From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 07:51:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMkAt6pO0xZb2pye-VEKdFQ_dYFgLA21fkYmnYPTWo8mzPrKDQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220307213356.2797205-33-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
()
On Mon, Mar 7, 2022 at 2:35 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> wrote:
>
> From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>
> CPUID instructions generate a #VC exception for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests,
> for which early handlers are currently set up to handle. In the case
> of SEV-SNP, guests can use a configurable location in guest memory
> that has been pre-populated with a firmware-validated CPUID table to
> look up the relevant CPUID values rather than requesting them from
> hypervisor via a VMGEXIT. Add the various hooks in the #VC handlers to
> allow CPUID instructions to be handled via the table. The code to
> actually configure/enable the table will be added in a subsequent
> commit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 326 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> index e9b6815b3b3d..0759af9b1acf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
> #define GHCB_TERM_PSC 1 /* Page State Change failure */
> #define GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE 2 /* Pvalidate failure */
> #define GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0 3 /* SNP guest is not running at VMPL-0 */
> +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID 4 /* CPUID-validation failure */
> +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV 5 /* CPUID failure during hypervisor fallback */
>
> #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v) ((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> index b4d5558c9d0a..0f1375164ff0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,36 @@ struct cpuid_leaf {
> u32 edx;
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Individual entries of the SNP CPUID table, as defined by the SNP
> + * Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9, Section 7.1, Table 14.
> + */
> +struct snp_cpuid_fn {
> + u32 eax_in;
> + u32 ecx_in;
> + u64 xcr0_in;
> + u64 xss_in;
> + u32 eax;
> + u32 ebx;
> + u32 ecx;
> + u32 edx;
> + u64 __reserved;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +/*
> + * SNP CPUID table, as defined by the SNP Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9,
> + * Section 8.14.2.6. Also noted there is the SNP firmware-enforced limit
> + * of 64 entries per CPUID table.
> + */
> +#define SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX 64
> +
> +struct snp_cpuid_table {
> + u32 count;
> + u32 __reserved1;
> + u64 __reserved2;
> + struct snp_cpuid_fn fn[SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX];
> +} __packed;
> +
> /*
> * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot
> * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed
> @@ -33,6 +63,19 @@ struct cpuid_leaf {
> */
> static u16 ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
>
> +/* Copy of the SNP firmware's CPUID page. */
> +static struct snp_cpuid_table cpuid_table_copy __ro_after_init;
> +
> +/*
> + * These will be initialized based on CPUID table so that non-present
> + * all-zero leaves (for sparse tables) can be differentiated from
> + * invalid/out-of-range leaves. This is needed since all-zero leaves
> + * still need to be post-processed.
> + */
> +static u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init;
> +static u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init;
> +static u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init;
> +
> static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
> {
> if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
> @@ -242,6 +285,252 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * This may be called early while still running on the initial identity
> + * mapping. Use RIP-relative addressing to obtain the correct address
> + * while running with the initial identity mapping as well as the
> + * switch-over to kernel virtual addresses later.
> + */
> +static const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void)
> +{
> + void *ptr;
> +
> + asm ("lea cpuid_table_copy(%%rip), %0"
> + : "=r" (ptr)
> + : "p" (&cpuid_table_copy));
> +
> + return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * The SNP Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9, Section 7.1, details the use of
> + * XCR0_IN and XSS_IN to encode multiple versions of 0xD subfunctions 0
> + * and 1 based on the corresponding features enabled by a particular
> + * combination of XCR0 and XSS registers so that a guest can look up the
> + * version corresponding to the features currently enabled in its XCR0/XSS
> + * registers. The only values that differ between these versions/table
> + * entries is the enabled XSAVE area size advertised via EBX.
> + *
> + * While hypervisors may choose to make use of this support, it is more
> + * robust/secure for a guest to simply find the entry corresponding to the
> + * base/legacy XSAVE area size (XCR0=1 or XCR0=3), and then calculate the
> + * XSAVE area size using subfunctions 2 through 64, as documented in APM
> + * Volume 3, Rev 3.31, Appendix E.3.8, which is what is done here.
> + *
> + * Since base/legacy XSAVE area size is documented as 0x240, use that value
> + * directly rather than relying on the base size in the CPUID table.
> + *
> + * Return: XSAVE area size on success, 0 otherwise.
> + */
> +static u32 snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)
> +{
> + const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
> + u64 xfeatures_found = 0;
> + u32 xsave_size = 0x240;
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
> + const struct snp_cpuid_fn *e = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
> +
> + if (!(e->eax_in == 0xD && e->ecx_in > 1 && e->ecx_in < 64))
> + continue;
> + if (!(xfeatures_en & (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in))))
> + continue;
> + if (xfeatures_found & (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in)))
> + continue;
> +
> + xfeatures_found |= (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in));
> +
> + if (compacted)
> + xsave_size += e->eax;
> + else
> + xsave_size = max(xsave_size, e->eax + e->ebx);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Either the guest set unsupported XCR0/XSS bits, or the corresponding
> + * entries in the CPUID table were not present. This is not a valid
> + * state to be in.
