From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 16/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 01:10:27 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200526221027.ixxahg6ya2z5fppy@box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200526061638.GA48741@kernel.org>
On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 09:16:38AM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 03:52:14PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > If the protected memory feature enabled, unmap guest memory from
> > kernel's direct mappings.
> >
> > Migration and KSM is disabled for protected memory as it would require a
> > special treatment.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 +
> > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++
> > mm/huge_memory.c | 9 +++++
> > mm/ksm.c | 3 ++
> > mm/memory.c | 13 +++++++
> > mm/rmap.c | 4 ++
> > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 7 files changed, 107 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > index 6f075766bb94..13988413af40 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > @@ -2227,6 +2227,7 @@ void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
> >
> > arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode();
> > }
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kernel_map_pages);
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
> > bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index b6944f88033d..e1d7762b615c 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -705,6 +705,9 @@ int kvm_protect_all_memory(struct kvm *kvm);
> > int kvm_protect_memory(struct kvm *kvm,
> > unsigned long gfn, unsigned long npages, bool protect);
> >
> > +void kvm_map_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages);
> > +void kvm_unmap_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages);
> > +
> > int gfn_to_page_many_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
> > struct page **pages, int nr_pages);
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
> > index c3562648a4ef..d8a444a401cc 100644
> > --- a/mm/huge_memory.c
> > +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
> > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> > #include <linux/oom.h>
> > #include <linux/numa.h>
> > #include <linux/page_owner.h>
> > +#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
>
> This does not seem right...
I agree. I try to find a more clean way to deal with it.
> > #include <asm/tlb.h>
> > #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> > @@ -650,6 +651,10 @@ static vm_fault_t __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf,
> > spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);
> > count_vm_event(THP_FAULT_ALLOC);
> > count_memcg_events(memcg, THP_FAULT_ALLOC, 1);
> > +
> > + /* Unmap page from direct mapping */
> > + if (vma_is_kvm_protected(vma))
> > + kvm_unmap_page(page, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
>
> ... and neither does this.
>
> I think the map/unmap primitives shoud be a part of the generic mm and
> not burried inside KVM.
Well, yes. Except, kvm_map_page() also clears the page before bringing it
back to direct mappings. Not sure yet how to deal with it.
> > return 0;
> > @@ -1886,6 +1891,10 @@ int zap_huge_pmd(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > page_remove_rmap(page, true);
> > VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_mapcount(page) < 0, page);
> > VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page), page);
> > +
> > + /* Map the page back to the direct mapping */
> > + if (vma_is_kvm_protected(vma))
> > + kvm_map_page(page, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
> > } else if (thp_migration_supported()) {
> > swp_entry_t entry;
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/ksm.c b/mm/ksm.c
> > index 281c00129a2e..942b88782ac2 100644
> > --- a/mm/ksm.c
> > +++ b/mm/ksm.c
> > @@ -527,6 +527,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *find_mergeable_vma(struct mm_struct *mm,
> > return NULL;
> > if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MERGEABLE) || !vma->anon_vma)
> > return NULL;
> > + /* TODO */
>
> Probably this is not something that should be done. For a security
> sensitive environment that wants protected memory, KSM woudn't be
> relevant anyway...
Hm. True.
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > index 71aac117357f..defc33d3a124 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
> > #include <linux/io.h>
> > #include <linux/lockdep.h>
> > #include <linux/kthread.h>
> > +#include <linux/pagewalk.h>
> >
> > #include <asm/processor.h>
> > #include <asm/ioctl.h>
> > @@ -2718,6 +2719,72 @@ void kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty);
> >
> > +void kvm_map_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + /* Clear page before returning it to the direct mapping */
> > + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
> > + void *p = map_page_atomic(page + i);
> > + memset(p, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> > + unmap_page_atomic(p);
> > + }
> > +
> > + kernel_map_pages(page, nr_pages, 1);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_map_page);
> > +
> > +void kvm_unmap_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages)
> > +{
> > + kernel_map_pages(page, nr_pages, 0);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_unmap_page);
> > +
> > +static int adjust_direct_mapping_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> > + unsigned long end,
> > + struct mm_walk *walk)
> > +{
> > + bool protect = (bool)walk->private;
> > + pte_t *pte;
> > + struct page *page;
> > +
> > + if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
> > + page = pmd_page(*pmd);
> > + if (is_huge_zero_page(page))
> > + return 0;
> > + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(total_mapcount(page) != 1, page);
> > + /* XXX: Would it fail with direct device assignment? */
> > + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page) != 1, page);
> > + kernel_map_pages(page, HPAGE_PMD_NR, !protect);
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
> > + for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
> > + pte_t entry = *pte;
> > +
> > + if (!pte_present(entry))
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + if (is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(entry)))
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + page = pte_page(entry);
> > +
> > + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_mapcount(page) != 1, page);
> > + /* XXX: Would it fail with direct device assignment? */
> > + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page) !=
> > + total_mapcount(compound_head(page)), page);
> > + kernel_map_pages(page, 1, !protect);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct mm_walk_ops adjust_direct_mapping_ops = {
> > + .pmd_entry = adjust_direct_mapping_pte_range,
> > +};
> > +
>
> All this seem to me an addition to set_memory APIs rather then KVM.
Emm?.. I don't think walking userspace mapping is set_memory thing.
And kernel_map_pages() is VMM interface already.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-26 22:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-22 12:51 [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:51 ` [RFC 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 02/16] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 14:58 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-27 5:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-27 8:39 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-27 8:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-03 2:09 ` Huang, Kai
2020-06-03 11:14 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 03/16] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 04/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 05/16] x86/kvm: Make VirtIO use DMA API in KVM guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 06/16] KVM: Use GUP instead of copy_from/to_user() to access guest memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:08 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-01 16:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-02 13:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:56 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-29 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 07/16] KVM: mm: Introduce VM_KVM_PROTECTED Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:15 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:01 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:40 ` John Hubbard
2020-05-26 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 08/16] KVM: x86: Use GUP for page walk instead of __get_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 09/16] KVM: Protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-03 1:34 ` Huang, Kai
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 10/16] KVM: x86: Enabled protected " Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-26 6:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 11/16] KVM: Rework copy_to/from_guest() to avoid direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 12/16] x86/kvm: Share steal time page with host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:22 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:42 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 14/16] KVM: Introduce gfn_to_pfn_memslot_protected() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 15/16] KVM: Handle protected memory in __kvm_map_gfn()/__kvm_unmap_gfn() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 16/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26 6:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2020-05-25 5:27 ` [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 13:47 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-25 14:46 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:56 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26 6:17 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 10:16 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26 11:38 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-27 15:45 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-27 21:22 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-06-04 15:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 16:27 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 16:35 ` Will Deacon
2020-06-04 19:09 ` Nakajima, Jun
2020-06-04 21:03 ` Jim Mattson
2020-06-04 23:29 ` Nakajima, Jun
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