From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@google.com>,
Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>,
Rajat Jain <rajatxjain@gmail.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>,
"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
"Krishnakumar,
Lalithambika" <lalithambika.krishnakumar@intel.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
linux-pci <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
Prashant Malani <pmalani@google.com>,
Benson Leung <bleung@google.com>, Todd Broch <tbroch@google.com>,
Alex Levin <levinale@google.com>,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@google.com>,
Zubin Mithra <zsm@google.com>,
Bernie Keany <bernie.keany@intel.com>,
Aaron Durbin <adurbin@google.com>,
Diego Rivas <diegorivas@google.com>,
Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@google.com>,
Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>,
Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 12:57:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200701105714.GA2098169@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200701084750.GA7144@amd>
On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 10:47:50AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > > We normally trust the hardware NOT to be malicious. (Because if hacker
> > > has physical access to hardware and lot of resources, you lost).
> >
> > That is what we originally thought, however the world has changed and we
> > need to be better about this, now that it is trivial to create a "bad"
> > device.
>
> I'm not disagreeing.
>
> > > This is still true today, but maybe trusting USB devices is bad idea,
> > > so drivers are being cleaned up. PCI drivers will be WORSE in this
> > > regard. And you can't really protect against malicious CPU, and it is
> > > very very hard to protect against malicous RAM (probably not practical
> > > without explicit CPU support).
> > >
> > > Linux was designed with "don't let hackers near your hardware" threat
> > > model in mind.
> >
> > Yes, it originally was designed that way, but again, the world has
> > changed so we have to change with it. That is why USB has for a long
> > time now, allowed you to not bind drivers to devices that you do not
> > "trust", and that trust can be determined by userspace. That all came
> > about thanks to the work done by the wireless USB spec people and kernel
> > authors, which showed that maybe you just don't want to trust any device
> > that comes within range of your system :)
>
> Again, not disagreeing; but note the scale here.
>
> It is mandatory to defend against malicious wireless USB devices.
Turns out there are no more wireless USB devices in the world, and the
code for that is gone from Linux :)
> We probably should work on robustness against malicious USB devices.
We are, and do have, that support today.
> Malicious PCI-express devices are lot less of concern.
Not really, they are a lot of concern to some people. Valid attacks are
out there today, see the thunderbolt attacks that numerous people have
done and published recently and for many years.
> Defending against malicious CPU/RAM does not make much sense.
That's what the spectre and rowhammer fixes have been for :)
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-01 10:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-01 23:07 [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers Rajat Jain
2020-05-04 11:47 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-04 11:59 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-04 19:17 ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-05 12:33 ` Mika Westerberg
2020-05-06 18:51 ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-11 20:31 ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-13 15:19 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-05-13 21:26 ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-14 13:42 ` Mika Westerberg
2020-05-14 19:12 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-05-15 2:18 ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-26 16:30 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-01 23:25 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-02 5:06 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 2:27 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 6:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 11:51 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 12:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 12:57 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 13:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-04 19:38 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-05 8:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-06 1:08 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-07 11:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 17:03 ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 17:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 18:29 ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 18:41 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-09 9:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 21:46 ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09 5:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 21:45 ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01 6:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01 8:47 ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01 10:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-07-01 11:08 ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09 21:04 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-09 23:23 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 0:04 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 0:30 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 20:17 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 23:09 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:01 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:46 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 7:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10 1:34 ` Oliver O'Halloran
2020-06-10 19:57 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-16 1:24 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 7:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-05-15 12:44 ` Joerg Roedel
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