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From: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+83e7f982ca045ab4405c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	andrii@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] [trace?] possible deadlock in force_sig_info_to_task
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 18:39:28 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240429103928.4166-1-hdanton@sina.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wh9D6f7HUkDgZHKmDCHUQmp+Co89GP+b8+z+G56BKeyNg@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, 28 Apr 2024 18:33:41 -0700 Linus Torvalds wrote:
> I cannot find it in myself to care, since I do not believe that
> anybody should be running with vsyscall=emulate in 2024 in the first
> place, much less if you are doing things like UML. But let's see if
> somebody screams.
> 
> Also, somebody should obviously test my COMPLETELY UNTESTED patch.

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git  5eb4573ea63d

 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 25 ++-----------------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h      |  1 -
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                   | 33 +--------------------------------
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index a3c0df11d0e6..3b0f61b2ea6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
 
 static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
-	 * sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away.
-	 */
-
 	if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) {
 		struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
 
@@ -123,7 +118,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	unsigned long caller;
 	int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
-	int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
 	long ret;
 	unsigned long orig_dx;
 
@@ -234,12 +228,8 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		goto do_ret;  /* skip requested */
 
 	/*
-	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.  We want to
-	 * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
+	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.
 	 */
-	prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err;
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
-
 	ret = -EFAULT;
 	switch (vsyscall_nr) {
 	case 0:
@@ -262,23 +252,12 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
-
 check_fault:
 	if (ret == -EFAULT) {
 		/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
 				  "vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
-
-		/*
-		 * If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
-		 * generate one here.  (This should be impossible.)
-		 */
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
-				 !sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
-			goto sigsegv;
-
-		return true;  /* Don't emulate the ret. */
+		goto sigsegv;
 	}
 
 	regs->ax = ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 811548f131f4..78e51b0d6433 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -472,7 +472,6 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	unsigned long		iopl_emul;
 
 	unsigned int		iopl_warn:1;
-	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 
 	/*
 	 * Protection Keys Register for Userspace.  Loaded immediately on
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 622d12ec7f08..bba4e020dd64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -723,39 +723,8 @@ kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs));
 
 	/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
-	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) {
-		/*
-		 * Any interrupt that takes a fault gets the fixup. This makes
-		 * the below recursive fault logic only apply to a faults from
-		 * task context.
-		 */
-		if (in_interrupt())
-			return;
-
-		/*
-		 * Per the above we're !in_interrupt(), aka. task context.
-		 *
-		 * In this case we need to make sure we're not recursively
-		 * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
-		 */
-		if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
-			sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
-
-			set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
-
-			if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR) {
-				force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, pkey);
-			} else {
-				/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
-				force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address);
-			}
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Barring that, we can do the fixup and be happy.
-		 */
+	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address))
 		return;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * AMD erratum #91 manifests as a spurious page fault on a PREFETCH
--

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-29 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-25  9:05 [syzbot] [bpf?] [trace?] possible deadlock in force_sig_info_to_task syzbot
2024-04-25 17:54 ` Jiri Olsa
2024-04-27 20:00 ` syzbot
2024-04-27 23:13   ` Hillf Danton
2024-04-28 20:01     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-28 20:22       ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-28 23:23       ` Hillf Danton
2024-04-29  0:50         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29  1:00           ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-04-29  1:33           ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29  8:00             ` [PATCH] x86/mm: Remove broken vsyscall emulation code from the page fault code Ingo Molnar
2024-04-29 13:51               ` Jiri Olsa
2024-04-29 23:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-29 15:51               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29 18:47                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29 19:07                   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29 23:29                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-30  0:05                       ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-30  6:10                     ` Ingo Molnar
2024-05-01  7:43                       ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-30 14:53               ` kernel test robot
2024-04-29 10:39             ` Hillf Danton [this message]
2024-04-29 11:35               ` [syzbot] [bpf?] [trace?] possible deadlock in force_sig_info_to_task syzbot
2024-04-30  6:16             ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/mm: Remove broken vsyscall emulation code from the page fault code tip-bot2 for Linus Torvalds
2024-05-01  7:50             ` tip-bot2 for Linus Torvalds
2024-04-29 14:17           ` [syzbot] [bpf?] [trace?] possible deadlock in force_sig_info_to_task Tetsuo Handa

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