From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 15:51:59 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200522125214.31348-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200522125214.31348-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
force_dma_unencrypted() has to return true for KVM guest with the memory
protected enabled. Move it out of AMD SME code.
Introduce new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON that has to be
selected by all x86 memory encryption features.
This is preparation for the following patches.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 +++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 4 +++-
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 30 -------------------------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2d3f963fd6f1..bc72bfd89bcf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1518,12 +1518,16 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS
helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge
page mappings when mapping protections are changed.
+config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
+ select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+ def_bool n
+
config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
- select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
- select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
---help---
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index e1aa17a468a8..c58d52fd7bf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -256,10 +256,12 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void)
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
static inline bool sev_key_active(void)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 98f7c6fa2eaa..af8683c053a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON) += mem_encrypt_common.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index a03614bd3e1a..112304a706f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
-#include <linux/device.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -350,32 +346,6 @@ bool sev_active(void)
return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
}
-/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
-bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
-{
- /*
- * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
- */
- if (sev_active())
- return true;
-
- /*
- * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
- * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
- * encryption mask.
- */
- if (sme_active()) {
- u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
- u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
- dev->bus_dma_limit);
-
- if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
-}
-
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..964e04152417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+
+/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
+bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
+{
+ /*
+ * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted/shared addresses.
+ */
+ if (sev_active())
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
+ * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
+ * encryption mask.
+ */
+ if (sme_active()) {
+ u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
+ u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
+ dev->bus_dma_limit);
+
+ if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-22 12:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-22 12:51 [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:51 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 02/16] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 14:58 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-27 5:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-27 8:39 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-27 8:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-03 2:09 ` Huang, Kai
2020-06-03 11:14 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 03/16] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 04/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 05/16] x86/kvm: Make VirtIO use DMA API in KVM guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 06/16] KVM: Use GUP instead of copy_from/to_user() to access guest memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:08 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-01 16:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-02 13:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:56 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-29 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 07/16] KVM: mm: Introduce VM_KVM_PROTECTED Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:15 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:01 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:40 ` John Hubbard
2020-05-26 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 08/16] KVM: x86: Use GUP for page walk instead of __get_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 09/16] KVM: Protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-03 1:34 ` Huang, Kai
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 10/16] KVM: x86: Enabled protected " Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-26 6:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 11/16] KVM: Rework copy_to/from_guest() to avoid direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 12/16] x86/kvm: Share steal time page with host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:22 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:42 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 14/16] KVM: Introduce gfn_to_pfn_memslot_protected() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 15/16] KVM: Handle protected memory in __kvm_map_gfn()/__kvm_unmap_gfn() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 16/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 5:27 ` [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 13:47 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-25 14:46 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:56 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26 6:17 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 10:16 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26 11:38 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-27 15:45 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-27 21:22 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-06-04 15:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 16:27 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 16:35 ` Will Deacon
2020-06-04 19:09 ` Nakajima, Jun
2020-06-04 21:03 ` Jim Mattson
2020-06-04 23:29 ` Nakajima, Jun
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200522125214.31348-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--to=kirill@shutemov.name \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=andi.kleen@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
--cc=wad@chromium.org \
--cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).