* [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3)
@ 2019-04-10 16:55 Micah Morton
2019-04-10 17:11 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Micah Morton @ 2019-04-10 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, keescook, casey, linux-security-module; +Cc: Jann Horn, Micah Morton
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
With the old code, when a process with the (real,effective,saved) UID set
(1,1,1) calls setresuid(2,3,4), safesetid_task_fix_setuid() only checks
whether the transition 1->2 is permitted; the transitions 1->3 and 1->4 are
not checked. Fix this.
This is also a good opportunity to refactor safesetid_task_fix_setuid() to
be less verbose - having one branch per set*uid() syscall is unnecessary.
Note that this slightly changes semantics: The UID transition check for
UIDs that were not in the old cred struct is now always performed against
the policy of the RUID. I think that's more consistent anyway, since the
RUID is also the one that decides whether any policy is enforced at all.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
---
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 125 +++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 2daecab3a4c0..5310fcf3052a 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -99,20 +99,30 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
return 0;
}
-static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
+/*
+ * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
+ * credentials that contain @new_uid.
+ */
+static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
{
- if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
- return 0;
- pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked\n",
- __kuid_val(parent),
- __kuid_val(child));
+ bool permitted;
+
+ /* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
+ if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
+ uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
+ return true;
+
/*
- * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
- * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
- * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+ * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
+ * RUID.
*/
- force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
- return -EACCES;
+ permitted = check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(old->uid, new_uid);
+ if (!permitted) {
+ pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+ __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
+ __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
+ }
+ return permitted;
}
/*
@@ -125,88 +135,23 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
int flags)
{
- /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
+ /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
return 0;
- switch (flags) {
- case LSM_SETID_RE:
- /*
- * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
- * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
- * explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
- */
- if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
- !uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
- }
- /*
- * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
- * effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
- * saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
- * the transition.
- */
- if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
- }
- break;
- case LSM_SETID_ID:
- /*
- * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
- * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
- * policy allows the transition.
- */
- if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
- return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
- if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
- return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
- break;
- case LSM_SETID_RES:
- /*
- * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
- * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
- * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
- * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
- * policy allows the transition.
- */
- if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
- }
- if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
- }
- if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
- }
- break;
- case LSM_SETID_FS:
- /*
- * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
- * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
- * the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
- * unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
- */
- if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
- !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
- return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
- }
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
- force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- return 0;
+ if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
+ uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
+ uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
+ uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+ * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
+ * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+ */
+ force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+ return -EACCES;
}
int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
--
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3)
2019-04-10 16:55 [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3) Micah Morton
@ 2019-04-10 17:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-07 15:01 ` Micah Morton
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-04-10 17:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Micah Morton
Cc: James Morris, Casey Schaufler, linux-security-module, Jann Horn
On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 9:55 AM Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>
> With the old code, when a process with the (real,effective,saved) UID set
> (1,1,1) calls setresuid(2,3,4), safesetid_task_fix_setuid() only checks
> whether the transition 1->2 is permitted; the transitions 1->3 and 1->4 are
> not checked. Fix this.
>
> This is also a good opportunity to refactor safesetid_task_fix_setuid() to
> be less verbose - having one branch per set*uid() syscall is unnecessary.
>
> Note that this slightly changes semantics: The UID transition check for
> UIDs that were not in the old cred struct is now always performed against
> the policy of the RUID. I think that's more consistent anyway, since the
> RUID is also the one that decides whether any policy is enforced at all.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 125 +++++++++++----------------------------
> 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 2daecab3a4c0..5310fcf3052a 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -99,20 +99,30 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
> +/*
> + * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
> + * credentials that contain @new_uid.
> + */
> +static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
> {
> - if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
> - return 0;
> - pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked\n",
> - __kuid_val(parent),
> - __kuid_val(child));
> + bool permitted;
> +
> + /* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
> + if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
> + uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
> + return true;
> +
> /*
> - * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
> - * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
> - * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
> + * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
> + * RUID.
> */
> - force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> - return -EACCES;
> + permitted = check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(old->uid, new_uid);
> + if (!permitted) {
> + pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
> + __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
> + __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
> + }
> + return permitted;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -125,88 +135,23 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
> int flags)
> {
>
> - /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
> + /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
> if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
> return 0;
>
> - switch (flags) {
> - case LSM_SETID_RE:
> - /*
> - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
> - * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
> - * explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
> - */
> - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
> - !uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> - }
> - /*
> - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
> - * effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
> - * saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
> - * the transition.
