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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 17:17:43 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190820001805.241928-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>

Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load.  In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.

Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.

secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub.  Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.

Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index f03237e3f192..5d64a22f99ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
 		return 0;
 
+	params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
 	ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
 	ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
 	ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-20  0:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-20  0:17 [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 14:26   ` Philipp Rudo
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 21:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-25  9:51   ` Pavel Machek
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 19:45   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2019-08-20 21:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2022-01-05  6:25   ` Kai-Heng Feng
2022-01-05  6:48     ` Matthew Garrett
2022-01-05  6:57       ` Kai-Heng Feng
2022-01-05  7:20         ` Matthew Garrett
2022-01-05 10:05           ` Kai-Heng Feng
2022-01-05 10:14             ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:07   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 16:39   ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  6:45 ` [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality James Morris
2019-08-30 16:28 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM David Howells
2019-09-04 16:51   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-10 10:06     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:31 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2019-09-04 16:57   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:32 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode David Howells

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