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From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
	Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Xiexiuqi (Xie XiuQi)" <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>,
	Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>,
	"Jason Yan" <yanaijie@huawei.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SELinux <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yangyingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>,
	Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 22:34:29 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5CB9DC75.7010600@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTdJ6uUOjyxrk=+iOkKe=VN+N9DMPtV=OchAY34x95g=w@mail.gmail.com>



On 2019/4/19 21:24, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 10:42 PM Yang Yingliang
> <yangyingliang@huawei.com> wrote:
>> On 2019/4/19 10:04, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:50 PM Yang Yingliang
>>> <yangyingliang@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>> On 2019/4/18 8:24, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> On 4/17/2019 4:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>>> Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr
>>>>>> hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is
>>>>>> a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to
>>>>>> make sure John and Casey are okay with that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Casey?
>>>>> I'm fine with the change going into proc_pid_attr_write().
>>>> The cred != real_cred checking is not enough.
>>>>
>>>> Consider this situation, when doing override, cred, real_cred and
>>>> new_cred are all same:
>>>>
>>>> after override_creds()    cred == real_cred == new1_cred
>>> I'm sorry, you've lost me.  After override_creds() returns
>>> current->cred and current->real_cred are not going to be the same,
>>> yes?
>> It's possible the new  cred is equal to current->real_cred and
>> current->cred,
>> so after overrides_creds(), they have the same value.
> Both task_struct.cred and task_struct.real_cred are pointer values,
> assuming that one uses prepare_creds() to allocate/initialize a new
> cred struct for use with override_creds() then the newly created cred
> should never be equal to task_struct.real_cred.  Am I missing
> something, or are you thinking of something else?
In do_acct_process(), file->f_cred may equal to current->real_cred, I 
confirm
it by adding some debug message in do_acct_process() like this:

--- a/kernel/acct.c
+++ b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct 
*acct)
         flim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
         current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
         /* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled 
accounting */
+       pr_info("task:%px new cred:%px real cred:%px cred:%px\n", 
current, file->f_cred, current->real_cred, current->cred);
         orig_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);



Messages:
[   56.643298] task:ffff88841a9595c0 new cred:ffff88841ae450c0 real 
cred:ffff88841ae450c0 cred:ffff88841ae450c0    //They are same.
[   56.646609] Process accounting resumed
[   56.649943] task:ffff88841a9595c0 new cred:ffff88841ae450c0 real 
cred:ffff88841c96c300 cred:ffff88841ae450c0
[   56.653565] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   56.655119] kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
[   56.656590] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   56.658033] CPU: 2 PID: 4169 Comm: syz-executor.15 Not tainted 
5.1.0-rc4-00034-g869e3305f23d-dirty #143
[   56.661077] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), 
BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   56.664895] RIP: 0010:commit_creds+0x1eb/0x230
[   56.666344] Code: 43 1c 0f 85 08 ff ff ff e9 10 ff ff ff 8b 45 10 39 
43 10 0f 85 18 ff ff ff 8b 43 20 39 45 20 0f 85 0c ff ff ff e9 14 ff ff 
ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 d0 d2 49 82 e8 17 3b 3e 00 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 c0 d2 49
[   56.672410] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a17b20 EFLAGS: 00010287
[   56.674098] RAX: ffff88841a9595c0 RBX: ffff88841ae450c0 RCX: 
0000000000000000
[   56.676410] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: 
ffff88841c96ce40
[   56.678691] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000800000 R09: 
0000000000000000
[   56.680997] R10: ffff88841c9265a0 R11: ffffffff810d6940 R12: 
ffff88841a9595c0
[   56.681198] task:ffff88841a9195c0 new cred:ffff88841aeaa0c0 real 
cred:ffff88841aeaa0c0 cred:ffff88841aeaa0c0
[   56.683293] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88841c96ce40 R15: 
0000000000000040
[   56.683296] FS:  00007f5969a5c700(0000) GS:ffff88842fa80000(0000) 
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   56.683297] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   56.683299] CR2: 00007f82742214f0 CR3: 000000041cbc0005 CR4: 
00000000000206e0
[   56.683305] Call Trace:
[   56.683340]  selinux_setprocattr+0x17b/0x480
[   56.686513] Process accounting resumed
[   56.688849]  proc_pid_attr_write+0xc0/0xf0
[   56.688857]  __kernel_write+0x4f/0xf0
[   56.688866]  do_acct_process+0x538/0x750
[   56.703090]  ? __schedule+0x290/0x960
[   56.704311]  ? __queue_work+0x160/0x5c0
[   56.705571]  acct_pin_kill+0x1e/0x70
[   56.706743]  pin_kill+0x81/0x150
[   56.707813]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[   56.708985]  mnt_pin_kill+0x1e/0x30
[   56.710127]  cleanup_mnt+0x6e/0x70
[   56.711247]  task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0
[   56.712453]  do_exit+0x2e0/0xc80
[   56.713525]  do_group_exit+0x33/0xb0
[   56.714701]  get_signal+0x143/0x810
[   56.715865]  do_signal+0x36/0x610
[   56.716962]  ? __x64_sys_futex+0x134/0x180
[   56.718307]  ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[   56.719606]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xe0
[   56.721003]  do_syscall_64+0x16c/0x180
[   56.722242]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9




  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-19 18:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <6e4428ca-3da1-a033-08f7-a51e57503989@huawei.com>
2019-04-12 15:28 ` kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434! Casey Schaufler
2019-04-15 13:43   ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-15 14:48     ` Paul Moore
2019-04-15 15:05       ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-15 16:20         ` Paul Moore
2019-04-16  3:40           ` Kees Cook
2019-04-16 14:46             ` chengjian (D)
2019-04-17 14:30               ` Paul Moore
2019-04-17 14:57                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-17 15:39                   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-17 15:40                   ` Paul Moore
2019-04-17 16:27                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-17 16:42                       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-18 13:39                         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-17 23:39                       ` Paul Moore
2019-04-18  0:17                         ` John Johansen
2019-04-18  0:24                         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-18  2:49                           ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-19  2:04                             ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19  2:34                               ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-19 13:24                                 ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19 14:34                                   ` Yang Yingliang [this message]
2019-04-19 16:13                                     ` Paul Moore
2019-04-20  7:38                                       ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-22 19:48                                         ` Paul Moore
2019-04-23  4:08                                           ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-23 20:18                                             ` Paul Moore

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