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From: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>,
	linux-pci <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: Prashant Malani <pmalani@google.com>,
	Benson Leung <bleung@google.com>, Todd Broch <tbroch@google.com>,
	Alex Levin <levinale@google.com>,
	Mattias Nissler <mnissler@google.com>,
	Zubin Mithra <zsm@google.com>, Rajat Jain <rajatxjain@gmail.com>,
	"Keany, Bernie" <bernie.keany@intel.com>,
	Aaron Durbin <adurbin@google.com>,
	Diego Rivas <diegorivas@google.com>,
	Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@google.com>,
	Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>,
	Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 13:31:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACK8Z6FEZFKA9xo-UkADAun-hK71CdFu=1OjukEF=zC9kbpKPQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACK8Z6E8pjVeC934oFgr=VB3pULx_GyT2NkzAogdRQJ9TKSX9A@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Bjorn,

On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 4:07 PM Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Currently, the PCI subsystem marks the PCI devices as "untrusted", if
> the firmware asks it to:
>
> 617654aae50e ("PCI / ACPI: Identify untrusted PCI devices")
> 9cb30a71acd4 ("PCI: OF: Support "external-facing" property")
>
> An "untrusted" device indicates a (likely external facing) device that
> may be malicious, and can trigger DMA attacks on the system. It may
> also try to exploit any vulnerabilities exposed by the driver, that
> may allow it to read/write unintended addresses in the host (e.g. if
> DMA buffers for the device, share memory pages with other driver data
> structures or code etc).
>
> High Level proposal
> ===============
> Currently, the "untrusted" device property is used as a hint to enable
> IOMMU restrictions (on Intel), disable ATS (on ARM) etc. We'd like to
> go a step further, and allow the administrator to build a list of
> whitelisted drivers for these "untrusted" devices. This whitelist of
> drivers are the ones that he trusts enough to have little or no
> vulnerabilities. (He may have built this list of whitelisted drivers
> by a combination of code analysis of drivers, or by extensive testing
> using PCIe fuzzing etc). We propose that the administrator be allowed
> to specify this list of whitelisted drivers to the kernel, and the PCI
> subsystem to impose this behavior:
>
> 1) The "untrusted" devices can bind to only "whitelisted drivers".
> 2) The other devices (i.e. dev->untrusted=0) can bind to any driver.
>
> Of course this behavior is to be imposed only if such a whitelist is
> provided by the administrator.

I was wondering if you got a chance to look at this proposal? WDYT?

Thanks & Best Regards,

Rajat


>
> Details
> ======
>
> 1) A kernel argument ("pci.impose_driver_whitelisting") to enable
> imposing of whitelisting by PCI subsystem.
>
> 2) Add a flag ("whitelisted") in struct pci_driver to indicate whether
> the driver is whitelisted.
>
> 3) Use the driver's "whitelisted" flag and the device's "untrusted"
> flag, to make a decision about whether to bind or not in
> pci_bus_match() or similar.
>
> 4) A mechanism to allow the administrator to specify the whitelist of
> drivers. I think this needs more thought as there are multiple
> options.
>
> a) Expose individual driver's "whitelisted" flag to userspace so a
> boot script can whitelist that driver. There are questions that still
> need answered though e.g. what to do about the devices that may have
> already been enumerated and rejected by then? What to do with the
> already bound devices, if the user changes a driver to remove it from
> the whitelist. etc.
>
>       b) Provide a way to specify the whitelist via the kernel command
> line. Accept a ("pci.whitelist") kernel parameter which is a comma
> separated list of driver names (just like "module_blacklist"), and
> then use it to initialize each driver's "whitelisted" flag as the
> drivers are registered. Essentially this would mean that the whitelist
> of devices cannot be changed after boot.
>
> To me (b) looks a better option but I think a future requirement would
> be the ability to remove the drivers from the whitelist after boot
> (adding drivers to whitelist at runtime may not be that critical IMO)
>
>  WDYT?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Rajat

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-11 20:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-01 23:07 [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers Rajat Jain
2020-05-04 11:47 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-04 11:59   ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-04 19:17     ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-05 12:33 ` Mika Westerberg
2020-05-06 18:51   ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-11 20:31 ` Rajat Jain [this message]
2020-05-13 15:19 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-05-13 21:26   ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-14 13:42     ` Mika Westerberg
2020-05-14 19:12     ` Raj, Ashok
2020-05-15  2:18       ` Rajat Jain
2020-05-26 16:30         ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-01 23:25           ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-02  5:06             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03  2:27               ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03  6:07                 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 11:51                   ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 12:16                     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 12:57                       ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 13:29                         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-04 19:38                       ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-05  8:02                         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-06  1:08                           ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-07 11:36                             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 17:03                               ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 17:50                                 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 18:29                                   ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 18:41                                     ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-09  9:54                                       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 21:46                                         ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09  5:57                                     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 21:45                                 ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01  6:54                                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01  8:47                                     ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01 10:57                                       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01 11:08                                         ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09 21:04                               ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-09 23:23                                 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10  0:04                                   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10  0:30                                     ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 20:17                                       ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 23:09                                         ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:01                                       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:46                                         ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10  7:13                                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10  1:34                                 ` Oliver O'Halloran
2020-06-10 19:57                                   ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-16  1:24                                     ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10  7:12                                 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-05-15 12:44     ` Joerg Roedel

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