From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 12:37:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fd6ddc3d-e5d3-4b9c-b00b-ac2b1f22d653@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240115181809.885385-20-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On 1/15/24 13:18, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
> integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
> ima_kernel_module_request().
>
> Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
> and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
> LSM infrastructure).
>
> Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
> passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
> cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
> commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
> unavailable").
>
> EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
> mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
> recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
> by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
> same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 10 +++++++++
> include/linux/integrity.h | 13 ------------
> security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 --------------------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 31ef6c3c3207..0f9af283cbc8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -256,4 +256,14 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
> return false;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)
> +extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +#else
> +static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#endif
> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> -
> -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> -
> #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 895f4b9ce8c6..de603cf42ac7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
> return ret;
> }
> -
> -/**
> - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> - * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> - *
> - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
> - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
> - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
> - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
> - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
> - *
> - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
> - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
> - * also signed with digsig.
> - */
> -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 02021ee467d3..908fa026ec58 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -1091,6 +1091,35 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +
> +/**
> + * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> + * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> + *
> + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA > + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
> + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
> + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
> + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
> + *
> + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
> + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
> + * also signed with digsig.
This text needs to some reformulation at some point..
> + *
> + * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
> + */
> +int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> +
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> {
> int error;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d2a1226e6e69..6c6571a141a1 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> + return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> }
>
> /**
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-12 17:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-15 18:17 [PATCH v9 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 1/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 2/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 3/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 4/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 5/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 6/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 7/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 8/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 9/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:17 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:17 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:56 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 9:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 10:12 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 10:46 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-09 11:34 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 12:02 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-12 21:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-12 21:16 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-13 12:58 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-13 15:33 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-14 20:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-14 21:21 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-15 8:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-15 15:02 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 19:15 ` Al Viro
2024-01-16 8:47 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-01-16 17:33 ` Al Viro
2024-01-16 18:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:15 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:21 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:54 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:23 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:53 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:26 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:51 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:52 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 17:37 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2024-02-12 17:56 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 20:28 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-13 8:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-13 16:31 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-15 9:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 18:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:50 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:45 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:45 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:48 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 18:26 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 19:13 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-12 19:47 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 19:50 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2024-02-08 8:05 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 14:16 ` Paul Moore
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