From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com,
seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com,
ebiederm@xmission.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 6/7] efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 01:57:04 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181208202705.18673-7-nayna@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181208202705.18673-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
variable if it is found.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
Changelog:
v0:
- No changes
v2:
- Fixed the checkpatch.pl warnings
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index acd9db90dde7..8bd2e9b421e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -16,6 +16,26 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
/*
+ * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
+ * it does.
+ *
+ * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
+ * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes. If it
+ * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
+ * this.
+ */
+static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
+{
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned int db = 0;
+ unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
+ efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
+ return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
* Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
*/
static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
@@ -116,7 +136,9 @@ static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *
}
/*
- * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the secondary trusted
+ * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
+ * keyring.
*/
static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
{
@@ -132,15 +154,18 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
* an error if we can't get them.
*/
- db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
- if (!db) {
- pr_err("Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
- } else {
- rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
- db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
- if (rc)
- pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
- kfree(db);
+ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
+ db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
+ rc);
+ kfree(db);
+ }
}
mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
--
2.13.6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-08 20:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-08 20:26 [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring Nayna Jain
2018-12-09 4:48 ` Nayna Jain
2018-12-13 0:15 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-11 18:27 ` James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] integrity: Load certs to the " Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:30 ` James Morris
2018-12-13 0:17 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] efi: Add EFI signature data types Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:30 ` James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:47 ` James Morris
2018-12-12 17:31 ` Nayna Jain
2018-12-12 21:32 ` [PATCH v2a " Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:27 ` Nayna Jain [this message]
2018-12-11 18:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:53 ` James Morris
2018-12-12 18:14 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-13 0:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-12-13 0:19 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-09 18:39 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA Mimi Zohar
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