* [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness
@ 2024-02-17 6:25 Kees Cook
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64 Kees Cook
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2024-02-17 6:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Kees Cook, Geert Uytterhoeven, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Qi Zheng, Alexandre Ghiti, Al Viro, Christian Brauner, Jan Kara,
Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Kirill A. Shutemov, Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas,
Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, y0un9n132, x86, linux-fsdevel,
linux-mm, linux-hardening
Hi,
It was recently pointed out[1] that x86_64 brk entropy was not great,
and that on all architectures the brk can (when the random offset is 0)
be immediately adjacent to .bss, leaving no gap that could stop linear
overflows from the .bss. Address both issues.
-Kees
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Kees Cook (2):
x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
2024-02-17 6:25 [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness Kees Cook
@ 2024-02-17 6:25 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-26 10:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk Kees Cook
2024-02-18 0:25 ` [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness H. Peter Anvin
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2024-02-17 6:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Kees Cook, y0un9n132, Geert Uytterhoeven, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Qi Zheng, Alexandre Ghiti, x86, Al Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy,
Josh Poimboeuf, Kirill A. Shutemov, Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst,
Bjorn Helgaas, Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel,
linux-mm, linux-hardening
In commit c1d171a00294 ("x86: randomize brk"), arch_randomize_brk() was
defined to use a 32MB range (13 bits of entropy), but was never increased
when moving to 64-bit. The default arch_randomize_brk() uses 32MB for
32-bit tasks, and 1GB (18 bits of entropy) for 64-bit tasks. Update
x86_64 to match the entropy used by arm64 and other 64-bit architectures.
Reported-by: y0un9n132@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index ab49ade31b0d..45a9d496fe2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -1030,7 +1030,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
+ if (mmap_is_ia32())
+ return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
+
+ return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
}
/*
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
2024-02-17 6:25 [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness Kees Cook
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64 Kees Cook
@ 2024-02-17 6:25 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-24 19:20 ` (subset) " Kees Cook
2024-02-18 0:25 ` [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness H. Peter Anvin
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2024-02-17 6:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Kees Cook, y0un9n132, Geert Uytterhoeven, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner, Jan Kara, Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy,
linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Qi Zheng, Alexandre Ghiti, Josh Poimboeuf, Kirill A. Shutemov,
Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas, Tony Battersby,
linux-kernel, x86, linux-hardening
Currently the brk starts its randomization immediately after .bss,
which means there is a chance that when the random offset is 0, linear
overflows from .bss can reach into the brk area. Leave at least a single
page gap between .bss and brk (when it has not already been explicitly
relocated into the mmap range).
Reported-by: y0un9n132@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 5397b552fbeb..7862962f7a85 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE) &&
elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN && !interpreter) {
mm->brk = mm->start_brk = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE;
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise leave a gap between .bss and brk. */
+ mm->brk = mm->start_brk = mm->brk + PAGE_SIZE;
}
mm->brk = mm->start_brk = arch_randomize_brk(mm);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness
2024-02-17 6:25 [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness Kees Cook
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64 Kees Cook
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk Kees Cook
@ 2024-02-18 0:25 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-18 1:25 ` Kees Cook
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: H. Peter Anvin @ 2024-02-18 0:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook, Jiri Kosina
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Qi Zheng,
Alexandre Ghiti, Al Viro, Christian Brauner, Jan Kara,
Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Kirill A. Shutemov, Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas,
Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, y0un9n132, x86, linux-fsdevel,
linux-mm, linux-hardening
On February 16, 2024 10:25:42 PM PST, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>Hi,
>
>It was recently pointed out[1] that x86_64 brk entropy was not great,
>and that on all architectures the brk can (when the random offset is 0)
>be immediately adjacent to .bss, leaving no gap that could stop linear
>overflows from the .bss. Address both issues.
>
>-Kees
>
>Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com [1]
>
>Kees Cook (2):
> x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
> binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
>
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 +++
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
Why do we even have the brk, or perhaps more importantly, why do we use it? Is there any reason whatsoever why glibc uses brk instead of mmap to her heap memory?
