From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"zhujianwei (C)" <zhujianwei7@huawei.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>,
Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Hehuazhen <hehuazhen@huawei.com>,
x86@kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 00:49:29 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200616074934.1600036-4-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200616074934.1600036-1-keescook@chromium.org>
For systems that provide multiple syscall maps based on architectures
(e.g. AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 and AUDIT_ARCH_I386 via CONFIG_COMPAT), allow
a fast way to pin the process to a specific syscall mapping, instead of
needing to generate all filters with an architecture check as the first
filter action.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/seccomp.h | 3 +++
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 +
kernel/seccomp.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index babcd6c02d09..6525ddec177a 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
*/
struct seccomp {
int mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ u32 arch;
+#endif
atomic_t filter_count;
struct seccomp_filter *filter;
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index c1735455bc53..84e89bb201ae 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3
+#define SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE 4
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index a319700c04c4..43edf53c2d84 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -268,9 +268,16 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
struct seccomp_filter **match)
{
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+ struct seccomp_filter *f;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ /* Block mismatched architectures. */
+ if (current->seccomp.arch && current->seccomp.arch != sd->arch)
+ return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
+#endif
+
/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
- struct seccomp_filter *f =
- READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
+ f = READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
@@ -478,6 +485,11 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ /* Copy any pinned architecture. */
+ thread->seccomp.arch = caller->seccomp.arch;
+#endif
+
/*
* Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
* As threads are considered to be trust-realm
@@ -1456,6 +1468,20 @@ static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user *usizes)
return 0;
}
+static long seccomp_pin_architecture(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ u32 arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
+
+ /* How did you even get here? */
+ if (current->seccomp.arch && current->seccomp.arch != arch)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ current->seccomp.arch = arch;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
void __user *uargs)
@@ -1477,6 +1503,13 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
return -EINVAL;
return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs);
+ case SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE:
+ if (flags != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (uargs != NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return seccomp_pin_architecture();
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-16 7:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-16 7:49 [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 1/8] selftests/seccomp: Improve calibration loop Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 2/8] seccomp: Use pr_fmt Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-06-16 16:56 ` [PATCH 3/8] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-17 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:31 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 4/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 12:14 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 18:36 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 21:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 14:40 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-16 16:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 5/8] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86: Provide API for local kernel TLB flushing Kees Cook
2020-06-16 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86: Enable seccomp constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 8/8] [DEBUG] seccomp: Report bitmap coverage ranges Kees Cook
2020-06-16 17:01 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 18:35 ` Kees Cook
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