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From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Etienne Dechamps" <etienne@edechamps.fr>,
	"Alexey Gladkov" <legion@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Solar Designer" <solar@openwall.com>,
	"Ran Xiaokai" <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>,
	"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Linux Containers" <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	"Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>,
	"Security Officers" <security@kernel.org>,
	"Neil Brown" <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>, NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Willy Tarreau" <w@1wt.eu>,
	"Linus Torvalds" <linus@torvalds.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ucounts: Fix systemd LimigtNPROC with private users regression
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 18:29:24 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y21zhjq3.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202202240826.E31BADF@keescook> (Kees Cook's message of "Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:28:41 -0800")

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:

> typo: Subject's LimigtNPROC -> LimitNPROC
>
> On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 09:41:44AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> 
>> Long story short recursively enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC when it is not
>> enforced on the process that creates a new user namespace, causes
>> currently working code to fail.  There is no reason to enforce
>> RLIMIT_NPROC recursively when we don't enforce it normally so update
>> the code to detect this case.
>> 
>> I would like to simply use capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) to detect when
>> RLIMIT_NPROC is not enforced upon the caller.  Unfortunately because
>> RLIMIT_NPROC is charged and checked for enforcement based upon the
>> real uid, using capable() wich is euid based is inconsistent with reality.
>
> typo: wich -> which

Ahh... Typos.

>> Come as close as possible to testing for capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) by
>> testing for when the real uid would match the conditions when
>> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE would be present if the real uid was the effective
>> uid.
>> 
>> Reported-by: Etienne Dechamps <etienne@edechamps.fr>
>> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215596
>> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e9589141-cfeb-90cd-2d0e-83a62787239a@edechamps.fr
>> Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>> ---
>> 
>> The previous conversation has given me enough clarity that I can see
>> which tests I am comfortable with use for this pending regression fix.
>> 
>> I have tested this and it works for me.  Does anyone have any concerns
>> with this change?
>
> I'd really love some kind of selftest that exercises the edge cases; do
> you have your tests in some form that could be converted?
>
> But otherwise, yes, this looks like the best option here.

Let's start with Michal Koutný tests.  I keep forgetting to look at
them.  This cold has really been kicking my butt.

For this issue the test case was a systemd unit file.  Which is simple
and demonstrates the real-world regression but not really minimal in the
way a kernel selftest should be.

> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
>> 
>>  kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> index 6b2e3ca7ee99..5481ba44a8d6 100644
>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>> @@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
>>  	cred->user_ns = user_ns;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static unsigned long enforced_nproc_rlimit(void)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
>> +
>> +	/* Is RLIMIT_NPROC currently enforced? */
>> +	if (!uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ||
>> +	    (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns))
>> +		limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC);
>> +
>> +	return limit;
>> +}
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the
>>   * passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the
>> @@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>>  	for (i = 0; i < MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS; i++) {
>>  		ns->ucount_max[i] = INT_MAX;
>>  	}
>> -	set_rlimit_ucount_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC));
>> +	set_rlimit_ucount_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, enforced_nproc_rlimit());
>>  	set_rlimit_ucount_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE, rlimit(RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE));
>>  	set_rlimit_ucount_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING, rlimit(RLIMIT_SIGPENDING));
>>  	set_rlimit_ucount_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK));
>> -- 
>> 2.29.2
>> 

Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-25  0:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-07 12:17 [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] set_user: Perform RLIMIT_NPROC capability check against new user credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-10  1:14   ` Solar Designer
2022-02-10  1:57     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 20:32     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:14       ` Solar Designer
2022-02-15 11:55     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] set*uid: Check RLIMIT_PROC against new credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] cred: Count tasks by their real uid into RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] ucounts: Allow root to override RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-10  0:21   ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] selftests: Challenge RLIMIT_NPROC in user namespaces Michal Koutný
2022-02-10  1:22   ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15  9:45     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:18 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] selftests: Test RLIMIT_NPROC in clone-created " Michal Koutný
2022-02-10  1:25   ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15  9:34     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-08 13:54 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 1/8] ucounts: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 18:37     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:22       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 2/8] ucounts: Fix set_cred_ucounts Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:10     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 3/8] ucounts: Fix and simplify RLIMIT_NPROC handling during setuid()+execve Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 23:17     ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:10       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 17:43         ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:35           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 4/8] ucounts: Only except the root user in init_user_ns from RLIMIT_NPROC Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:54     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:41       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 5/8] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:36     ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:23       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 15:23         ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:25         ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-14 17:16       ` David Laight
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 6/8] ucounts: Handle inc_rlimit_ucounts wrapping in fork Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 11:34     ` Alexey Gladkov
2022-02-11 17:50       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:32         ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 18:40         ` Alexey Gladkov
2022-02-11 19:56           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 7/8] rlimit: For RLIMIT_NPROC test the child not the parent for capabilites Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11  2:13   ` [PATCH 8/8] ucounts: Use the same code to enforce RLIMIT_NPROC in fork and exec Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:22   ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 19:23     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:37     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:56   ` [PATCH v2 0/5] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58     ` [PATCH v2 1/5] rlimit: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement failure caused by capability calls in set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:42       ` Solar Designer
2022-02-16 15:58     ` [PATCH v2 2/5] ucounts: Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC not RLIMIT_NPROC+1 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58     ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ucounts: Base set_cred_ucounts changes on the real user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58     ` [PATCH v2 4/5] ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58     ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:28       ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-18 15:34     ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes for v5.17 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-20 19:05       ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-03-03  0:12       ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: Regression fix " Eric W. Biederman
2022-03-03  0:30         ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-02-12 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Etienne Dechamps
2022-02-15 10:11   ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-23  0:57     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 18:00       ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 19:44         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-23 21:28           ` Willy Tarreau
2022-02-23 19:50         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24  1:24           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24  1:41             ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24  2:12               ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 15:41                 ` [PATCH] ucounts: Fix systemd LimigtNPROC with private users regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 16:28                   ` Kees Cook
2022-02-24 18:53                     ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-25  0:29                     ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-02-24  3:00               ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? David Laight
2022-02-24  1:32           ` Eric W. Biederman

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