From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode.
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 13:09:37 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f415ec28-8440-3b29-176c-50da09247ea3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201911301035.74813D4533@keescook>
I can see how using a policy would be beneficial; I only did this
because as I understood it, policy wouldn't be able to change these
particular settings since anything attempting to do so would be from
userspace.
On 11/30/19 12:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:49:48AM -0600, Matt Parnell wrote:
>> From 452b8460e464422d268659a8abb93353a182f8c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
>> Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 00:44:09 -0600
>> Subject: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even
>> in confidentiality mode.
>>
>> For Intel CPUs, some of the MDS mitigations utilize the new "flush" MSR, and
>> while this isn't something normally used in userspace, it does cause false
>> positives for the "Forshadow" vulnerability.
>>
>> Additionally, Intel CPUs use MSRs for voltage and frequency controls,
>> which in
>> many cases is useful for undervolting to avoid excess heat.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
> I would expect this to just be implemented via LSM policy, not ifdefs
> and Kconfig?
>
> -Kees
>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 5 ++++-
>> security/lockdown/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> index 1547be359d7f..4adce59455c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const
>> char __user *buf,
>> int err = 0;
>> ssize_t bytes = 0;
>>
>> +#if defined(LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR)
>> err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR);
>> if (err)
>> return err;
>> -
>> +#endif
>> if (count % 8)
>> return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
>>
>> @@ -135,9 +136,11 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
>> int ioc, unsigned long arg)
>> err = -EFAULT;
>> break;
>> }
>> +#if defined(LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR)
>> err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR);
>> if (err)
>> break;
>> +#endif
>> err = wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(cpu, regs);
>> if (err)
>> break;
>> diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> index e84ddf484010..f4fe72c4bf8f 100644
>> --- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> @@ -44,4 +44,16 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
>> code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
>> disabled.
>>
>> +config LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR
>> + bool "Lock down and deny raw MSR access"
>> + depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
>> + default y
>> + help
>> + Some Intel based systems require raw MSR access to use the flush
>> + MSR for MDS mitigation confirmation. Raw access can also be used
>> + to undervolt many Intel CPUs.
>> +
>> + Say Y to prevent access or N to allow raw MSR access for such
>> + cases.
>> +
>> endchoice
>> --
>> 2.24.0
>>
>>
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-30 19:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-30 6:49 [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode Matt Parnell
2019-11-30 18:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-30 19:09 ` Matt Parnell [this message]
2019-12-01 20:53 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 18:29 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 22:55 ` Jordan Glover
2019-12-02 23:13 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 23:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 23:31 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:13 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-03 2:24 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:50 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 3:57 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 19:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 20:39 ` Matt Parnell
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=f415ec28-8440-3b29-176c-50da09247ea3@gmail.com \
--to=mparnell@gmail.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).