From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 11:02:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWW2AEhO0TY8Xr7Fe5u9c7WB7zg4d2TPp3G6b9X1pO8BA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1572171452-7958-2-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.org>
On Sun, Oct 27, 2019 at 3:17 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> The mappings created with MAP_EXCLUSIVE are visible only in the context of
> the owning process and can be used by applications to store secret
> information that will not be visible not only to other processes but to the
> kernel as well.
>
> The pages in these mappings are removed from the kernel direct map and
> marked with PG_user_exclusive flag. When the exclusive area is unmapped,
> the pages are mapped back into the direct map.
>
> The MAP_EXCLUSIVE flag implies MAP_POPULATE and MAP_LOCKED.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 14 ++++++++++
> fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 1 +
> include/linux/mm.h | 9 +++++++
> include/linux/page-flags.h | 7 +++++
> include/linux/page_excl.h | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 9 ++++++-
> include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 +
> kernel/fork.c | 3 ++-
> mm/Kconfig | 3 +++
> mm/gup.c | 8 ++++++
> mm/memory.c | 3 +++
> mm/mmap.c | 16 +++++++++++
> mm/page_alloc.c | 5 ++++
> 13 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/page_excl.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index 9ceacd1..8f73a75 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> /* exception_enter(), ... */
> #include <linux/uaccess.h> /* faulthandler_disabled() */
> #include <linux/efi.h> /* efi_recover_from_page_fault()*/
> +#include <linux/page_excl.h> /* page_is_user_exclusive() */
> #include <linux/mm_types.h>
>
> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
> @@ -1218,6 +1219,13 @@ static int fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)
> return address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX;
> }
>
> +static bool fault_in_user_exclusive_page(unsigned long address)
> +{
> + struct page *page = virt_to_page(address);
> +
> + return page_is_user_exclusive(page);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Called for all faults where 'address' is part of the kernel address
> * space. Might get called for faults that originate from *code* that
> @@ -1261,6 +1269,12 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
> if (spurious_kernel_fault(hw_error_code, address))
> return;
>
> + /* FIXME: warn and handle gracefully */
> + if (unlikely(fault_in_user_exclusive_page(address))) {
> + pr_err("page fault in user exclusive page at %lx", address);
> + force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, (void __user *)address);
> + }
Sending a signal here is not a reasonable thing to do in response to
an unexpected kernel fault. You need to OOPS. Printing a nice
message would be nice.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-28 18:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-27 10:17 [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings Mike Rapoport
2019-10-27 10:17 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-28 12:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-10-28 13:00 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-28 13:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-10-28 13:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-28 19:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-10-28 21:00 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-29 17:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-10-30 10:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-30 15:35 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-10-30 18:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-30 18:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-10-30 17:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-10-30 17:58 ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-30 18:01 ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-29 5:43 ` Dan Williams
2019-10-29 6:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-10-29 8:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-29 11:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-10-29 12:39 ` AMD TLB errata, (Was: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings) Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-15 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2019-11-15 14:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-10-29 19:43 ` [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings Dan Williams
2019-10-29 20:07 ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-29 7:08 ` Christopher Lameter
2019-10-29 8:55 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-29 10:12 ` Christopher Lameter
2019-10-30 7:11 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-30 12:09 ` Christopher Lameter
2019-10-28 14:55 ` David Hildenbrand
2019-10-28 17:12 ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-28 17:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-28 18:08 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-10-29 9:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-29 9:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-28 18:02 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-10-29 11:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2019-10-30 8:15 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-30 8:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2019-10-31 19:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-31 21:52 ` Dan Williams
2019-10-27 10:30 ` Florian Weimer
2019-10-27 11:00 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-28 20:23 ` Florian Weimer
2019-10-29 9:01 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-28 20:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-29 9:32 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-29 17:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-30 8:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-10-30 21:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-31 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-12-05 15:34 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-12-08 14:10 ` [PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create secret memory kbuild test robot
2019-10-29 11:25 ` [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings Reshetova, Elena
2019-10-29 15:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-10-29 17:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-29 17:37 ` Alan Cox
2019-10-29 17:43 ` James Bottomley
2019-10-29 18:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
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