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From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 09:30:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YgN7mOTtQ03etVJX@owl.dominikbrodowski.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220209011919.493762-8-Jason@zx2c4.com>

Nice work, just a few minor queries:

> -static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
> +/*
> + * The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from
> + * <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>. It generates a ChaCha
> + * block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that
> + * key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the
> + * user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of
> + * random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than
> + * 32.
> + */
> +static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
> +				  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
> +				  u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
>  {
> -	unsigned long flags, init_time;
> +	u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];

Do we need a BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32) here?

>  
> -	if (crng_ready()) {
> -		init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time);
> -		if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
> -			crng_reseed();
> -	}
> -	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
> -	chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out);
> -	if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0)
> -		primary_crng.state[13]++;
> -	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
> +	chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
> +	memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
> +	memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);

No IV, no generation counter here? As you already have a generation counter
in use for other purposes, why not use it here as well as some non-zero
starting point?

Otherwise, it looks really nice.

Thanks,
	Dominik

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-09  8:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-09  1:19 [PATCH v2 0/9] random: cleanups around per-cpu crng & rdrand Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  6:18   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] random: get rid of secondary crngs Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:26     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  2:38   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:22   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:27     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:23   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:37     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:28   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:40     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:29   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 10:45     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-15 21:13       ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  2:47         ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:57           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 14:58             ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 19:08               ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski [this message]
2022-02-09 10:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-14 18:46   ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-16 23:21     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:37       ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:42         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09  8:30   ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-21  3:40   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21  3:56   ` Eric Biggers

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