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From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com,
	seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 23:01:15 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d36bfd7c-7564-778b-1e75-5b835d40b6f1@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1812120547110.11653@namei.org>



On 12/12/2018 12:17 AM, James Morris wrote:
> On Sun, 9 Dec 2018, Nayna Jain wrote:
>
>> +/*
>> + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
>> + */
>> +static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
>> +					   const void *data, size_t len)
>> +{
>> +	char *hash, *p;
>> +
>> +	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (!hash)
>> +		return;
>> +	p = memcpy(hash, "tbs:", 4);
>> +	p += 4;
>> +	bin2hex(p, data, len);
>> +	p += len * 2;
>> +	*p = 0;
>> +
>> +	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
>> +	kfree(hash);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
>> + */
>> +static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
>> +					 const void *data, size_t len)
>> +{
>> +	char *hash, *p;
>> +
>> +	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (!hash)
>> +		return;
>> +	p = memcpy(hash, "bin:", 4);
>> +	p += 4;
>> +	bin2hex(p, data, len);
>> +	p += len * 2;
>> +	*p = 0;
>> +
>> +	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
>> +	kfree(hash);
>> +}
>>
> These could be refactored into one function.
>
>

Thanks James for reviewing.

Yes, the code should be refactored.  However, I think making it a single 
function would require adding a new field to the function callback 
definitions as well. Probably, a simpler approach would be to define a 
common function uefi_blacklist_hash(...)  which can then be used by the 
two functions uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(...) and 
uefi_blacklist_binary(...). These two functions now act as wrapper 
functions. Below is the example code:

+/*
+ * Blacklist a hash.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void 
*data,
+                                 size_t len, char *type, size_t type_len)
+{
+       char *hash, *p;
+
+       hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!hash)
+               return;
+       p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
+       p += type_len;
+       bin2hex(p, data, len);
+       p += len * 2;
+       *p = 0;
+
+       mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
+       kfree(hash);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
+                                          const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+       uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:" , 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
+                                        const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+       uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:" , 4);
+}


Thanks & Regards,
    - Nayna




  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-12 17:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-08 20:26 [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring Nayna Jain
2018-12-09  4:48   ` Nayna Jain
2018-12-13  0:15     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-11 18:27   ` James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] integrity: Load certs to the " Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:30   ` James Morris
2018-12-13  0:17   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] efi: Add EFI signature data types Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:30   ` James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:47   ` James Morris
2018-12-12 17:31     ` Nayna Jain [this message]
2018-12-12 21:32   ` [PATCH v2a " Nayna Jain
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:49   ` James Morris
2018-12-08 20:27 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal Nayna Jain
2018-12-11 18:53   ` James Morris
2018-12-12 18:14   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-13  0:18     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-12-13  0:19   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-12-09 18:39 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA Mimi Zohar

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