From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"zhujianwei (C)" <zhujianwei7@huawei.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>,
Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Hehuazhen <hehuazhen@huawei.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 10:01:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVLA22khom-iSu5iTJGKfUykOnwyz8j7Tm9g6hWW_e0Aw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200616074934.1600036-1-keescook@chromium.org>
On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 12:49 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> In order to build this mapping at filter attach time, each filter is
> executed for every syscall (under each possible architecture), and
> checked for any accesses of struct seccomp_data that are not the "arch"
> nor "nr" (syscall) members. If only "arch" and "nr" are examined, then
> there is a constant mapping for that syscall, and bitmaps can be updated
> accordingly. If any accesses happen outside of those struct members,
> seccomp must not bypass filter execution for that syscall, since program
> state will be used to determine filter action result.
>
> During syscall action probing, in order to determine whether other members
> of struct seccomp_data are being accessed during a filter execution,
> the struct is placed across a page boundary with the "arch" and "nr"
> members in the first page, and everything else in the second page. The
> "page accessed" flag is cleared in the second page's PTE, and the filter
> is run. If the "page accessed" flag appears as set after running the
> filter, we can determine that the filter looked beyond the "arch" and
> "nr" members, and exclude that syscall from the constant action bitmaps.
This is... evil. I don't know how I feel about it. It's also
potentially quite slow.
I don't suppose you could, instead, instrument the BPF code to get at
this without TLB hackery? Or maybe try to do some real symbolic
execution of the BPF code?
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-16 17:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-16 7:49 [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 1/8] selftests/seccomp: Improve calibration loop Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 2/8] seccomp: Use pr_fmt Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 3/8] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE Kees Cook
2020-06-16 16:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-17 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-17 15:31 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 4/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 12:14 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 18:36 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-16 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 21:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 14:40 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-16 16:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 5/8] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86: Provide API for local kernel TLB flushing Kees Cook
2020-06-16 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-16 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86: Enable seccomp constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-06-16 7:49 ` [PATCH 8/8] [DEBUG] seccomp: Report bitmap coverage ranges Kees Cook
2020-06-16 17:01 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-06-16 18:35 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/8] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
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