From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
josh@joshtriplett.org, luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, cedric.xing@intel.com,
puiterwijk@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 04:34:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200504093432.GA5382@wind.enjellic.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BD424C59-0B02-451D-8DF0-74F92292A87C@amacapital.net>
On Sat, May 02, 2020 at 05:48:30PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
Good morning, I hope the week is starting well for everyone.
> > On May 2, 2020, at 4:05 PM, Dr. Greg <greg@enjellic.com> wrote:
> > In a nutshell, the driver needs our patch that implements
> > cryptographic policy management.
> >
> > A patch that:
> >
> > 1.) Does not change the default behavior of the driver.
> >
> > 2.) Implements capabilities that are consistent with what the hardware
> > was designed to do, but only at the discretion of the platform owner.
> >
> > 3.) Has no impact on the driver architecture.
> >
> > The only consumer for this driver are SGX runtimes. To our knowledge,
> > there exist only two complete runtime implementations, Intel's and
> > ours. It us unclear why our approach to the use of the technology
> > should be discriminated against when it doesn't impact the other user
> > community.
> Can you clarify how exactly this patch set discriminates against
> your stack?
The driver has no provisions for implementing cryptographically based
SGX policy management of any type.
Our stack is extremely lightweight with no external dependencies and
is used in privacy and security sensitive applications, including
financial services of certain types. There is a desire in this, and
other venues, to use cloud and edge resources with a strong guarantee
that the platforms have only had a known set of behaviors. The
current DAC based controls in the driver are insufficient to provide
those guarantees.
I believe I have discussed our use of SGX previously. In a nutshell,
we use SGX based modeling engines to supervise kernel based behavioral
namespaces, one enclave per namespace. The closest equivalent work
that we have seen may be the IPE architecture advanced by Deven Bowers
at Microsoft but we address a number of issues that work does not,
including non-kernel based behavioral supervision.
We support the concern over hardware locked platforms and do not
disagree with the driver not supporting those platforms. That being
said, there is no technical rationale for not providing cryptographic
policy management on FLC based platforms, as I believe our patch
demonstrates.
Best wishes for a productive week.
Dr. Greg
As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker Artisans in autonomously
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC self-defensive platforms.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND 58102
PH: 701-281-1686 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Can't they?
A 64bit number incremented every millisecond can grow for half a
billion years. As far as I'm concerned, that is forever."
-- Neil Brown
linux-raid
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-04 9:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-21 21:52 [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 01/20] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 02/20] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:52 ` [PATCH v29 03/20] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 04/20] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 05/20] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 06/20] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 07/20] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 08/20] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 09/20] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 10/20] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 11/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-08 19:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 12/20] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 13/20] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 14/20] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 21:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-13 21:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 15/20] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 16/20] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 17/20] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 18/20] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 19/20] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-21 21:53 ` [PATCH v29 20/20] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-22 16:48 ` [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations Connor Kuehl
2020-04-29 5:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-26 16:57 ` Dr. Greg
2020-04-29 5:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-29 15:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-30 3:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-02 23:05 ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-03 0:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-04 9:34 ` Dr. Greg [this message]
2020-04-29 15:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-08 0:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-07 0:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08 19:02 ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-08 19:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14 9:16 ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-14 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14 16:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-14 19:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-15 9:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 9:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-15 16:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 0:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 19:54 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-16 9:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-24 21:27 ` Pavel Machek
2020-05-26 8:16 ` David Laight
2020-04-26 17:03 ` Dr. Greg
2020-04-29 15:27 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-04-30 3:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-30 7:19 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-04-30 8:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-04-30 14:12 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-05-06 12:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 16:39 ` Jordan Hand
2020-05-07 18:06 ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-08 16:16 ` Jordan Hand
2020-05-13 23:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-06 21:42 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-06 22:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-07 5:02 ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-07 16:49 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-05-07 19:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-07 22:35 ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-08 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-28 11:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-28 11:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-07 22:31 ` Haitao Huang
2020-05-13 22:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-13 22:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-14 6:31 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-05-14 19:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-15 0:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-08 19:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-14 19:05 ` Seth Moore
2020-05-15 0:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-12 11:55 ` Hui, Chunyang
2020-05-12 16:51 ` Dr. Greg
2020-05-14 10:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-16 8:53 ` [PATCH] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
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