From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 09:48:44 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 14:10 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote:
> Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific
> functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA
> include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch
> defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing
> the different architectures to select it.
>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +-
> arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
> include/linux/ima.h | 3 +--
> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++
> 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index 497b7d0b2d7e..b8ce1b995633 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ config PPC
> select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
> select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
> select VIRT_TO_BUS if !PPC64
> + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> #
> # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically.
> #
> @@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> prompt "Enable secure boot support"
> bool
> depends on PPC_POWERNV
> - depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> help
> Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security
> policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> index 8abe77536d9d..90ff3633ade6 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390
> select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
> select SWIOTLB
> select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
> + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
>
>
> config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index beea77046f9b..cafa66313fe2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86
> select VIRT_TO_BUS
> select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS
> select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS
> + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI
Not everyone is interested in enabling IMA or requiring IMA runtime
policies. With this patch, enabling IMA_ARCH_POLICY is therefore
still left up to the person building the kernel. As a result, I'm
seeing the following warning, which is kind of cool.
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for
IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && IMA [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- X86 [=y] && EFI [=y]
Ard, Michael, Martin, just making sure this type of warning is
acceptable before upstreaming this patch. I would appreciate your
tags.
thanks!
Mimi
>
> config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
> def_bool y
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 1659217e9b60..aefe758f4466 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
> extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
> #endif
>
> -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \
> - || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
> extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
> extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
> #else
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index 3f3ee4e2eb0d..d17972aa413a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -327,3 +327,12 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
> depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> default y
> +
> +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
> + bool
> + depends on IMA
> + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + default n
> + help
> + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or
> + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-02 14:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-26 19:10 [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies Nayna Jain
2020-02-26 19:21 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-02-26 20:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-02-27 19:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-03-02 14:48 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-03-02 14:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-02 14:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-03-02 21:21 ` Heiko Carstens
2020-03-02 23:23 ` Michael Ellerman
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