From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com, sfrench@samba.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
rgb@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
SELinux <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 22/27] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 17:39:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <32623.1550252354@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <758871dc-15b7-ed5c-a119-a40037309507@tycho.nsa.gov>
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -6560,6 +6560,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > {
> > struct key *key;
> > struct key_security_struct *ksec;
> > + unsigned oldstyle_perm;
> > u32 sid;
> > /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
> > @@ -6568,13 +6569,26 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > if (perm == 0)
> > return 0;
> > + oldstyle_perm = perm & (KEY_NEED_VIEW | KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_WRITE
> > |
> > + KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_LINK);
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_SETSEC)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_INVAL)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_REVOKE && !(perm & OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_JOIN)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_CLEAR)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
> > +
> > sid = cred_sid(cred);
> > key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
> > ksec = key->security;
> > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> > - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
> > + sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, oldstyle_perm, NULL);
>
> This might be ok temporarily for compatibility but we'll want to ultimately
> define the new permissions in SELinux and switch over to using them if a new
> policy capability bit is set to indicate that the policy supports them. We
> should probably decouple the SELinux permission bits from the KEY_NEED_*
> values and explicitly map them all at the same time.
Sounds reasonable. I should probably detach the first two ACL patches from
the set and push them separately.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-15 17:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-15 16:07 [RFC PATCH 00/27] Containers and using authenticated filesystems David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 01/27] containers: Rename linux/container.h to linux/container_dev.h David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 02/27] containers: Implement containers as kernel objects David Howells
2019-02-17 18:57 ` Trond Myklebust
2019-02-17 19:39 ` James Bottomley
2019-02-19 16:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-19 23:03 ` David Howells
2019-02-20 14:23 ` Trond Myklebust
2019-02-19 23:06 ` David Howells
2019-02-20 2:20 ` James Bottomley
2019-02-20 3:04 ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20 3:46 ` James Bottomley
2019-02-20 4:42 ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20 6:57 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-19 23:13 ` David Howells
2019-02-19 23:55 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-02-20 2:46 ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20 13:26 ` Christian Brauner
2019-02-21 10:39 ` Ian Kent
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 03/27] containers: Provide /proc/containers David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 04/27] containers: Allow a process to be forked into a container David Howells
2019-02-15 17:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-19 16:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-19 23:16 ` David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 05/27] containers: Open a socket inside " David Howells
2019-02-19 16:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/27] containers, vfs: Allow syscall dirfd arguments to take a container fd David Howells
2019-02-19 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-19 23:24 ` David Howells
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/27] containers: Make fsopen() able to create a superblock in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/27] containers, vfs: Honour CONTAINER_NEW_EMPTY_FS_NS David Howells
2019-02-17 0:11 ` Al Viro
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/27] vfs: Allow mounting to other namespaces David Howells
2019-02-17 0:14 ` Al Viro
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/27] containers: Provide fs_context op for container setting David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 11/27] containers: Sample program for driving container objects David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 12/27] containers: Allow a daemon to intercept request_key upcalls in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 13/27] keys: Provide a keyctl to query a request_key authentication key David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 14/27] keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 15/27] keys: Make __key_link_begin() handle lockdep nesting David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 16/27] keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 17/27] keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 18/27] keys: Find the least-recently used unseen key in a keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 19/27] containers: Sample: request_key upcall handling David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 20/27] container, keys: Add a container keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 21:46 ` Eric Biggers
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 21/27] keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 22/27] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL David Howells
2019-02-15 17:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-15 17:39 ` David Howells [this message]
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 23/27] KEYS: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 24/27] keys: Allow a container to be specified as a subject in a key's ACL David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 25/27] keys: Provide a way to ask for the container keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 16:12 ` [RFC PATCH 26/27] keys: Allow containers to be included in key ACLs by name David Howells
2019-02-15 16:12 ` [RFC PATCH 27/27] containers: Sample to grant access to a key in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH 00/27] Containers and using authenticated filesystems James Morris
2019-02-19 16:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-20 14:18 ` Christian Brauner
2019-02-19 23:42 ` David Howells
2019-02-20 7:00 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-20 18:54 ` Steve French
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