> + */
> + if (xfeatures_found != (xfeatures_en & GENMASK_ULL(63, 2)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return xsave_size;
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
> +{
> + const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
> + const struct snp_cpuid_fn *e = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
> +
> + if (e->eax_in != leaf->fn)
> + continue;
> +
> + if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(leaf->fn) && e->ecx_in != leaf->subfn)
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * For 0xD subfunctions 0 and 1, only use the entry corresponding
> + * to the base/legacy XSAVE area size (XCR0=1 or XCR0=3, XSS=0).
> + * See the comments above snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size() for more
> + * details.
> + */
> + if (e->eax_in == 0xD && (e->ecx_in == 0 || e->ecx_in == 1))
> + if (!(e->xcr0_in == 1 || e->xcr0_in == 3) || e->xss_in)
> + continue;
> +
> + leaf->eax = e->eax;
> + leaf->ebx = e->ebx;
> + leaf->ecx = e->ecx;
> + leaf->edx = e->edx;
> +
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_cpuid_hv(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
> +{
> + if (sev_cpuid_hv(leaf))
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV);
> +}
> +
> +static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
> +{
> + struct cpuid_leaf leaf_hv = *leaf;
> +
> + switch (leaf->fn) {
> + case 0x1:
> + snp_cpuid_hv(&leaf_hv);
> +
> + /* initial APIC ID */
> + leaf->ebx = (leaf_hv.ebx & GENMASK(31, 24)) | (leaf->ebx & GENMASK(23, 0));
> + /* APIC enabled bit */
> + leaf->edx = (leaf_hv.edx & BIT(9)) | (leaf->edx & ~BIT(9));
> +
> + /* OSXSAVE enabled bit */
> + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
> + leaf->ecx |= BIT(27);
> + break;
> + case 0x7:
> + /* OSPKE enabled bit */
> + leaf->ecx &= ~BIT(4);
> + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_PKE)
> + leaf->ecx |= BIT(4);
> + break;
> + case 0xB:
> + leaf_hv.subfn = 0;
> + snp_cpuid_hv(&leaf_hv);
> +
> + /* extended APIC ID */
> + leaf->edx = leaf_hv.edx;
> + break;
> + case 0xD: {
> + bool compacted = false;
> + u64 xcr0 = 1, xss = 0;
> + u32 xsave_size;
> +
> + if (leaf->subfn != 0 && leaf->subfn != 1)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
> + xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
> + if (leaf->subfn == 1) {
> + /* Get XSS value if XSAVES is enabled. */
> + if (leaf->eax & BIT(3)) {
> + unsigned long lo, hi;
> +
> + asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)
> + : "c" (MSR_IA32_XSS));
> + xss = (hi << 32) | lo;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * The PPR and APM aren't clear on what size should be
> + * encoded in 0xD:0x1:EBX when compaction is not enabled
> + * by either XSAVEC (feature bit 1) or XSAVES (feature
> + * bit 3) since SNP-capable hardware has these feature
> + * bits fixed as 1. KVM sets it to 0 in this case, but
> + * to avoid this becoming an issue it's safer to simply
> + * treat this as unsupported for SNP guests.
> + */
> + if (!(leaf->eax & (BIT(1) | BIT(3))))
> + return -EINVAL;
I couldn't get this patch set to boot and I found that I was setting
these XSAVE cpuid bits wrong. This took me a while to debug because
inside of handle_vc_boot_ghcb() this -EINVAL means we jump into the
halt loop, in addition the early_printk()s inside of that function
don't seem to be working for me but should the halt in
handle_vc_boot_ghcb() be replaced with an sev_es_terminate() or
something?
I am still working on why the early_printk()s in that function are not
working, it seems that they lead to a different halt. Have you tested
any of those error paths manually? For example if you set your CPUID
bits to explicitly fail here do you see the expected printks?
> +
> + compacted = true;
> + }
> +
> + xsave_size = snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(xcr0 | xss, compacted);
> + if (!xsave_size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + leaf->ebx = xsave_size;
> + }
> + break;
> + case 0x8000001E:
> + snp_cpuid_hv(&leaf_hv);
> +
> + /* extended APIC ID */
> + leaf->eax = leaf_hv.eax;
> + /* compute ID */
> + leaf->ebx = (leaf->ebx & GENMASK(31, 8)) | (leaf_hv.ebx & GENMASK(7, 0));
> + /* node ID */
> + leaf->ecx = (leaf->ecx & GENMASK(31, 8)) | (leaf_hv.ecx & GENMASK(7, 0));
> + break;
> + default:
> + /* No fix-ups needed, use values as-is. */
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other non-zero return value
> + * should be treated as fatal by caller.
