netdev.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1
@ 2018-07-17  1:59 Gustavo A. R. Silva
  2018-07-18 20:31 ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-07-17  1:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Santosh Raspatur, David S. Miller
  Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva

t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'

Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
adapter->msix_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c
index 7b795ed..a19172d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cxgb3_ioctl.h"
@@ -2268,6 +2269,7 @@ static int cxgb_extension_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 
 		if (t.qset_idx >= nqsets)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		t.qset_idx = array_index_nospec(t.qset_idx, nqsets);
 
 		q = &adapter->params.sge.qset[q1 + t.qset_idx];
 		t.rspq_size = q->rspq_size;
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1
  2018-07-17  1:59 [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-07-18 20:31 ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2018-07-18 20:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: gustavo; +Cc: santosh, netdev, linux-kernel

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 20:59:58 -0500

> t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> 
> drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
> warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
> adapter->msix_info
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

Applied, thanks.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-07-18 20:31 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-07-17  1:59 [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-07-18 20:31 ` David Miller

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).