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* [PATCH] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
@ 2019-03-20 23:42 Gustavo A. R. Silva
  2019-03-21 12:25 ` Takashi Iwai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-03-20 23:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai
  Cc: alsa-devel, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva

dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c
index 278ebb993122..c93945917235 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c
@@ -617,13 +617,14 @@ int
 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, struct synth_info *inf)
 {
 	struct seq_oss_synth *rec;
+	struct seq_oss_synthinfo *info = get_synthinfo_nospec(dp, dev);
 
-	if (dev < 0 || dev >= dp->max_synthdev)
+	if (!info)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	if (dp->synths[dev].is_midi) {
+	if (info->is_midi) {
 		struct midi_info minf;
-		snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, dp->synths[dev].midi_mapped, &minf);
+		snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, info->midi_mapped, &minf);
 		inf->synth_type = SYNTH_TYPE_MIDI;
 		inf->synth_subtype = 0;
 		inf->nr_voices = 16;
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
  2019-03-20 23:42 [PATCH] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-03-21 12:25 ` Takashi Iwai
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Takashi Iwai @ 2019-03-21 12:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To:  Gustavo A. R. Silva ; +Cc: Jaroslav Kysela, alsa-devel, linux-kernel

On Thu, 21 Mar 2019 00:42:01 +0100,
 Gustavo A. R. Silva  wrote:
> 
> dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> 
> sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap)
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths.
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

Applied, thanks.


Takashi

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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