I thought the base of the brk wasn't even known to userspace other than in the form of the image end...
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness
2024-02-18 0:25 ` [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness H. Peter Anvin
@ 2024-02-18 1:25 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2024-02-18 1:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: H. Peter Anvin
Cc: Jiri Kosina, Geert Uytterhoeven, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Peter Zijlstra, Qi Zheng,
Alexandre Ghiti, Al Viro, Christian Brauner, Jan Kara,
Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Kirill A. Shutemov, Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas,
Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, y0un9n132, x86, linux-fsdevel,
linux-mm, linux-hardening
On Sat, Feb 17, 2024 at 04:25:33PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On February 16, 2024 10:25:42 PM PST, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >Hi,
> >
> >It was recently pointed out[1] that x86_64 brk entropy was not great,
> >and that on all architectures the brk can (when the random offset is 0)
> >be immediately adjacent to .bss, leaving no gap that could stop linear
> >overflows from the .bss. Address both issues.
> >
> >-Kees
> >
> >Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com [1]
> >
> >Kees Cook (2):
> > x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
> > binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
> >
> > arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
> > fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 +++
> > 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
>
> Why do we even have the brk, or perhaps more importantly, why do we use it? Is there any reason whatsoever why glibc uses brk instead of mmap to her heap memory?
>
> I thought the base of the brk wasn't even known to userspace other than in the form of the image end...
AFAIK, it's part of ELF ABI, and the loader uses it only for very early
allocations. e.g. it's what shows up as "[heap]" in /proc/$pid/maps.
It's also available to any program that wants it still (see "man brk").
I don't think glibc has plans to redirect it.
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64 Kees Cook
@ 2024-02-26 10:39 ` Jiri Kosina
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jiri Kosina @ 2024-02-26 10:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: y0un9n132, Geert Uytterhoeven, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Qi Zheng, Alexandre Ghiti, x86, Al Viro, Christian Brauner,
Jan Kara, Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy, Josh Poimboeuf,
Kirill A. Shutemov, Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas,
Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
linux-hardening
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024, Kees Cook wrote:
> In commit c1d171a00294 ("x86: randomize brk"), arch_randomize_brk() was
> defined to use a 32MB range (13 bits of entropy), but was never increased
> when moving to 64-bit. The default arch_randomize_brk() uses 32MB for
> 32-bit tasks, and 1GB (18 bits of entropy) for 64-bit tasks. Update
> x86_64 to match the entropy used by arm64 and other 64-bit architectures.
>
> Reported-by: y0un9n132@gmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Wow, this is a pretty aged code indeed.
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: (subset) [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk Kees Cook
@ 2024-04-24 19:20 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2024-04-24 19:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Kosina, Kees Cook
Cc: y0un9n132, Geert Uytterhoeven, Alexander Viro, Christian Brauner,
Jan Kara, Eric Biederman, Christophe Leroy, linux-fsdevel,
linux-mm, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra, Qi Zheng,
Alexandre Ghiti, Josh Poimboeuf, Kirill A. Shutemov,
Rick Edgecombe, Brian Gerst, Bjorn Helgaas, Tony Battersby,
linux-kernel, x86, linux-hardening
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 22:25:44 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Currently the brk starts its randomization immediately after .bss,
> which means there is a chance that when the random offset is 0, linear
> overflows from .bss can reach into the brk area. Leave at least a single
> page gap between .bss and brk (when it has not already been explicitly
> relocated into the mmap range).
>
>
> [...]
Patch 1/2 was already applied via x86 tip, so I'll grab this one for the execve/binfmt tree.
Applied to for-next/execve.
[2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2a5eb9995528
Take care,
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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2024-02-17 6:25 [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness Kees Cook
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2024-02-26 10:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-17 6:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk Kees Cook
2024-04-24 19:20 ` (subset) " Kees Cook
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