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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	wugyuan@cn.ibm.com, jlayton@kernel.org, hsiangkao@aol.com,
	Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] vfs: Really check for inode ptr in lookup_fast
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 21:11:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191022201131.GZ26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191022143736.GX26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 03:37:36PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 07:08:54PM +0530, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
> > I think we have still not taken this patch. Al?

> You've picked the easiest one to hit, but on e.g. KVM setups you can have the
> host thread representing the CPU where __d_set_inode_and_type() runs get
> preempted (by the host kernel), leaving others with much wider window.
> 
> Sure, we can do that to all callers of d_is_negative/d_is_positive, but...
> the same goes for any places that assumes that d_is_dir() implies that
> the sucker is positive, etc.
> 
> What we have guaranteed is
> 	* ->d_lock serializes ->d_flags/->d_inode changes
> 	* ->d_seq is bumped before/after such changes
> 	* positive dentry never changes ->d_inode as long as you hold
> a reference (negative dentry *can* become positive right under you)
> 
> So there are 3 classes of valid users: those holding ->d_lock, those
> sampling and rechecking ->d_seq and those relying upon having observed
> the sucker they've pinned to be positive.
> 
> What you've been hitting is "we have it pinned, ->d_flags says it's
> positive but we still observe the value of ->d_inode from before the
> store to ->d_flags that has made it look positive".

Actually, your patch opens another problem there.  Suppose you make
it d_really_is_positive() and hit the same race sans reordering.
Dentry is found by __d_lookup() and is negative.  Right after we
return from __d_lookup() another thread makes it positive (a symlink)
- ->d_inode is set, d_really_is_positive() becomes true.  OK, on we
go, pick the inode and move on.  Right?  ->d_flags is still not set
by the thread that made it positive.  We return from lookup_fast()
and call step_into().  And get to
        if (likely(!d_is_symlink(path->dentry)) ||
Which checks ->d_flags and sees the value from before the sucker
became positive.  IOW, d_is_symlink() is false here.  If that
was the last path component and we'd been told to follow links,
we will end up with positive dentry of a symlink coming out of
pathname resolution.

Similar fun happens if you have mkdir racing with lookup - ENOENT
is what should've happened if lookup comes first, success - if
mkdir does.  This way we can hit ENOTDIR, due to false negative
from d_can_lookup().

IOW, d_really_is_negative() in lookup_fast() will paper over
one of oopsen, but it
	* won't cover similar oopsen on other codepaths and
	* will lead to bogus behaviour.

I'm not sure that blanket conversion of d_is_... to smp_load_acquire()
is the right solution; it might very well be that we need to do that
only on a small subset of call sites, lookup_fast() being one of
those.  But we do want at least to be certain that something we'd
got from lookup_fast() in non-RCU mode already has ->d_flags visible.

I'm going through the callers right now, will post a followup once
the things get cleaner...

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-22 20:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-27  4:42 [PATCH RESEND 1/1] vfs: Really check for inode ptr in lookup_fast Ritesh Harjani
2019-10-15  4:07 ` Ritesh Harjani
2019-10-22 13:38   ` Ritesh Harjani
2019-10-22 14:37     ` Al Viro
2019-10-22 14:50       ` Al Viro
2019-10-22 20:11       ` Al Viro [this message]
2019-10-23 11:05         ` Ritesh Harjani
2019-11-01 23:46           ` Al Viro
2019-11-02  6:17             ` Al Viro
2019-11-02 17:24               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-02 17:22             ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-02 18:08               ` Al Viro
2019-11-03 14:41                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-03 16:35                 ` [RFC] lookup_one_len_unlocked() lousy calling conventions Al Viro
2019-11-03 18:20                   ` Al Viro
2019-11-03 18:51                     ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable Al Viro
2019-11-03 19:03                       ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_parent is not stable either Al Viro
2019-11-13  7:01                       ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable Amir Goldstein
2019-11-13 12:52                         ` Al Viro
2019-11-13 16:22                           ` Amir Goldstein
2019-11-13 20:18                           ` Jean-Louis Biasini
2019-11-03 17:05                 ` [PATCH][RFC] ecryptfs unlink/rmdir breakage (similar to caught in ecryptfs rename last year) Al Viro
2019-11-09  3:13                 ` [PATCH][RFC] race in exportfs_decode_fh() Al Viro
2019-11-09 16:55                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-09 18:26                     ` Al Viro
2019-11-11  9:16                   ` Christoph Hellwig

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