From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
hch@infradead.org, igor.stoppa@huawei.com,
james.l.morris@oracle.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 10:26:22 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201705281026.EHD04622.HJFOLQFMSOtFOV@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ045iaDfoW+2dXU+U-KhfnNH1WX5ngUW9dHyS5Yn3EGg@mail.gmail.com>
Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 4:17 AM, Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> > Commit 3dfc9b02864b19f4 ("LSM: Initialize security_hook_heads upon
> > registration.") treats "struct security_hook_heads" as an implicit array
> > of "struct list_head" so that we can eliminate code for static
> > initialization. Although we haven't encountered compilers which do not
> > treat sizeof(security_hook_heads) != sizeof(struct list_head) *
> > (sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct list_head)), Casey does not
> > like the assumption that a structure of N elements can be assumed to be
> > the same as an array of N elements.
> >
> > Now that Kees found that randstruct complains such casting
> >
> > security/security.c: In function 'security_init':
> > security/security.c:59:20: note: found mismatched op0 struct pointer types: 'struct list_head' and 'struct security_hook_heads'
> >
> > struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads;
> >
> > and Christoph thinks that we should fix it rather than make randstruct
> > whitelist it, this patch fixes it.
> >
> > It would be possible to revert commit 3dfc9b02864b19f4, but this patch
> > converts security_hook_heads into an explicit array of struct list_head
> > by introducing an enum, due to reasons explained below.
>
> Like Casey, I had confused this patch with the other(?) that resulted
> in dropped type checking. This just switches from named list_heads to
> indexed list_heads, which is fine now that the BUG_ON exists to
> sanity-check the index being used.
Casey, are you just confused as well?
>
> > In MM subsystem, a sealable memory allocator patch was proposed, and
> > the LSM hooks ("struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" and
> > "struct security_hook_list ...[]") will benefit from this allocator via
> > protection using set_memory_ro()/set_memory_rw(), and that allocator
> > will remove CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS config option. Thus, we will
> > likely be moving to that direction.
>
> It's unlikely that smalloc will allow unsealing after initialization,
> so the SELinux disabling case will remain, IIUC.
LKM-based LSM modules will need it. Look at the result of a recent poll at
https://distrowatch.com/weekly.php?pollnumber=102&myaction=SeeVote&issue=20170522#poll .
We are still failing to provide users "a security module that individual user
can afford enabling". And we know that we cannot merge all security modules
into mainline. Thus, allowing LKM-based LSM modules is inevitable.
> > @@ -179,7 +182,8 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > do { \
> > struct security_hook_list *P; \
> > \
> > - list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
> > + list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads \
> > + [LSM_##FUNC], list) \
>
> Can this be unsplit so the [...] remains next to security_hook_heads?
These are needed for passing 80 columns check by scripts/checkpatch.pl .
Should we ignore that warning or rename security_hook_heads to e.g. SHH ?
> Otherwise, yeah, I can be convinced to take this. :) Thanks for
> persisting with this, I think it makes sense now.
Thank you.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-28 1:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-27 11:17 [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa [this message]
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [PATCH v2] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris
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