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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 11:45:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9qMRO0YFwQRUZfuUjTy2=C0QYkNLZSK5YgVD0xpcP2qbQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YgN7TvD5rs/5i1dQ@owl.dominikbrodowski.net>

On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 9:31 AM Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Am Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 02:19:16AM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> > During crng_init == 0, we never credit entropy in add_interrupt_
> > randomness(), but instead dump it directly into the base_crng. That's
> > fine, except for the fact that we then wind up throwing away that
> > entropy later when we switch to extracting from the input pool and
> > overwriting the base_crng key. The two other early init sites --
> > add_hwgenerator_randomness()'s use crng_fast_load() and add_device_
> > randomness()'s use of crng_slow_load() -- always additionally give their
> > inputs to the input pool. But not add_interrupt_randomness().
>
> Hm, up to this patch there is no base_crng key. So maybe change the ordering
> of the patches?

I'll fix the commit message, actually. Eric wrote in his review of v1
that he thinks this problem needs to be fixed before we move to
overwriting keys in the subsequent patch and I agreed. Hence, this
patch comes first.

> > +
> > +                     /* Technically this call means that we're using a spinlock_t
> > +                      * in the IRQ handler, which isn't terrific for PREEMPT_RT.
> > +                      * However, this only happens during very early boot, and then
>
> Whether it's only during "very early" boot depends on how fast we progress
> to crng_init = 2. So maybe just "during boot"?

Will do.

Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-09 11:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-09  1:19 [PATCH v2 0/9] random: cleanups around per-cpu crng & rdrand Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  6:18   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] random: get rid of secondary crngs Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:26     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  2:38   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:27     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:23   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:37     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:28   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:40     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:29   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:45     ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-02-15 21:13       ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  2:47         ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:57           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 14:58             ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 19:08               ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-14 18:46   ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-16 23:21     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:37       ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:42         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-21  3:40   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:56   ` Eric Biggers

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