Harjani
2019-11-01 23:46           ` Al Viro
2019-11-02  6:17             ` Al Viro
2019-11-02 17:24               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-02 17:22             ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-02 18:08               ` Al Viro
2019-11-03 14:41                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-03 16:35                 ` [RFC] lookup_one_len_unlocked() lousy calling conventions Al Viro
2019-11-03 18:20                   ` Al Viro
2019-11-03 18:51                     ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable Al Viro
2019-11-03 19:03                       ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_parent is not stable either Al Viro
2019-11-13  7:01                       ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable Amir Goldstein
2019-11-13 12:52                         ` Al Viro
2019-11-13 16:22                           ` Amir Goldstein
2019-11-13 20:18                           ` Jean-Louis Biasini
2019-11-03 17:05                 ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs unlink/rmdir breakage (similar to caught in ecryptfs rename last year) Al Viro
2019-11-09  3:13                 ` [PATCH][RFC] race in exportfs_decode_fh() Al Viro
2019-11-09 16:55                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-09 18:26                     ` Al Viro
2019-11-11  9:16                   ` Christoph Hellwig

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