From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Solar Designer" <solar@openwall.com>,
"Ran Xiaokai" <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>,
containers@lists.linux.dev, "Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/8] ucounts: Handle inc_rlimit_ucounts wrapping in fork
Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 19:40:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220211184041.dlqjk2fgdnkmtpe3@example.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87sfspz409.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>
On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 11:50:46AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> writes:
>
> > On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 08:13:22PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Move inc_rlimit_ucounts from copy_creds into copy_process immediately
> >> after copy_creds where it can be called exactly once. Test for and
> >> handle it when inc_rlimit_ucounts returns LONG_MAX indicating the
> >> count has wrapped.
> >>
> >> This is good hygenine and fixes a theoretical bug. In practice
> >> PID_MAX_LIMIT is at most 2^22 so there is not a chance the number of
> >> processes would ever wrap even on an architecture with a 32bit long.
> >>
> >> Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
> >> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> >> ---
> >> kernel/cred.c | 2 --
> >> kernel/fork.c | 2 ++
> >> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> >> index 229cff081167..96d5fd6ff26f 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> >> @@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
> >> kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
> >> p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
> >> read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
> >> - inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -395,7 +394,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
> >> #endif
> >>
> >> p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
> >> - inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
> >> alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
> >> validate_creds(new);
> >> return 0;
> >> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> >> index 6f62d37f3650..69333078259c 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> >> @@ -2026,6 +2026,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
> >> goto bad_fork_free;
> >>
> >> retval = -EAGAIN;
> >> + if (inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1) == LONG_MAX)
> >> + goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
> >> if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
> >> if ((task_ucounts(p) != &init_ucounts) &&
> >> !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >
> > It might make sense to do something like:
> >
> > if (inc_rlimit_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) == LONG_MAX) {
> > if ((task_ucounts(p) != &init_ucounts) &&
> > !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >
> > and the new function:
> >
> > long inc_rlimit_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v, unsigned long rlimit)
> > {
> > struct ucounts *iter;
> > long ret = 0;
> > long max = rlimit;
> > if (rlimit > LONG_MAX)
> > max = LONG_MAX;
> > for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
> > long new = atomic_long_add_return(v, &iter->ucount[type]);
> > if (new < 0 || new > max)
> > ret = LONG_MAX;
> > else if (iter == ucounts)
> > ret = new;
> > max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]);
> > }
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > This will avoid double checking the same userns tree.
> >
> > Or even modify inc_rlimit_ucounts. This function is used elsewhere like
> > this:
> >
> >
> > msgqueue = inc_rlimit_ucounts(info->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE, mq_bytes);
> > if (msgqueue == LONG_MAX || msgqueue > rlimit(RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE)) {
> >
> >
> > memlock = inc_rlimit_ucounts(ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
> > if (!allowed && (memlock == LONG_MAX || memlock > lock_limit) && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
> >
> >
> > In all cases, we have max value for comparison.
>
> Good point. The downside is that it means we can't use the same code
> in exec. The upside is that the code is more idiomatic.
My suggestion was before I saw the 8/8 patch :)
We can make something like:
static inline bool is_nproc_overlimit(struct task_struct *task)
{
return (task_ucounts(task) != &init_ucounts) &&
!has_capability(task, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
!has_capability(task, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
In copy_process:
if (inc_rlimit_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) == LONG_MAX) {
if (is_nproc_overlimit(p))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
}
In do_execveat_common:
if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_CHECK) &&
is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
is_nproc_overlimit(current)) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
goto out_ret;
}
--
Rgrds, legion
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-11 18:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-07 12:17 [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] set_user: Perform RLIMIT_NPROC capability check against new user credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:14 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-10 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 20:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:14 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-15 11:55 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] set*uid: Check RLIMIT_PROC against new credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] cred: Count tasks by their real uid into RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] ucounts: Allow root to override RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 0:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] selftests: Challenge RLIMIT_NPROC in user namespaces Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:22 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15 9:45 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:18 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] selftests: Test RLIMIT_NPROC in clone-created " Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:25 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15 9:34 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-08 13:54 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 1/8] ucounts: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 18:37 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 2/8] ucounts: Fix set_cred_ucounts Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:10 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 3/8] ucounts: Fix and simplify RLIMIT_NPROC handling during setuid()+execve Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 23:17 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:25 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 4/8] ucounts: Only except the root user in init_user_ns from RLIMIT_NPROC Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:54 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 5/8] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:36 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 15:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:25 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-14 17:16 ` David Laight
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 6/8] ucounts: Handle inc_rlimit_ucounts wrapping in fork Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 11:34 ` Alexey Gladkov
2022-02-11 17:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:32 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 18:40 ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
2022-02-11 19:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 7/8] rlimit: For RLIMIT_NPROC test the child not the parent for capabilites Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 8/8] ucounts: Use the same code to enforce RLIMIT_NPROC in fork and exec Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:22 ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 19:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:37 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:56 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] rlimit: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement failure caused by capability calls in set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:42 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] ucounts: Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC not RLIMIT_NPROC+1 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ucounts: Base set_cred_ucounts changes on the real user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:28 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-18 15:34 ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes for v5.17 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-20 19:05 ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-03-03 0:12 ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: Regression fix " Eric W. Biederman
2022-03-03 0:30 ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-02-12 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Etienne Dechamps
2022-02-15 10:11 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-23 0:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 18:00 ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-23 21:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2022-02-23 19:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24 1:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 1:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24 2:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 15:41 ` [PATCH] ucounts: Fix systemd LimigtNPROC with private users regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 16:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-24 18:53 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-25 0:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 3:00 ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? David Laight
2022-02-24 1:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
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