From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, y0un9n132@gmail.com,
x86@kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 22:25:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240217062035.work.493-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
Hi,
It was recently pointed out[1] that x86_64 brk entropy was not great,
and that on all architectures the brk can (when the random offset is 0)
be immediately adjacent to .bss, leaving no gap that could stop linear
overflows from the .bss. Address both issues.
-Kees
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Kees Cook (2):
x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2024-02-17 6:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-17 6:25 Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64 Kees Cook
2024-02-26 10:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk Kees Cook
2024-04-24 19:20 ` (subset) " Kees Cook
2024-02-18 0:25 ` [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-18 1:25 ` Kees Cook
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