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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com,
	sfrench@samba.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, rgb@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 06/27] containers, vfs: Allow syscall dirfd arguments to take a container fd
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 10:45:33 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8736ojwwuq.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <155024688620.21651.16013251077091180213.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (David Howells's message of "Fri, 15 Feb 2019 16:08:06 +0000")

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes:

> Some filesystem system calls, such as mkdirat(), take a 'directory fd' to
> specify the pathwalk origin.  This takes either AT_FDCWD or a file
> descriptor that refers to an open directory.
>
> Make it possible to supply a container fd, as obtained from
> container_create(), instead thereby specifying the container's root as the
> origin.  This performs the filesystem operation into the container's mount
> namespace.  For example:
>
> 	int cfd = container_create("fred", CONTAINER_NEW_MNT_NS, 0);
> 	mkdirat(cfd, "/fred", 0755);
>
> A better way to do this might be to temporarily override current->fs and
> current->nsproxy, but this requires splitting those fields so that procfs
> doesn't see the override.
>
> A sequence number and lock are available to protect the root pointer in
> case container_chroot() and/or container_pivot_root() are implemented.

If this is desirable we can do this without a ``container''.  We already
have mount namespaces.

Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

In fact if you take care to use a path that starts with '/' the normal
dirfd based operations work just fine.

So I don't see the point of this system call at all.


> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
>  fs/namei.c |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index a85deb55d0c9..4932b5467285 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -2232,20 +2232,43 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
>  		if (!f.file)
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
>  
> -		dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
> +		if (is_container_file(f.file)) {
> +			struct container *c = f.file->private_data;
> +			unsigned seq;
>  
> -		if (*s && unlikely(!d_can_lookup(dentry))) {
> -			fdput(f);
> -			return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
> -		}
> +			if (!*s)
> +				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  
> -		nd->path = f.file->f_path;
> -		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> -			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> -			nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
> +			if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> +				do {
> +					seq = read_seqcount_begin(&c->seq);
> +					nd->path = c->root;
> +					nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> +					nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
> +				} while (read_seqcount_retry(&c->seq, seq));
> +			} else {
> +				spin_lock(&c->lock);
> +				nd->path = c->root;
> +				path_get(&nd->path);
> +				spin_unlock(&c->lock);
> +				nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> +			}
>  		} else {
> -			path_get(&nd->path);
> -			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> +			dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
> +
> +			if (*s && unlikely(!d_can_lookup(dentry))) {
> +				fdput(f);
> +				return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
> +			}
> +
> +			nd->path = f.file->f_path;
> +			if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> +				nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> +				nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
> +			} else {
> +				path_get(&nd->path);
> +				nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
> +			}
>  		}
>  		fdput(f);
>  		return s;

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-19 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-15 16:07 [RFC PATCH 00/27] Containers and using authenticated filesystems David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 01/27] containers: Rename linux/container.h to linux/container_dev.h David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 02/27] containers: Implement containers as kernel objects David Howells
2019-02-17 18:57   ` Trond Myklebust
2019-02-17 19:39   ` James Bottomley
2019-02-19 16:56   ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-19 23:03   ` David Howells
2019-02-20 14:23     ` Trond Myklebust
2019-02-19 23:06   ` David Howells
2019-02-20  2:20     ` James Bottomley
2019-02-20  3:04       ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20  3:46         ` James Bottomley
2019-02-20  4:42           ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20  6:57           ` Paul Moore
2019-02-19 23:13   ` David Howells
2019-02-19 23:55   ` Tycho Andersen
2019-02-20  2:46   ` Ian Kent
2019-02-20 13:26     ` Christian Brauner
2019-02-21 10:39       ` Ian Kent
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 03/27] containers: Provide /proc/containers David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 04/27] containers: Allow a process to be forked into a container David Howells
2019-02-15 17:39   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-19 16:39   ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-19 23:16   ` David Howells
2019-02-15 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 05/27] containers: Open a socket inside " David Howells
2019-02-19 16:41   ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/27] containers, vfs: Allow syscall dirfd arguments to take a container fd David Howells
2019-02-19 16:45   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2019-02-19 23:24   ` David Howells
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/27] containers: Make fsopen() able to create a superblock in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/27] containers, vfs: Honour CONTAINER_NEW_EMPTY_FS_NS David Howells
2019-02-17  0:11   ` Al Viro
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/27] vfs: Allow mounting to other namespaces David Howells
2019-02-17  0:14   ` Al Viro
2019-02-15 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/27] containers: Provide fs_context op for container setting David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 11/27] containers: Sample program for driving container objects David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 12/27] containers: Allow a daemon to intercept request_key upcalls in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 13/27] keys: Provide a keyctl to query a request_key authentication key David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 14/27] keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 15/27] keys: Make __key_link_begin() handle lockdep nesting David Howells
2019-02-15 16:09 ` [RFC PATCH 16/27] keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 17/27] keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 18/27] keys: Find the least-recently used unseen key in a keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 19/27] containers: Sample: request_key upcall handling David Howells
2019-02-15 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH 20/27] container, keys: Add a container keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 21:46   ` Eric Biggers
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 21/27] keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 22/27] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL David Howells
2019-02-15 17:32   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-15 17:39   ` David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 23/27] KEYS: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 24/27] keys: Allow a container to be specified as a subject in a key's ACL David Howells
2019-02-15 16:11 ` [RFC PATCH 25/27] keys: Provide a way to ask for the container keyring David Howells
2019-02-15 16:12 ` [RFC PATCH 26/27] keys: Allow containers to be included in key ACLs by name David Howells
2019-02-15 16:12 ` [RFC PATCH 27/27] containers: Sample to grant access to a key in a container David Howells
2019-02-15 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH 00/27] Containers and using authenticated filesystems James Morris
2019-02-19 16:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-02-20 14:18   ` Christian Brauner
2019-02-19 23:42 ` David Howells
2019-02-20  7:00   ` Paul Moore
2019-02-20 18:54   ` Steve French

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