> + */
> +static int snp_cpuid(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
> +{
> + const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
> +
> + if (!cpuid_table->count)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + if (!snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(leaf)) {
> + /*
> + * Some hypervisors will avoid keeping track of CPUID entries
> + * where all values are zero, since they can be handled the
> + * same as out-of-range values (all-zero). This is useful here
> + * as well as it allows virtually all guest configurations to
> + * work using a single SNP CPUID table.
> + *
> + * To allow for this, there is a need to distinguish between
> + * out-of-range entries and in-range zero entries, since the
> + * CPUID table entries are only a template that may need to be
> + * augmented with additional values for things like
> + * CPU-specific information during post-processing. So if it's
> + * not in the table, set the values to zero. Then, if they are
> + * within a valid CPUID range, proceed with post-processing
> + * using zeros as the initial values. Otherwise, skip
> + * post-processing and just return zeros immediately.
> + */
> + leaf->eax = leaf->ebx = leaf->ecx = leaf->edx = 0;
> +
> + /* Skip post-processing for out-of-range zero leafs. */
> + if (!(leaf->fn <= cpuid_std_range_max ||
> + (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_hyp_range_max) ||
> + (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_ext_range_max)))
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + return snp_cpuid_postprocess(leaf);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
> * page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
> @@ -252,6 +541,7 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
> unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32);
> unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32);
> struct cpuid_leaf leaf;
> + int ret;
>
> /* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */
> if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID)
> @@ -259,9 +549,18 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
>
> leaf.fn = fn;
> leaf.subfn = subfn;
> +
> + ret = snp_cpuid(&leaf);
> + if (!ret)
> + goto cpuid_done;
> +
> + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + goto fail;
> +
> if (sev_cpuid_hv(&leaf))
> goto fail;
>
> +cpuid_done:
> regs->ax = leaf.eax;
> regs->bx = leaf.ebx;
> regs->cx = leaf.ecx;
> @@ -556,12 +855,37 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static int vc_handle_cpuid_snp(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + struct cpuid_leaf leaf;
> + int ret;
> +
> + leaf.fn = regs->ax;
> + leaf.subfn = regs->cx;
> + ret = snp_cpuid(&leaf);
> + if (!ret) {
> + regs->ax = leaf.eax;
> + regs->bx = leaf.ebx;
> + regs->cx = leaf.ecx;
> + regs->dx = leaf.edx;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> {
> struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
> u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
> enum es_result ret;
> + int snp_cpuid_ret;
> +
> + snp_cpuid_ret = vc_handle_cpuid_snp(regs);
> + if (!snp_cpuid_ret)
> + return ES_OK;
> + if (snp_cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return ES_VMM_ERROR;
>
> ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);
> ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-07 21:33 [PATCH v12 00/46] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 01/46] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and VMPL " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 02/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:27 ` [PATCH v12 2.1/46] " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 03/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 04/46] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 05/46] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 06/46] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 07/46] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier during boot tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 08/46] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 09/46] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 10/46] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Define the Linux-specific " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 11/46] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 12/46] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 13/46] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 14/46] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Check the VMPL level tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 15/46] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 16/46] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 17/46] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 18/46] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/kernel: Mark the .bss..decrypted section as shared in the " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-06-14 0:46 ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in " Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 15:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 16:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-14 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 19:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-14 19:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-16 16:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-16 16:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-01 16:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-07 20:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 20/46] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 21/46] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 0:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-05 16:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 9:09 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 23/46] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 24/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 25/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 26/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 27/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 28/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2022-04-06 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-07 14:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-07 14:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-07-17 5:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 30/46] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 31/46] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-03-10 14:51 ` Peter Gonda [this message]
2022-03-10 21:25 ` Michael Roth
2022-03-11 17:06 ` Joerg Roedel
2022-03-14 17:34 ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-17 13:11 ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-17 20:20 ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 33/46] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 34/46] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 35/46] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 36/46] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 37/46] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 38/46] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 39/46] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table Brijesh Singh
2022-03-25 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add a sev= cmdline option tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 41/46] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 42/46] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 43/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-04-18 16:42 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-04-18 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-18 17:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-04-18 21:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-08-24 18:01 ` [PATCH v12 43/46] " Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-08-24 19:28 ` Peter Gonda
2022-08-25 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-08-25 20:09 ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 44/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 45/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-03-14 15:37 ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08 9:08 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:53 ` [PATCH v12 43.1/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
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