From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
<platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
<brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com>, <tony.luck@intel.com>,
<marcorr@google.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 21/46] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 15:33:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220307213356.2797205-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220307213356.2797205-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared
to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as
documented in the GHCB spec.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 22 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 13 +++
5 files changed, 209 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index f077a6c95e67..1aa72b5c2490 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -105,6 +105,28 @@ enum psc_op {
#define GHCB_HV_FT_SNP BIT_ULL(0)
+/* SNP Page State Change NAE event */
+#define VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY 253
+
+struct psc_hdr {
+ u16 cur_entry;
+ u16 end_entry;
+ u32 reserved;
+} __packed;
+
+struct psc_entry {
+ u64 cur_page : 12,
+ gfn : 40,
+ operation : 4,
+ pagesize : 1,
+ reserved : 7;
+} __packed;
+
+struct snp_psc_desc {
+ struct psc_hdr hdr;
+ struct psc_entry entries[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
+} __packed;
+
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ 0x100
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS 12
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK 0xf
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index f65d257e3d4a..feeb93e6ec97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned int npages);
void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op);
+void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
+void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -142,6 +144,8 @@ early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned
static inline void __init
early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { }
static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) { }
+static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { }
+static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { }
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index b0ad00f4c1e1..0dcdb6e0c913 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC 0x80000010
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
@@ -219,6 +220,7 @@
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE, "vmgexit_nmi_complete" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP, "vmgexit_ap_hlt_loop" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE, "vmgexit_ap_jump_table" }, \
+ { SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, "vmgexit_page_state_change" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES, "vmgexit_hypervisor_feature" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_ERR, "invalid_guest_state" }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 1e8dc71e7ba6..4315be1602d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -655,6 +655,174 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op
WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
}
+static int vmgexit_psc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
+{
+ int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0;
+ struct snp_psc_desc *data;
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ /*
+ * __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is using
+ * a per-CPU GHCB.
+ */
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ if (!ghcb) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the input desc into GHCB shared buffer */
+ data = (struct snp_psc_desc *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+ memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, desc, min_t(int, GHCB_SHARED_BUF_SIZE, sizeof(*desc)));
+
+ /*
+ * As per the GHCB specification, the hypervisor can resume the guest
+ * before processing all the entries. Check whether all the entries
+ * are processed. If not, then keep retrying. Note, the hypervisor
+ * will update the data memory directly to indicate the status, so
+ * reference the data->hdr everywhere.
+ *
+ * The strategy here is to wait for the hypervisor to change the page
+ * state in the RMP table before guest accesses the memory pages. If the
+ * page state change was not successful, then later memory access will
+ * result in a crash.
+ */
+ cur_entry = data->hdr.cur_entry;
+ end_entry = data->hdr.end_entry;
+
+ while (data->hdr.cur_entry <= data->hdr.end_entry) {
+ ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, (u64)__pa(data));
+
+ /* This will advance the shared buffer data points to. */
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, true, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, 0, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Page State Change VMGEXIT can pass error code through
+ * exit_info_2.
+ */
+ if (WARN(ret || ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2,
+ "SNP: PSC failed ret=%d exit_info_2=%llx\n",
+ ret, ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that reserved bit is not set */
+ if (WARN(data->hdr.reserved, "Reserved bit is set in the PSC header\n")) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that entry processing is not going backwards.
+ * This will happen only if hypervisor is tricking us.
+ */
+ if (WARN(data->hdr.end_entry > end_entry || cur_entry > data->hdr.cur_entry,
+"SNP: PSC processing going backward, end_entry %d (got %d) cur_entry %d (got %d)\n",
+ end_entry, data->hdr.end_entry, cur_entry, data->hdr.cur_entry)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+out_unlock:
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __set_pages_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long vaddr,
+ unsigned long vaddr_end, int op)
+{
+ struct psc_hdr *hdr;
+ struct psc_entry *e;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ int i;
+
+ hdr = &data->hdr;
+ e = data->entries;
+
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+ i = 0;
+
+ while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)vaddr))
+ pfn = vmalloc_to_pfn((void *)vaddr);
+ else
+ pfn = __pa(vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ e->gfn = pfn;
+ e->operation = op;
+ hdr->end_entry = i;
+
+ /*
+ * Current SNP implementation doesn't keep track of the RMP page
+ * size so use 4K for simplicity.
+ */
+ e->pagesize = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
+
+ vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+ e++;
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ if (vmgexit_psc(data))
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
+}
+
+static void set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+ struct snp_psc_desc *desc;
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!desc)
+ panic("SNP: failed to allocate memory for PSC descriptor\n");
+
+ vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
+ /* Calculate the last vaddr that fits in one struct snp_psc_desc. */
+ next_vaddr = min_t(unsigned long, vaddr_end,
+ (VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY * PAGE_SIZE) + vaddr);
+
+ __set_pages_state(desc, vaddr, next_vaddr, op);
+
+ vaddr = next_vaddr;
+ }
+
+ kfree(desc);
+}
+
+void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
+{
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+ return;
+
+ pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, false);
+
+ set_pages_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+}
+
+void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
+{
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+ return;
+
+ set_pages_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+
+ pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, true);
+}
+
int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
{
u16 startup_cs, startup_ip;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 8539dd6f24ff..d3c88d9ef8d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -316,11 +316,24 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
{
+ /*
+ * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
+ * to invalidate the memory before encryption attribute is cleared.
+ */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
+ snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
}
/* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
{
+ /*
+ * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
+ * so that it is consistent with the page table updates.
+ */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && enc)
+ snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
+
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages, enc);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-07 21:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-07 21:33 [PATCH v12 00/46] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 01/46] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and VMPL " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 02/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:27 ` [PATCH v12 2.1/46] " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 03/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 04/46] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 05/46] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 06/46] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 07/46] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier during boot tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 08/46] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 09/46] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 10/46] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Define the Linux-specific " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 11/46] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 12/46] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 13/46] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 14/46] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Check the VMPL level tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 15/46] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 16/46] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 17/46] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 18/46] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/kernel: Mark the .bss..decrypted section as shared in the " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-06-14 0:46 ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in " Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 15:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 16:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-14 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 19:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-14 19:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-16 16:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-16 16:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-01 16:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-07 20:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 20/46] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 0:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-05 16:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 23/46] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 24/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 25/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 26/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 27/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 28/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2022-04-06 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-07 14:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-07 14:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-07-17 5:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 30/46] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 31/46] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-03-10 14:51 ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-10 21:25 ` Michael Roth
2022-03-11 17:06 ` Joerg Roedel
2022-03-14 17:34 ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-17 13:11 ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-17 20:20 ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 33/46] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 34/46] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 35/46] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 36/46] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 37/46] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 38/46] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 39/46] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table Brijesh Singh
2022-03-25 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add a sev= cmdline option tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 41/46] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 42/46] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 43/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-04-18 16:42 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-04-18 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-18 17:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-04-18 21:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-08-24 18:01 ` [PATCH v12 43/46] " Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-08-24 19:28 ` Peter Gonda
2022-08-25 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-08-25 20:09 ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 44/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 45/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-03-14 15:37 ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:53 ` [PATCH v12 43.1/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
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