> - */
> - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
> - }
> - break;
> - case LSM_SETID_ID:
> - /*
> - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> - * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
> - * policy allows the transition.
> - */
> - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
> - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> - if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
> - return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
> - break;
> - case LSM_SETID_RES:
> - /*
> - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> - * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
> - * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
> - * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
> - * policy allows the transition.
> - */
> - if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> - }
> - if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
> - }
> - if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
> - }
> - break;
> - case LSM_SETID_FS:
> - /*
> - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> - * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
> - * the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
> - * unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
> - */
> - if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
> - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
> - return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
> - }
> - break;
> - default:
> - pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
> - force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> - return 0;
> + if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
> + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
> + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
> + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
> + * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
> + * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
> + */
> + force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> + return -EACCES;
> }
>
> int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
> --
> 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3)
2019-04-10 17:11 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-05-07 15:01 ` Micah Morton
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Micah Morton @ 2019-05-07 15:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook; +Cc: James Morris, Casey Schaufler, linux-security-module, Jann Horn
Ready for merge.
On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:11 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 9:55 AM Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> >
> > With the old code, when a process with the (real,effective,saved) UID set
> > (1,1,1) calls setresuid(2,3,4), safesetid_task_fix_setuid() only checks
> > whether the transition 1->2 is permitted; the transitions 1->3 and 1->4 are
> > not checked. Fix this.
> >
> > This is also a good opportunity to refactor safesetid_task_fix_setuid() to
> > be less verbose - having one branch per set*uid() syscall is unnecessary.
> >
> > Note that this slightly changes semantics: The UID transition check for
> > UIDs that were not in the old cred struct is now always performed against
> > the policy of the RUID. I think that's more consistent anyway, since the
> > RUID is also the one that decides whether any policy is enforced at all.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> -Kees
>
> > ---
> > security/safesetid/lsm.c | 125 +++++++++++----------------------------
> > 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > index 2daecab3a4c0..5310fcf3052a 100644
> > --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > @@ -99,20 +99,30 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > -static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
> > +/*
> > + * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
> > + * credentials that contain @new_uid.
> > + */
> > +static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
> > {
> > - if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
> > - return 0;
> > - pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked\n",
> > - __kuid_val(parent),
> > - __kuid_val(child));
> > + bool permitted;
> > +
> > + /* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
> > + if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
> > + uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
> > + return true;
> > +
> > /*
> > - * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
> > - * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
> > - * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
> > + * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
> > + * RUID.
> > */
> > - force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> > - return -EACCES;
> > + permitted = check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(old->uid, new_uid);
> > + if (!permitted) {
> > + pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
> > + __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
> > + __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
> > + }
> > + return permitted;
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -125,88 +135,23 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
> > int flags)
> > {
> >
> > - /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
> > + /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
> > if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
> > return 0;
> >
> > - switch (flags) {
> > - case LSM_SETID_RE:
> > - /*
> > - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
> > - * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
> > - * explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
> > - */
> > - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> > - }
> > - /*
> > - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
> > - * effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
> > - * saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
> > - * the transition.
> > - */
> > - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
> > - }
> > - break;
> > - case LSM_SETID_ID:
> > - /*
> > - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> > - * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
> > - * policy allows the transition.
> > - */
> > - if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> > - if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
> > - break;
> > - case LSM_SETID_RES:
> > - /*
> > - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> > - * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
> > - * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
> > - * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
> > - * policy allows the transition.
> > - */
> > - if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
> > - }
> > - if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
> > - }
> > - if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
> > - }
> > - break;
> > - case LSM_SETID_FS:
> > - /*
> > - * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
> > - * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
> > - * the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
> > - * unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
> > - */
> > - if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
> > - !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
> > - return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
> > - }
> > - break;
> > - default:
> > - pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
> > - force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> > - return -EINVAL;
> > - }
> > - return 0;
> > + if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
> > + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
> > + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
> > + uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
> > + * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
> > + * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
> > + */
> > + force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
> > + return -EACCES;
> > }
> >
> > int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
> > --
> > 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
> >
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-05-07 15:01 UTC | newest]
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2019-04-10 16:55 [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3) Micah Morton
2019-04-10 17:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-07 15:01 ` Micah Morton
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