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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 01/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 14:45:25 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4b89b542e8ceba9bd6abde2f386afed6d99244a9.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>

The fault-handling code that takes mmap_sem needs to avoid a
deadlock that could occur if the kernel took a bad (OOPS-worthy)
page fault on a user address while holding mmap_sem.  This can only
happen if the faulting instruction was in the kernel
(i.e. user_mode(regs)).  Rather than checking the sw_error_code
(which will have the USER bit set if the fault was a USER-permission
access *or* if user_mode(regs)), just check user_mode(regs)
directly.

The old code would have malfunctioned if the kernel executed a bogus
WRUSS instruction while holding mmap_sem.  Fortunately, that is
extremely unlikely in current kernels, which don't use WRUSS.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 71d4b9d4d43f..91d4d2722f2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1344,13 +1344,10 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 * Only do the expensive exception table search when we might be at
 	 * risk of a deadlock.  This happens if we
 	 * 1. Failed to acquire mmap_sem, and
-	 * 2. The access did not originate in userspace.  Note: either the
-	 *    hardware or earlier page fault code may set X86_PF_USER
-	 *    in sw_error_code.
+	 * 2. The access did not originate in userspace.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
-		if (!(sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) &&
-		    !search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
+		if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
 			/*
 			 * Fault from code in kernel from
 			 * which we do not expect faults.
-- 
2.17.2


  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-19 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-19 22:45 [PATCH 00/13] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-20  8:14   ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [PATCH 01/13] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  7:39   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20  8:13     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpufeatures, x86/fault: Mark SMAP as disabled when configured out Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/fault: Fold smap_violation() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:16   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/fault: Improve the condition for signalling vs OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:16   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:17   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86/fault: Don't set thread.cr2, etc before OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:17   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-27 14:46   ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code Andy Lutomirski

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