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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 05/13] x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 14:45:29 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d1d1b2e66ef31f884dba172084486ea9423ddcdb.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>

Currently, if a user program somehow triggers an implicit supervisor
access to a user address (e.g. if the kernel somehow sets LDTR to a
user address), it will be incorrectly detected as a SMAP violation
if AC is clear and SMAP is enabled.  This is incorrect -- the error
has nothing to do with SMAP.  Fix the condition so that only
accesses with the hardware USER bit set are diagnosed as SMAP
violations.

With the logic fixed, an implicit supervisor access to a user address
will hit the code lower in the function that is intended to handle it
even if SMAP is enabled.  That logic is still a bit buggy, and later
patches will clean it up.

I *think* this code is still correct for WRUSS, and I've added a
comment to that effect.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index c50cd67521b6..95d94d48a10d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1235,12 +1235,15 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 		pgtable_bad(regs, hw_error_code, address);
 
 	/*
-	 * If SMAP is on, check for invalid kernel (supervisor)
-	 * access to user pages in the user address space.
+	 * If SMAP is on, check for invalid kernel (supervisor) access to user
+	 * pages in the user address space.  The odd case here is WRUSS,
+	 * which, according to the preliminary documentation, does not respect
+	 * SMAP and will have the USER bit set so, in all cases, SMAP
+	 * enforcement appears to be consistent with the USER bit.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) &&
 		     !(hw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) &&
-		     (user_mode(regs) || !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))))
+		     !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)))
 	{
 		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, hw_error_code, address);
 		return;
-- 
2.17.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-19 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-19 22:45 [PATCH 00/13] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:14   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [PATCH 01/13] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  7:39   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20  8:13     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpufeatures, x86/fault: Mark SMAP as disabled when configured out Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/fault: Fold smap_violation() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:15   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-20  8:16   ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/fault: Improve the condition for signalling vs OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:16   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:17   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86/fault: Don't set thread.cr2, etc before OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20  8:17   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-27 14:46   ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code Andy Lutomirski

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